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I explore five features that bear upon literary value and what is involved in 
appreciating those features. In the introduction, I motivate the project, examine the notion 
of literary value itself, and sketch the major arguments of the dissertation. In chapter one, 
I argue that the sonic qualities of a work of fictional literature are always relevant to the 
literary value of the work. In chapter two, I develop a working account of rhythm in 
literature and argue that sufficiently appreciating rhythm when reading a work of 
literature requires performative interpretation. In chapter three, I argue that truth is 
sometimes relevant to the literary value of fiction. In chapter four, I argue that literature 
has the capacity to cultivate moral expertise in the intuitive judgment of particular moral 
cases and that such capacity contributes to literary value. Finally, in chapter five, I argue 
that fictional literature can provide a reader with the resources for an intimate emotional 
connection with the author and that a work’s ability to afford such an experience is a 
literary merit. The larger goal of the dissertation is to make a positive contribution to the 
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 By the very fact that the enterprise of literature exists as it does—with magazines, 
academic programs, and neighborhood book clubs devoted to its study, classes, 
workshops, and conferences devoted to its production, and publishers and public readings 
devoted to its dissemination, despite the occasional lament over a decline in reading and 
book sales—it is clear that we value it. And suggestions as to why this is abound, from 
author testimonials to critic reports to everyday reader reviews. It is said, among other 
things, that literature makes us more human, lifts our hearts, allows us to better 
empathize, and gives us new ways seeing the world. But while such pithy statements may 
resonate—with us, our intuitions, our own experiences in reading—pinning down just 
what they amount to, and thus where literature’s value lies, is a tricky business. 
 The concern of this project is to get in on this business, and to do so on four fronts 
as they pertain to literary fiction: aesthetic, factual, moral, and emotional.1 As Malcolm 
Budd (1995) notes, a work of art “can possess as many kinds of value as there are points 
of view from which it can be evaluated” (1). In this sense, my project is of limited scope 
in that it only considers four points of view. But the four points of view I take up are, it 
seems, crucial to literary fiction. On the one hand, the latter three have seen much time in 
the philosophical literature, and with good reason, as many intuitive notions of fiction’s 
value fit within their bounds. On the other hand, at least when it comes to sonic qualities, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The term “literary fiction” is sometimes taken to designate a particular kind or genre of fictional 
prose literature. In this sense, a literary novel is distinguished from, say, a horror novel or a 
romance novel. It lacks the entrenched conventions of these more narrow genres and generally 
takes more care with the construction of sentences and characters. But in this monograph, unless 
otherwise noted, “literary fiction” should simply be understood as shorthand for fictional prose 
literature. 
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the aesthetic value of literary fiction has been neglected. To be sure, literary critics and 
scholars almost seem to take the value of fiction’s sonic qualities as given. But in analytic 
aesthetics, when the sonic qualities of literature are addressed, they are often taken as a 
feature of poetry alone, or at least as primarily a feature of poetry. So something in 
defense of fiction too having this value seems in order. 
 The goal of this project is, along each considered point of view, to elucidate a 
feature of value that has yet to be noted or elucidated in full, and though in doing so I will 
inevitably express worries with others’ accounts, I take the lion’s share of my work to be 
positive. Within each considered point of view, there is room for various particular 
features of value. Put differently, there need not be any one, exclusive account of any 
kind of value. In fact, it seems we shouldn’t think there is. 
 A notion of value itself as it pertains to literary fiction seems straightforward 
enough. Any feature of a work of fiction that is a good-making feature of the work 
contributes to the work’s value; and any feature of a work of fiction that is a bad-making 
feature of the work detracts from the work’s value. But how we are to spell out what such 
good- and bad-making features amount to is not so straightforward. On the one hand, 
there is a question of whether such features inhere in or depend on our experience of 
works or somehow inhere in the works themselves, independent of our experiences of 
them. On the other hand, there is a question of what features count in our calculation of 
the work’s value as art, or what its literary value is (where literary value is a species of 
artistic value). 
 As for the first question, though I have some aesthetic realist intuitions, it seems 
somewhat mysterious how such features, be they aesthetic or artistic, could be located in 
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works themselves. In other words, it seems somewhat mysterious how aesthetic and 
artistic properties could be non-relational, how they could not in some way be dependent 
on the sorts of creatures we are. In short, it seems all literary value is, strictly speaking, 
extrinsic value, even if there may be compelling ways to accommodate, within an 
extrinsic framework, some of the intuitions driving the notion that value is intrinsic to 
works. For example, Jerrold Levinson (2006) argues that though a work of art is not 
intrinsically valuable, it can contribute to the intrinsic value of a life and a world in which 
there are lives that include the possibility of experiencing that work. We might also just 
shift the locus of intrinsic value, at least in part, to the experiences had from properly 
engaging literature.2 But it is important to note, as Levinson does, that even if the value 
of fiction is dependent on our experience of fiction, “it does not follow that an art work is 
valuable only in so far as experience of it (or engagement with it) is pleasant or 
straightforwardly enjoyable. Rather, an experience (or engagement) may be worth while, 
may be worth having, even while not predominantly pleasant, on either a first- or second-
order level” (1992, 296). At any rate, I plan to take no hard line on this issue, as it is not 
the business of this project to argue for any substantive theory of literary value. Whatever 
way things go, this ultimately seems orthogonal to the particular features I aim to show 
contribute to literary fiction’s value as literary fiction. 
 As for the second question, we might begin by distinguishing instrumental value 
(being valuable as a means to some other value) and final value (being valuable for its 
own sake). The trouble is that one might argue that all artistic value, and thus all literary 
value, is instrumental. Robert Stecker (2003) sketches one such possible argument: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See, for instance, Budd (1995, 4–8). 
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“Works of art are artefacts in the broad sense of being items made or performed by 
human beings. Artefacts always have human purposes or functions that they serve, and 
this is where their chief value is found. Hence the chief value of art is found in fulfilling 
its functions well” (309). Now, whether this argument is right is not the issue. Rather, 
that such an argument is at least prima facie plausible shows that the distinction on its 
own does not get us very far in determining what counts as literary value. 
 We might take a step further and follow Matthew Kieran (2001, 216–17), among 
others, in distinguishing two kinds of instrumental value: pure instrumental value (being 
valuable solely as a means to some other value) and inherent value (being valuable as a 
means that partly constitutes some other value). Unlike money, which is purely 
instrumental, the ends served by works of art are in some way constituted by those works. 
We cannot, for instance, specify the pleasures afforded by a work of art without some 
reference to the work itself. But even if all artistic value is inherent value, it is clear that 
not all inherent value of art is artistic value. One may value a literary work because a 
character in the work reminds one of a loved one, but such inherent value surely is not 
something that figures in the value of the work as a work of literature. Thus the 
distinction between kinds of instrumental value also does not, on its own, provide much 
help in determining what counts as literary value. 
 The distinctions among pure instrumental value, inherent value, and final value 
only do work in light of some substantive theory of artistic value. So although it is not the 
business of this project to argue for any theory of literary value, some discussion of such 
theories, however limited, is in order. 
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 Broadly speaking, theories of artistic value fall into two kinds: essentialist and 
non-essentialist (Stecker 2003, 310). Essentialist accounts have it that artistic value 
consists in one distinctive value (or bundle of values). So an essentialist theory of literary 
value as it pertains to fiction would have it that literary value consists in one distinctive 
value (or bundle of values). For instance, Lamarque and Olsen (1994) argue that literary 
value consists in aesthetic value, which, in fiction, manifests in structure and theme. Non-
essentialist accounts, then, have it that artistic value is pluralistic, that it consists in 
different things for different works—and likewise for a non-essentialist account of 
literary value. That is, what contributes to a work’s literary value will vary from work to 
work. For instance, say that works of fiction can, in principle, have cognitive value that 
contributes to literary value. It does not seem that all works will, in fact, have such value. 
So if works of fiction can have such value, then it seems literary value is non-essentialist. 
 Now, there may be a way to accommodate all the features I argue bear on literary 
value in some essentialist picture, but it seems this is a stretch. Thus, as far as substantive 
theoretical considerations go, it seems I am committed to a non-essentialist account of 
literary value. But I have no plans to argue for this account at any theoretical level and do 
not believe I need to. Rather, my arguments for various particular features being part of 
literary value will bear this burden. If my arguments for these particular features are 
convincing, and such features’ being part of literary value entail non-essentialism, then it 
seems we have evidence for just that. I think an argument for non-essentialism can, and 
maybe must, be run from the ground up. What kinds of features bear upon literary value 
is to be sorted on a case-by-case basis, in the lines of particular works, so to speak. One 
of the most powerful arguments for making a substantive distinction between aesthetic 
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and artistic value is that aesthetic theories of artistic value cannot account for all the 
reasons we value art as art (see Stecker 2012, 356). But, of course, the force of this 
argument turns on elucidating these nonaesthetic values. 
 That said, it would undoubtedly be nice if there were some principled way of 
picking out features that contribute to artistic—and thus literary—value and, as Stecker 
puts it, “carv[ing] off adventitious values” (2012, 359), values such as the one noted 
above regarding a character in a literary work reminding a reader of a loved one.3 But 
lacking such an account does not prevent us from getting on with the business of carving, 
one feature at a time. Even with a satisfactory account of literary value in hand, 
individual literary values still require elucidation. In the remainder of this introduction, I 
will outline what values I hope to elucidate and how I go about doing so. 
 
I. AESTHETIC VALUE 
In chapter one, I argue that the sonic qualities of fiction’s prose are always 
relevant to literary value and that this has consequences for how we ought to read fiction. 
In his book The Performance of Reading, Peter Kivy argues that when we silently read 
fiction, he claims, we give a silent performance to ourselves (2006, 126). While I think 
Kivy is wrong about this, I do think he’s on to something with the idea that when we read 
fiction, we often experience an inner voicing of the text and thus something performance-
like. However, I argue not that we do invariably experience an inner voicing but rather 
that we should. Kivy makes descriptive claims; in this chapter, I am out to make and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Stecker (2012) and Pratt (2012) are recent promising attempts at offering an account of this 
kind, a theory of artistic value. Assessing the success of these attempts, however, is beyond the 
scope of this project. 
7 
defend a normative one. Or, more accurately, a normative claim predicated on a 
descriptive one: since the sonic qualities of fiction are important to its value, we must 
hear its text read in order to fully appreciate it. But before making this argument, I first 
use Kivy’s account of silent reading to lay some conceptual groundwork and then sketch 
some reasons why we should not think reading “aloud” silently is a performance. 
 The brunt of this chapter comes in arguing against Kivy’s claim that “largely 
speaking, silently read prose fiction is a non-aesthetic art, or, at least, less aesthetic than 
it is usually taken to be” (Once-Told Tales 2011, 72). The main argument against this 
claim and in favor of the sound of fiction’s prose always being relevant to literary value 
goes roughly as follows. Joyce’s Ulysses is considered very good fiction, largely because 
of its mellifluous prose. Now, if a work is considered very good fiction in large part 
because of some feature F, then F is an evaluatively relevant feature of fiction. This 
seems uncontroversial. So sonic qualities are an evaluatively relevant feature of fiction. 
Ulysses demonstrates this. And Kivy, I think, would acknowledge that much. But what 
Kivy misses is that it is not just poetic or mellifluous prose of which we need to take 
stock. There’s also clunky prose and tinny prose and awkward prose and prose whose 
alliteration drags, all of which might require pauses, albeit pauses to cleanse the palate 
rather than “savor the ‘sound’” (Kivy 2011, 72), and all of which, unlike the sonicity of 
Ulysses, typically count against a work’s value. Sonicity is a good- or bad-making feature 
of fiction, and one that appears to contribute to a work’s value or lack thereof. Story may 
certainly make up for bad-sounding prose, but the prose is still there, calling attention to 
itself. In short, sonic qualities are a feature of fiction’s medium, and one that seems 
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inescapable. So sonic qualities are relevant to fiction’s value as literary fiction, always, 
for better or worse. 
 In chapter two, I establish a working account of one of the most notable sonic 
qualities of literary fiction: rhythm. I have no intentions of attempting to settle the 
metaphysical question of what rhythm really is, but rather to provide a frame upon which 
questions of appreciation and value can hang, for it is these questions that I find most 
pressing. While we of course need to have some idea of what rhythm is in order to 
address the appreciation of it, there is no requirement to have its nature definitively 
pinned down. I argue that a working account of rhythm boils down to three conditions: 
(1) rhythm is organized sound, (2) rhythm does not reduce to meter, and (3) rhythm may 
be—and often is—experienced as a sense of movement. And the features that organize 
language—and thus literature—rhythmically fall into three classes: features of 
pronunciation, features of intonation, and features of phrasing. 
 After addressing these features, I then argue that if one is to appreciate the rhythm 
of a work of literature, reading is more demanding than typically thought, as it requires 
not only critical interpretation but also performative interpretation. To appreciate a 
literary work’s rhythm, one must hear it right. This turns on the fact that the features of 
rhythmic organization in literature do not determine the rhythm of a work. Because of 
this, realizing the rhythm of a literary work requires a considered way of reading the 
work aloud, or what Levinson calls performative interpretation (1996c, 63). A reader 
must elect values of intonation and phrasing that conform to a plausible critical 
interpretation of the work. She must choose to phrase and place accents in a way she 
believes captures the way the work should be read aloud. It may seem, then, that the 
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demands for adequately appreciating rhythm are incredibly high. However, while not part 
of common reading practice, I argue that an avid reader of literature should be able to 
build strong performative interpretations into her repertoire without too much difficulty. 
 
II. FACTUAL VALUE 
 In chapter three, I argue that truth is sometimes relevant to the literary value of 
fictional works. It seems that we are not willing to give up the intuitions that (a) works of 
fiction are free from the constraints of historical truth and (b) historical inaccuracies 
sometimes count against the artistic value of works of fiction. Christopher Bartel calls 
this the puzzle of historical criticism (2012, 213–22). I argue that this puzzle extends 
beyond historical facts. While it is especially salient that historical accuracy at times 
appears to be relevant to evaluation of literary fiction, such relevance appears to be a 
feature of facts in general. Much of the praise of an encyclopedic work rests on how well 
it weaves non-trivial facts about the real world into its narrative. Thomas Pynchon’s 
Gravity’s Rainbow is a paradigmatic case. It covers, fairly extensively and among other 
things, chemistry, ballistics, behaviorism, and some calculus, all with both allusion and 
factual statements. Were an encyclopedic work to get any such non-trivial facts wrong, it 
would be subject to serious criticism. Of course, with a work that is not encyclopedic, the 
expectation to get the facts right will likely be weaker. But this expectation seems to exist 
given any attempt to employ, reference, or allude to non-trivial real-world facts, be it 
within an encyclopedic work or otherwise. Engaging with non-trivial facts is not an 
uncommon feature of literary fiction. Many works may do so only to a minor degree, and 
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so truth may count for little in their overall evaluation, but it still counts. Encyclopedic 
narratives are simply cases where truth matters much. 
 I then propose a partial strategy for resolving the puzzle. It is not uncommon to 
consider what a work of fiction is attempting to do, what its aims are. We might say, for 
instance, that a work aims to move readers emotionally or parody a particular style, and 
then assess whether it succeeds in doing so. I think a theory of factual criticism and praise 
turns on considerations of this kind. If a work’s aims are relevant to its evaluation and 
factual accuracy is an aim of some works of fiction, then factual accuracy is relevant to 
evaluation. When the aims of a fictional work include employing, referencing, or alluding 
to non-trivial real-world facts, we are justified in evaluating the work according to those 
aims. More specifically, given any constituent part P of a fictional work W, where W 
either aims at real-world factual accuracy in P or has a greater aim of real-world factual 
accuracy against which P appears incongruous (in virtue of other constituent parts in 
which W aims at real-world factual accuracy), we are justified in evaluating P (and thus 
W) on grounds of real-world factual accuracy. The assessment of aims, as complicated as 
that may be, explains and unifies the evaluation of fictional works according to real-
world factual accuracy, historical or otherwise. 
 
III. MORAL VALUE 
 In chapter four, I argue that properly experiencing works of fiction can cultivate 
expertise in making intuitive moral judgments and that this capacity contributes to 
literary value. When it comes to making a moral judgment of a particular case, intuition 
more often than not takes the lead. But empirical research has shown that these moral 
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intuitions are subject to framing and order effects, for both the folk and professional 
philosophers (see Weigmann 2012 and Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2012). With a change 
in the order of cases comes a change in moral judgment. The trouble then, as I see it, is 
understanding what moral expertise amounts to, as the traditional account of expertise 
does not apply. I argue that though training in moral philosophy may not entail having 
moral intuitions any more reliable than the folk, it does entail being more sensitive to 
evidence and thus belief revision, and it is here, in this sensitivity and willingness to 
revise, in a resistance to becoming what Haidt (2001) calls “morally dumbfounded,” that 
moral expertise lies. But I also argue such moral expertise does not require training in 
moral philosophy. It seems that properly experiencing works of fiction can cultivate these 
sensitivities and dispositions, and do so particularly well. 
 In making this argument, I take a cue from Eileen John (2010), who argues that 
“morality demands an evaluative ‘double take’” and that literature is an apt vehicle 
through which this demand might be met (287). According to John, “literary works [are 
able to] set up moral judgment as a form of complex judgment, one that asks for more 
than one perspective to be taken on situations or persons” (2010, 287). Works often 
provide resources to see a character’s failings as understandable deserving of 
compassion. However, though we may understand, sympathize, or empathize with a 
character’s moral failing, this does not, as John acknowledges, remove the grounds for 
our initial judgment. What is at issue with moral expertise as I characterize it is a 
willingness to revise one’s judgment, not simply sympathize with those you have judged. 
But I think John’s view can be pushed further, where these double takes extend to the 
judgment of the acts in question. To be sure, in morally clear cases this will not be so. 
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However much readers may empathize with, say, aspects of Humbert Humbert of Lolita, 
their initial judgment of the wrongness of seduction of the underage will stand firm. But 
there are plenty of cases that are not so clear, and the narratives of much literary fiction 
live in this middle ground. 
 
IV. EMOTIONAL VALUE 
 In the fifth and final chapter, I argue that readers can experience an emotional 
connection with the author of a fictional literary work and that a work’s ability to afford 
this experience contributes to literary value. A satisfying explanation of this experience, I 
argue, turns on four features: (1) the psychological context of reading, (2) sharing beliefs 
and attitudes expressed in a work, (3) resonating with the personality expressed through 
the work’s style, and (4) believing that were one to have the expressive powers of the 
work’s author, one would express things in the way the author has. In its most 
emotionally intimate moments, reading a work of fiction can feel as though you are 
engaging with the thoughts of a person whose beliefs and attitudes intersect with yours, 
whose personality you find mesmerizing, and who expresses things in a way that you 
believe you would if you could, if you had such expressive power. And all of this is 
intensified by a context ripe for emotional intimacy, one in which it feels as though it is 
only you and another’s thoughts. 
 It is no surprise, then, that readers sometimes experience an emotional connection 
with the author of a literary work. Yet it is unclear how a work of fictional literature 
could supply the resources for such an experience. It is, after all, a work of fiction, not a 
report of the author’s experience, as with memoir or autobiography. It is here that I think 
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we can turn to something John points to. She argues that “[t]he practice of art, as an 
intensely focused and reflective making, gives a default warrant for the rest of us to take 
nearly every mark, every feature that we think could be controlled by the artist, as 
evidence of something the artist found to be worth experiencing” (2012, 200). So then, 
while the beliefs, attitudes, and personality expressed in and expressive potency of a 
work of fiction may only strictly be that of the implied author, the sensibility expressed in 
a work is that of the actual author. Even if we do not, in reading fictional literature 
(strictly as literature), have the chance of finding a fellow human being whose actual 
view of the world resonates deeply with ours, we do have the chance of finding a fellow 
human being who understands and values a view of the world that resonates deeply with 
ours, and does so with an expressive power beyond our own. This, it seems, is grounds 




1. SONICITY AND THE PERFORMANCE OF READING 
 
In his book The Performance of Reading, Peter Kivy argues that “silent reading of 
fictional literature, the novel in particular, can be understood as something very like a 
performance” (2006, 126). More pointedly, when we silently read fiction, he claims, we 
give a silent performance to ourselves. While I think Kivy is wrong about this, I do think 
he’s on to something with the idea that when we read fiction, we often experience an 
inner voicing of the text and thus something performance-like. However, I argue not that 
we do invariably experience an inner voicing but rather that we should. Kivy makes 
descriptive claims; in this chapter, I am out to make a normative one. Or, more 
accurately, a normative claim predicated on a descriptive one: since the sonic qualities of 
fiction are always relevant to its value, we must hear its text read in order to fully 
appreciate it. But before making this argument, I will first use Kivy’s account of silent 
reading to lay some conceptual groundwork and then sketch some reasons why we should 
not think reading “aloud” silently is a performance. 
 
I. SILENT PERFORMANCES? 
 Kivy’s argument that silent reading can be understood as performance rests 
largely on an analogy to score-reading, where this should be understood as “hearing,” or 
internally realizing, the sounds of a musical work by reading the score alone. As Kivy 
puts it, when score-reading, “[o]ne can ‘hear’ a production in the mind” (2006, 36). And 
because score-reading takes immense skill, a feat only capable of being accomplished by 
the musically talented, by the Mozarts, Beethovens, and Brahms of the world, score-
readers will have sophisticated interpretations of the musical work in question. Thus, it 
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seems, score-readers will have “an experience in truth significantly like the perceptual 
experience of listening to a sonic performance of the work” (Kivy 2006, 40). At 
minimum, according to Kivy, “there is a powerful prima facie case for score-reading as 
an internal performance” (2006, 50). 
 With this account of score-reading in mind, Kivy’s initial argument for silent 
reading being performance goes something like the following (see 2006, 50–51). It is 
clear that playing to oneself on the piano is a bona fide case of performance. It is also 
clear that such a performance, though neither intended nor offered as a “public object,” is 
potentially hearable and observable in principle. Thus, such a performance is a possible 
object of criticism. There is a powerful prima facie case for score-reading as 
internal/silent performance, as this internal/silent performance is potentially hearable in 
that another token of its type could be produced and criticized in the normal way. If this 
is right, then the move to silent reading as performance is at least plausible. 
The step from plausible to actual comes with poetry. It serves as a sort of halfway 
house between music and fiction. Consider that in addition to reading poetry silently to 
ourselves, we also attend poetry readings, where either the poet or some professional 
reader reads aloud to the audience. It seems this reading aloud is not window dressing, so 
to speak, to the poem, that it is not simply some pragmatic way of sharing the poem with 
a mass audience. Rather, it seems this reading aloud relays important qualities of the 
poem itself, namely its sonic ones. The reading aloud matters because the sound of 
language is important to poetry. And if this is right, in order to fully appreciate poetry 
you must, as Kivy puts it, “‘hear’ the sound of the poem in your mind’s ear, be very 
conscious, in other words, of its sound if it were recited” (2006, 55). Poetry, then, serves 
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as the verbal analogue of score-reading, giving us a stronger conclusion to the argument 
above. 
 The trouble, as far as Kivy sees it, is that the same argument cannot be made for 
fiction,1 because unlike with poetry, the sound of language is not important to “anywhere 
near the degree” (2006, 55). Of course I will be arguing that the sound of language is 
important to fiction, such that without its appreciation, one cannot fully appreciate any 
work of fiction; so I see no particular trouble here. But more of that later. Kivy’s solution 
is twofold: (a) we naturally read works of fiction with expression or feeling and (b) 
interpretation is crucial to understanding a work of fiction at any significant or nontrivial 
level. The former establishes that the silent reading of fiction has clear performative 
qualities; the latter establishes that the silent reading of fiction is interpretation-driven, 
and thus that the performative qualities constitute legitimate performance. 
 First note that works of fiction look clearly performable. When a great actor reads 
a novel aloud for an audio book recording, she reads with expression and feeling. This 
seems to be a case of performance just as is the case of musicians in a studio playing a 
piece of music for a recording. Now consider the same actor reading the same novel 
silently to herself in preparation for the recording. If she reads with and “hears” in her 
head all the expression and feeling she intends to present for the recording—and 
presumably she does—then we have restored a clean analogy with score-reading. 
 But obviously the readers we are concerned with are not professional actors. 
Consider, though, a parent reading a bedtime story to her child. She may be no pro, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Throughout The Performance of Reading, Kivy regularly discusses the novel rather than 
fictional literature in general. But with respect to the novel (as opposed to, say, the short story), 
there is nothing distinctively important to Kivy’s view. So throughout this chapter, I will simply 
appeal to fiction in general. 
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there will be all the dramatic expression required to render the story exciting and lifelike 
to her child. Here it seems we have no less of a case of performance. It is a performance 
for a child, but a performance nonetheless. And as far as Kivy’s concerned, anytime you 
read a work of fiction aloud, “unless you make a special effort to read in an 
expressionless monotone, like a court recorder reading back testimony, you will, quite 
naturally, read con espressione. I think that unless you are autistic, or making a special 
effort, you will, perhaps unconsciously, make a performance of it” (2006, 46). Questions 
about autism aside, this looks right. But it is ordinary readers reading silently that’s the 
tricky step. Unlike with the case of the actor reading silently to herself in preparation for 
her recording, ordinary silent readers are not typically preparing for any reading aloud. 
So why should we think their silent readings have any expression or feeling? Kivy’s 
answer is the necessity of interpretation. 
 While readers may understand many sentences of a work of fiction without 
interpreting them, larger meanings of the work as a whole (be they thematic, symbolic, 
and so on) along with the function of the work’s parts as they bear on that whole (events, 
embedded references to other material, narrative tone, characters’ motivations, 
dispositions, beliefs, and so on) require interpretive work. Evidence of this consists in the 
fact that we can have better and worse interpretations of works of fiction. Say you read 
some work of fiction for the first time as a child. Now say you read the same work for the 
first time as an adult. It seems clear your reading as an adult “would be a reading with 
more understanding, more perceptivity, a more highly developed emotional and moral 
sensibility, wider and deeper knowledge of the literary tradition into which it fits, and so 
forth” (Kivy 2006, 71). So, because works of fiction require interpretation, silent readers 
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will always have some interpretation or other of the work, and thus will naturally present 
that interpretation in their silent reading. Their silent readings will naturally have 
expression and feeling in virtue of their reading naturally being interpretation-driven.2 
 Despite the analogy to score-reading now back in place for professional and 
ordinary readers alike, there remains one more obstacle to calling silent reading 
performance. During a performance, there are two distinct objects experienced: the work 
being performed and the performance of the work. There is no problem making sense of 
this when it comes to out-loud, paradigm performances. And it may make sense to 
distinguish these two objects in score-readings of musical prodigies and silent 
preparatory readings of great actors. But the distinction seems very strange in the silent 
readings of ordinary readers. As Kivy notes, “one hardly knows what it would mean to 
switch one’s concentration from work to performance” (2006, 84). But this can be 
attributed to the performance of the work being transparent to most silent readers in most 
circumstances, just as the performance is transparent to the average concert-going music-
lover, who neither has musical training nor any musical knowledge beyond anecdotal 
accounts of works, composers, or performers. Transparent or not, “[i]n experiencing the 
work you are experiencing the performance; in experiencing the performance you are 
experiencing the work” (Kivy 2006, 85). 
 
II. OBJECTIONS TO KIVY’S ACCOUNT 
 First off, the first move in Kivy’s argument seems to need qualification, because it 
is not, as Kivy assumes, clear that playing to oneself on the piano is a performance. As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For Kivy’s own condensed account of these arguments concerning expression and 
interpretation, see Kivy 2010, 114–16. 
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David Davies notes, clear cases of performances are done for an intended audience, such 
that the performer is “guided in her actions by expectations about this audience” (2011, 
176). In any uncontroversial case of performance, the performer is not just performing 
but performing for some particular audience. The audience may be many or one, present 
or absent, actual or imagined, but it seems there must be an intended audience for 
performance. This is what distinguishes performing, say, a piano piece and merely 
playing that piece. Without this distinction, anytime anyone plays a piece of music or 
dances a dance or recites a monologue under some interpretation, however subconscious 
it is, she is performing. 
 So, in the case of playing piano to oneself, for the playing to be performance, the 
intended audience must be the player. The person playing the piano must not only occupy 
both the role of performer and audience, but also guide her actions as performer 
according to her expectations as audience; she must, it seems, not just occupy two distinct 
roles, but two distinct cognitive states. If this is right, Kivy’s claims about the 
transparency of performance to the silent reader need bolstering, and apparently to an 
implausible degree. Not only must the performance be transparent to the ordinary silent 
reader, but so must the fact that she is guided in her reading by expectations about 
herself, that she is performing for herself. Maybe there is a way to render this plausible, 
but it seems any cognitive state guiding our actions on account of some expectations will 
be far from transparent. 
 Second, Kivy’s account of score-reading also needs qualification. The trouble 
here is that despite the anecdotal evidence Kivy gives about Mozart, Beethoven, Brahms, 
and a few others, it is hard to imagine anyone can “hear” in their head more than one line 
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of a score at a time. Mozart, Beethoven, and Brahms may have been able to have some 
sort of comprehension of the entirety of a many-lined score, but if “hearing” in the head 
is some form of subvocalization, as it seems it must be, and subvocalizing musical lines 
is not substantially different from subvocalizing speech, then they could not have “heard” 
the entirety of a many-lined score, not at all to the degree of a performance of the score. 
Whether accompanied by faint whispering, soundless movement of the lips, or no visual 
cues at all, subvocalization is the muscular movements in the larynx of people as they 
read silently, measured by various types of instrumentation, of which electromyographic 
equipment is most sophisticated (Wright 2004, 546–47). Since the larynx cannot vocalize 
two distinct sounds simultaneously, it is hard to see how it could produce two distinct 
subvocal muscular movements simultaneously. This point does greatly limit the extent of 
Kivy’s anecdotal examples of score-reading, but it does not make any trouble for his 
overall argument, as the score-reading of a single-lined score will fit the bill just fine. 
 Third, there are problems with Kivy’s move from poetry to fiction, specifically 
with his analysis of interpretation. Christopher Bartel points out that while, yes, reading 
literature is interpretation-driven, “the same could be said of our experience of paintings 
and sculptures. ‘Viewings’ are arguably interpretation-driven” (2010, 222).3 Whether 
viewing visual art or portraits, it seems interpretation of meaning is called for. If 
interpretation is, as Kivy’s arguments appear to entail, what ultimately makes our silent 
readings performance, then it seems our “viewings” are performance just the same. But 
Kivy presses that “the most obvious difference between the visual arts and the arts 
traditionally recognized as performing arts is the existence of a ‘notation’ in the latter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A similar objection to the silent reading of poetry as performance is raised in chapter 5 of 
Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art (1968). 
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from which an experience of the work must be ‘realized’” (2006, 129). With music, 
through a complex act of comprehension, symbols must be “translated” to sounds. With 
visual art, there is no such “translation.” Fair enough, but what is the “translation” when 
silently reading works of fiction? We might press Kivy here, because on his account, it 
seems it cannot be symbols to sounds. Unlike with poetry, he thinks the sound of 
language is not important to fiction. 
 But even if Kivy can dodge Bartel’s objection, it appears there is a more 
fundamental problem with his analysis of interpretation. Interpretation of meaning is, as 
Jerrold Levinson argues, very different from interpretation of how to play a score or read 
a piece of poetry in a particular way, “in effect electing particular values of its defining, 
though never absolutely specific, parameters of tempo, rhythm, dynamics, accent, and 
phrasing” (1996c, 61). The former (which Levinson calls critical interpretation) is the 
business of criticism; the latter (which Levinson calls performative interpretation) is the 
business of performance. Surely we would not call some literary critic presenting her 
interpretation of the meaning of some novel to an audience a performance of the novel. 
So it is not at all clear why, as Kivy seems to think, the necessity of critical interpretation 
when reading works of fiction entails that silent readings are performance. 
 One answer might be that, at least when it comes to reading works of fiction, 
critical  interpretation is part of performance. Kivy does not explicitly argue for this point 
but it might be drawn from his analysis of Socrates’ dialogue with Ion, the Greek 
rhapsode, reciter of the Homeric epics. Kivy’s analysis has it that Ion “not only recited or 
sung the narration, and the characters’ speeches, perhaps impersonating the dramatis 
personae with gesture and voice; he also, in his performance, made interpretive remarks 
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about the meanings of the poems he was performing. […] In other words, Ion performed 
what we would think of as literary criticism” (2006, 9). So it is not so surprising that the 
necessity of critical interpretation when reading works of fiction would lead to our silent 
performance of works of fiction, as critical interpretation is part of literary performance. 
 There are two problems with this answer. First, Kivy himself acknowledges “the 
danger […] of committing the genetic fallacy of inferring that something must have 
certain properties or a certain character merely because its historical predecessors and 
sources had those properties or that character,” and claims he will try hard not to commit 
it (2006, 6). So even if Kivy’s analysis of Ion’s performance is right, nothing about the 
performance of silent reading follows from that alone. Second, in his analysis, Kivy 
clearly acknowledges that performative and critical interpretation are distinct parts of 
Ion’s performance. But in his attempt to move from the silent performance of poetry to 
the silent performance of fiction, Kivy appeals to the necessity of critical interpretation to 
underpin why we silently read works of fiction con espressione. The two elements of the 
silent performance of fiction are not distinct, as in Ion’s case; rather, one gives rise to the 
other. I think this is the best way to understand Kivy’s argument—that we have 
performative interpretations in our silent reading because we must have critical 
interpretations. 
 But then Kivy owes an argument as to why this relationship holds and an analysis 
of the nature of performative interpretation when silently reading works of fiction. To be 
sure, a critical interpretation of some work may well inform a performative interpretation, 
such that a critical interpretation limits the domain of appropriate performative 
interpretations. If one understands a literary work to be satire, presumably some ways of 
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performing the work would be considered inappropriate. But it seems wrong to think that 
having a critical interpretation entails having a performative interpretation, for while 
critical interpretation is a “conceptual and standardly propositional affair,” performative 
interpretation is “a sensuous realization of a work, a particular way of sounding it” and 
thus contains aspects that “are irreducibly performative—aspects whose content may be 
signaled, though not captured, by phrases such as ‘this is how it should go’“ (Levinson 
1996c, 66). So, not only do critical interpretation and performative interpretations appear 
to be fundamentally different things, however detailed a critical interpretation is, it cannot 
determine a performative interpretation. The gap between critical and performative 
interpretation is far too wide for a reader to have latter because of the former. 
 Also, since for Kivy performative interpretation of works of fiction cannot be 
grounded in the sound of language—as he thinks “hearing” the sound of language in your 
mind’s ear is not important to experiencing works of fiction—it remains to be explained 
just what performative interpretation of works of fiction amounts to. From Kivy’s stress 
on reading with expression and feeling, it seems performative interpretation lies 
somewhere with dramatic qualities, with playing the role of an actor. But then Kivy owes 
us a story of how dramatic qualities, when reciting fiction, do not involve sonic qualities 
to an important degree. 
 Ultimately, I think Kivy’s only good chance of saving the analogy to (single-line) 
score-reading is to appeal to the sonic qualities of fiction. But even if he were to do this—
and thereby revise the view he argues for in his Once-Told Tales4 of “how non-aesthetic 
the experience of silently read prose fiction really is” (2011, 73)—he would still need to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See especially chapter 5. 
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move from a descriptive position to a normative one. Our attending performances of 
plays and musical works is not what makes drama and music performing arts, but rather 
the fact that only through performances can drama and music be fully appreciated. As 
Davies notes, if Kivy wants to argue that fiction is a performing art, as he claims in the 
closing sections of The Performance of Reading (§30 on forward), “then descriptive facts 
about the phenomenology of our reading experiences, however insightful, cannot serve as 
the principal argument for viewing the reading of fictional literature as a performing art 
analogous to musical performance” (2008, 90). 
 It is to this issue, and thus the primary thesis of this chapter, I now turn. In the 
following section, I argue that fiction is very much an aesthetic art in virtue of its sonic 
qualities. Then, in the subsequent section, I analyze the consequences this has for the full 
appreciation of fiction. But as stated in this chapter’s opening, these arguments are not 
intended to save Kivy’s view that fiction is a performing art. Due to the first objection 
discussed in this section, I think the silent performance of fiction is a very odd and 
demanding affair, one rarely, if ever, instantiated. 
 
III. THE SONIC QUALITIES OF FICTION 
 The “central thesis” of Kivy’s Once-Told Tales—a book he calls “a companion 
piece to my previous monograph on the philosophy of literature, The Performance of 
Reading” (2011, viii)—is that, “largely speaking, silently read prose fiction is a non-
aesthetic art, or, at least, less aesthetic than it is usually taken to be” (2011, 72). Not only 
does he think the story is the focus of fiction, but also that all aesthetic properties take the 
back seat, so much so that they play no noticeable role in the typical reading experience. 
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And of the aesthetic properties of fiction—chiefly, as he sees it, sonic and structural—he 
seems to think sonic ones are the easiest to dismiss or downplay. And as far as the lay of 
the philosophy-of-literature land goes, Kivy is not alone. While I have no quarrels with 
calling the story a, or maybe the focus of fiction, the business of this section is to argue 
against Kivy’s central thesis on the grounds that the sonic qualities of language are 
important to fiction and its full appreciation. Even if story is the most important piece of 
good fiction, this does not preclude the sound of language also being important.5 
 For Kivy, a beginning argument against sonicity playing any important role in 
fiction rests with comparison to poetry. In essence, the poetry argument (let’s call it) goes 
as follows. The sound of language is important to poetry; we can all agree on that. In 
addition to reading poetry silently to ourselves, we also attend poetry readings in order to 
hear the poet (or some practiced reader) read aloud. The reading aloud matters because 
the sound of language is important to poetry. Now consider fiction. The sound of 
language has nowhere near the importance it does in poetry. Therefore, sonicity is not 
important to fiction. The poetry argument appears in Kivy’s The Performance of Reading 
(2006, 55), but it is given the most attention in Kivy’s Once-Told Tales (2011, 70–72).6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 By sonic qualities, or the sound of language, I mean (and take Kivy to mean) something along 
the following lines. The sonic qualities of a sentence S are all the qualities audible to the human 
ear when S is appropriately vocalized by a natural language speaker of the language in which S is 
written, where an appropriate vocalization contains correct pronunciation and has a cadence 
sensitive to punctuation and contextual cues. And I will assume in this chapter that the sonic 
qualities of language can be internally realized via subvocalization, just as the sounds of single-
lined score can in principle. 
6 Kivy is not alone in subscribing to something like the poetry argument. See Smith (1970, 557) 
and Davies’ critique of Kivy, wherein he states, “Of course, all of these things [‘soundings’ in the 
head] are arguably crucial to our appreciation of poetry and of drama, which is why we do 
routinely ‘perform’ such works, even to ourselves, when we seek to appreciate them, and why the 
ability to ‘sound’ such works is one that is fostered in literary education. But these considerations 
seem much more peripheral to appreciation of the novel” (2008, 91). 
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 The main trouble I see with the poetry argument is that its whole force depends on 
a relative notion. To be sure, at least in general, “in contrast with poetry, prose literary 
language does not emphasize the sonic dimension” (Kivy 2011, 71). Poetry, unlike 
fiction, has sonicity woven into its formal structure. Rhyme is an obvious sonic feature. 
But even in free verse there are still stanzas, lines, and meter, all of which dictate rhythm. 
And unlike in fiction, the full appreciation of poetry involves formal analysis of these 
sonic features via scansion, which “helps to reveal rhythm and gives the reader a 
representation of the ‘tune’ underlying and supporting the words” (Cuddon 1999, 787). 
But this contrast alone does not entail that “the sound of the language is hardly 
paramount” in fiction (Kivy 2011, 25). An independent argument must be provided for 
that. Simply that fiction typically has, unlike poetry, plot and character as part of its 
features cannot account for the contrast in emphasis on sonicity. On its own, the contrast 
only shows that sonicity is less important in fiction than in poetry. To be fair, this may be 
all the work Kivy hopes to get out of the poetry comparison, since he does have 
independent, relative-free arguments for his conclusion. He appeals to the experience of 
reading works of fiction and to literary critics. I will consider these in turn. 
 Kivy thinks that that the story is the primary focus of works of fiction shows itself 
in the experience of silently reading fiction. About this he makes two related, but distinct 
claims: (1) “when reading a novel one tends to get taken up: enthralled and swept away, 
one hopes, by the story” such that “[t]he novel is read in a rush, with the story continually 
beckoning one on” (2011, 71); (2) “[t]he ongoing propulsion of literary narrative in 
silently read prose fiction does not encourage pauses in which to savor the ‘sound’ or 
other aspects of literary language that might be bearers of aesthetic properties” (2011, 
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72). (1) makes a claim about the way people tend to read fiction (presumably when the 
work is well-crafted); (2) makes a claim about how narrative in fiction affects the 
experience of reading (again, presumably when the work is well-crafted). 
 As for (1), even if most people tend (or hope) to get swept up in a story and 
compelled to read works of fiction in a rush, this says nothing about what are the 
important features of good fiction, unless there is reason to think the reading habits or 
hopes of the populace indicate what the important features of good fiction are. And it 
seems there is not. Or if there is, the literary canon and literary education are due for 
some major overhaul. 
 As for (2), I do not see why literary narrative itself, however enthralling, propels a 
reader past the sound of prose if the sound of that prose is worth savoring. And after 
claiming (2), Kivy makes it clear that he is concerned with the general reading 
experience, with “most readers, most of the time” (2011, 72). He acknowledges there are 
exceptions to the general rule—with the examples of Joyce and Proust being mentioned 
on numerous occasions—and admits that “novels vary in respect to how thick the 
linguistic medium is, some more than others encouraging or even requiring ‘poetic 
pauses.’ And such events, to be sure, are an important artistic and aesthetic part of the 
novel-reading experience” (2011, 72). So then we are back to (1), and back to the same 
objection to (1) giving reason to reject sonicity as important to fiction. 
 Certainly a better place to look for evidence of the important features of some art 
is in the criticism of that art. On this matter, Kivy’s claims that “seldom, in my 
experience, do literary critics dwell on the sonic aspects of prose” (2011, 25). So, we 
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might say, if the critics don’t discuss it, then it must not be of much concern to the 
practice and its appreciation. 
But just a small sampling of criticism from The Salon.com Reader’s Guide to 
Contemporary Authors (2000) seems to suggest that sonic aspects of prose are important, 
for better or worse. John Banville has “pitch-perfect first person” (30), Raymond 
Carver’s sentences “start on a high note only to give way beneath you” with “foot-
dragging rhythms” (82), Karen Joy Fowler’s “elegant prose” is “more than window 
dressing” (148), William Gaddis has an “extraordinary ear for speech” and “a supple 
style that bridges the lyrical, the elegiac, and the gothic” (151), Denis Johnson “strings 
sentences” in which “the words crackle and smoke” (202), Cormac McCarthy writes 
“lyrical books” (247), and Ian McEwan’s prose is “affectless” (252). It’s suggested that 
“you listen closely to [Rick Moody’s] best work” (263), said that Toni Morrison has “a 
poet’s grace” (272), and that Grace Paley’s background in poetry is “apparent in the 
mobile, seductive rhythms of her prose and in her stubborn care over words” (297). In 
places, Thomas Pynchon’s prose “is as beautiful as prose gets” (319), John Updike 
“writes beautiful sentences that bop around in your head after you read them like show 
tunes” (390), William T. Vollman’s work has “lyrical complexity” (397), David Foster 
Wallace “has developed a distinctive and infectious style, an acrobatic cartwheeling 
between high intellectual discourse and vernacular insouciance, which makes him 
tremendously fun to read” (405), and “Stephen Wright’s novels have such a hair-raising 
vividness, such a lyric certainty, that reading them is like watching an arrow strike the 
dead center of a bullseye; you almost don’t care what he’s writing about” (422). 
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 And this comes from a host of critics.7 And the criticism also is not geared for 
some elite literary crowd, but rather seems just up the alley of Kivy’s serious in-it-for-
the-story reader.8 As Laura Miller points out in the preface, the guide is not for “an 
audience of researchers or scholars or critics or prize committees or members of the 
publishing industry,” but rather “for those remarkable and slightly mysterious individuals 
who read contemporary fiction for pleasure” (2000, v). Though I am guessing none of 
these remarks on sonicity qualify as dwelling. But maybe the lack of critical time spent 
on sonicity simply reflects story being easier to talk about, that there are no sonic themes 
or trajectories whose evolutions can be explicated, that the sonicity of fiction occurs 
sentence by sentence and, when discussing a work as a whole, as critics often do, can 
only be captured in sweeping statements. Nevertheless, there undoubtedly are critics who 
routinely do dwell on the sonicity of fiction. William Gass, for example, is one of them.9 
At minimum, it seems there is good reason to question Kivy’s descriptive claim about 
criticism. At bottom, Kivy’s appeal to most people’s reading tendencies and critics does 
not much strengthen the poetry argument. 
 But what positive reason do we have to think sonicity is important to fiction? It 
lies, I argue, in the fact that there are obvious exceptions to Kivy’s general rule, and 
many more than he recognizes. Joyce’s Ulysses is often considered in the top tier of 
works of fiction. It is, in other words, considered very good fiction, in large part because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Twelve, to be exact. Respectively, Albert Mobilio, Ray Sawhill, Alan Michael Parker, Carter 
Scholz, Gary Kamiya, A.O. Scott, Sylvia Brownrigg, Dwight Garner, Adam Begley, Sylvia 
Brownrigg (again), Adam Begley (again), David Lipsky, Lily Burana, Laura Miller, and (again) 
Laura Miller. 
8 This is the type of reader Kivy is most concerned with. See 2011, 33–34. 
9 Among his other critical collections, see Finding a Form (2009), in which he contends that “no 
prose can pretend to greatness if its music is not also great” (314). 
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of its mellifluous prose. It seems evidence of this, that Ulysses’ sonicity contributes 
substantially to its evaluation as very good fiction, is found in its reputation, the history 
of criticism surrounding it, that each chapter is written in a distinctively different style, 
and that every year on June 16th (the day on which the events of Ulysses take place) 
people in Ireland and elsewhere gather for Bloomsday, when the novel is celebrated and 
read aloud.10 As Kivy himself says, after claiming the novel, unlike poetry, is read in a 
rush, “One does not read Joyce or Proust that way” (2011, 71). One does not, because, in 
part, the prose is too sonorous to pass by so quickly; it requires “poetic pauses.”  But 
what Kivy misses is that it is not just poetic or mellifluous prose of which we need to take 
stock. There’s also clunky prose and tinny prose and awkward prose and prose whose 
alliteration drags, all of which might require pauses, albeit pauses to cleanse the palate 
rather than “savor the ‘sound’” (Kivy 2011, 72), and all of which, unlike with the sonicity 
of Ulysses, typically count against a work’s value.11 Consider, for example, the bit of 
criticism on Raymond Carver quoted above. Sonicity is a good- or bad-making feature of 
fiction, and one that has the potential to contribute substantially to a work’s value or lack 
thereof. Story may certainly make up for bad-sounding prose, but the prose is still there, 
calling attention to itself.12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 And note that, in general, people go to fiction readings in the same way that they go to poetry 
readings. Fiction readings are far from uncommon. In fact, fiction and poetry authors often get 
equal time in university reading series. So Kivy’s point that we go to poetry readings does not 
show anything about poetry that can’t be shown about fiction. 
11 And the qualification of “typically” is important, as there very well may be cases where clunky, 
tinny, or awkward prose is rightly considered a merit of a work, cases where such prose is 
deliberate, where the nature of a character or narrator calls for such prose, for instance. 
12 Numerous books have been recommended to me with the warning that no, the writing (read: 
prose) is not very good, but the story is. 
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What, though, of prose occupying the space between good and bad, prose that is 
neither clunky nor mellifluous, prose that appears plain? What of, say, Ian McEwan’s 
“affectless” prose, as noted in the criticism above? While Kivy may be right that the 
sonic features of many of these works themselves don’t have important aesthetic 
properties, such that the sonic features neither add nor detract much from the works’ 
value, this does not entail that sonicity is not important to fiction as a whole, and thus that 
fiction is a non-aesthetic art. Rather, that there are cases where sonicity does add and 
detract significantly from a works’ value and that language is the very medium of fiction 
demonstrates that sonicity is always relevant to the value of fiction. Minimally, that there 
are clear cases of fiction where sonic qualities play an important role in evaluation shows 
that sonic qualities are evaluatively relevant. We may justifiably consider sonic qualities 
in our evaluation of other works. This seems uncontroversial. When we justifiably find 
any quality to be important to our evaluation of a particular work, we may consider this 
new finding in our future assessments of other works, or we may even return to 
previously read works, hoping to see them afresh. Of course, in either new or revisited 
works, we simply may not find the quality up for consideration. For instance, layout, font 
choices, and colored text might justifiably be considered important to the value of Mark 
Danielewski’s novel House of Leaves. But in most works of fiction, we will not find 
colored text; and it would be wrong to consider layout and font as part of most works of 
fiction, as these things are often neither designated nor determined by the author. 
However, things are quite different when it comes to sonic qualities. They are a feature of 
language; and since language is the very medium of fiction, sonic qualities will always be 
found in and part of any work. Once the literary community recognized sonicity as 
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important to the evaluation of a work of fiction, all works could legitimately be subjected 
to such evaluation, for all works have sonic qualities, whether one takes notice of not. 
To put the point generally, it only takes one work of art x whose evaluation as 
good or bad is substantially or importantly due to a necessary feature of the art’s medium 
F to demonstrate that F is always relevant to the value of the art of which x is a member. 
And “demonstrate” should be understood in a weak way. Whether the demonstration is 
epistemic (such that x simply made it known that F is always relevant) or constructive 
(such that x made it the case that F is always relevant) is of no issue to the general point. 
It is in virtue of the artworld recognizing F as important to the evaluation of x that x has 
demonstrated F as always evaluatively relevant to the art in question. 
Now, even if I am right that (1) sonic qualities are evaluatively relevant to literary 
fiction and (2) sonic qualities are part of all works of literary fiction, it might be argued 
that it does not follow that (3) sonic qualities are always evaluatively relevant to all 
works of literary fiction, for an author might not intend for sonic qualities to be 
considered in the evaluation of her work. And, to be sure, it is easy to imagine an author 
having such an intention. But while the intentions of the author arguably do matter in 
some cases, this cannot be one of them. Any feature that is part of a work and 
evaluatively relevant is open for evaluation whether the author likes it or not. Our 
evaluation of literature is not held hostage to authorial intent willy-nilly. 
 
IV. EXPERIENCING SONICITY 
 If sonicity is always evaluatively relevant to fiction, then in in order to fully 
experience works of fiction, we must experience their sonicity, we must hear the sound of 
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a work’s language, and thus, when reading silently, we must subvocalize.13 One implied 
reason Kivy appears to think sonicity is not important to fiction is that if it were, there 
would be much more re-reading of works of fiction, which he argues does not typically 
go on. The typical (non-serious and serious alike) reader reads a work of fiction only 
once. This is because “once you have negotiated the intricacies of the plot […] you have 
realized the intentions of the novelist qua story-teller,” and thus exhausted the primary 
content of the work, or at least till you have forgotten the story (Kivy 2011, 7–8). It 
seems plausible that most readers only read a book and its passages once, that many 
authors craft their works “with a view to the effect it will have on the reader the first time 
through,” and that storytelling plays a big (and maybe the primary) role in these 
considerations (Kivy 2011, 7). But while sonically good works of fiction might reward 
re-rereading, I do not think sonicity’s importance requires re-reading of fiction. I think 
“hearing” the sentences in your head one time through will do the trick just fine. 
 Though this does not entail that the silent reading of fiction is performance (just 
as it does not with poetry), it does, however, seem to entail something strange about the 
ontology of literature, namely that its instances—the things that have all those 
experiential properties necessary to fully play the experiential role in the appreciation of 
literary works (see Davies 2011, 27)—are vocalized or subvocalized readings, not texts. 
As Barbara Herrnstein Smith points out, “texts are altogether mute objects” and thus 
require something to serve as the instrument of translating the text into an instance of the 
work (1970, 555). In short, questions of literature being a performing art aside, it looks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Yes, it has been shown that “[s]ubvocal speech is present during silent reading for all 
individuals” (Riley 1981, 7). But this does not mean that every word, or nearly every word, is 
subvocalized, and this is what I think fully experiencing the sonicity of literature requires. 
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like the texts of literary works have the same ontological status as scores. But beside 
objections of the Bartel sort, along with counterexamples such as concrete poetry, this 
result might be too strange to buy. And I think it can be resisted. 
 While texts are mute and need a reader to transform the printed words into their 
pronounced counterparts, they too need a reader to cognize those words, sentences, and 
paragraphs. But this latter fact does not lead us to believe newspapers and textbooks, 
unvoiced, are not instances of those entities. So why should the former (arguable) fact 
lead us to believe copies of poetry collections and novels are not instances of 
corresponding works? It appears that readings would alone be instances of literary works 
only if literary works required performance or, performance or not, dramatization, replete 
with character voices and so on. Subvocalized silent reading is simply the means through 
which literary works are fully experienced. Yes, subvocalized silent reading does require 
something much like a performative interpretation of the way the prose (or verse) goes, 
which, most markedly, concerns cadence. So there is something akin to reading a score 
for solo voice. But the score is for voice; it is intended to be sung, aloud; it is music. 
Music requires an instrument to be fully experienced; the “music” of literature does not. 
The “instrument” of voice may aid in revealing Ulysses’ sonicity, as may a guidebook or 





2. HEARING IT RIGHT: RHYTHM AND READING 
 
Within the philosophy of music, rhythm as a focus of concern is only fairly recent 
and long overdue, for rhythm is a crucial feature of music and the experience of music. 
But within the philosophy of literature, the matter of sound, let alone rhythm, has been 
sadly neglected. To be sure, literary theorists have long been concerned with rhythm. But 
there is still a gap to be filled when it comes to a philosophical treatment of the issue. In 
this chapter, I am out to begin the project of filling that gap. Though this is a tall order, 
my particular aims are modest. At minimum, I hope to clear the ground for further 
discussion of rhythm in the philosophy of literature. First, I establish a working account 
of rhythm as it pertains to literature. I have no intentions of attempting to settle the 
metaphysical question of what rhythm really is, but rather to provide a frame upon which 
questions of appreciation and value can hang, for it is these questions that I find most 
pressing. While we of course need to have some idea of what rhythm is in order to 
address the appreciation of it, there is no requirement to have its nature definitively 
pinned down. Second, I argue that if one is to appreciate the rhythm of a work of 
literature, reading is more demanding than typically thought, as it requires not only 
critical interpretation but also performative interpretation. To appreciate a literary work’s 
rhythm, one must hear it right. 
 
I. RHYTHM & LITERATURE 
 When a work of literature is read aloud, there is a temptation to talk about the 
work’s music, especially when the work’s verse or prose is mellifluous or euphonious. 
But strictly speaking, any reference to a literary work’s music is metaphorical. Literature 
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does not contain bars or notes or time signatures. Nor does it contain any explicit 
instructions as to how its sentences or lines ought to be read. There are no directions to 
read largo, presto, or forte.1 And when read aloud, it lacks two key features of vocal 
music signaled by Jerrold Levinson: “in song there is a sustaining of tones, with some 
degree of resonance and vibrato, and a connecting of sustained tones into a more or less 
continuous vocal line” (1996d, 43). Literature neither is nor contains music. Yet as 
William Gass notes, “prose has a pace; it is dotted with stops and pauses, frequent rests; 
inflections rise and fall like a low range of hills; certain tones are prolonged; there are 
patterns of stress and harmonious measures; there is a proper method of pronunciation, 
even if it is rarely observed” (2009a, 314). And surely the same goes for poetry, and 
maybe even more so, considering its addition of, at least in some cases, meter and 
lineation. If there is any place where talk of the musical features of literature is not 
metaphorical, it lies in the features that Gass enumerates. For like a work of music, a 
work of literature has rhythm, and the pauses, inflections, stresses, and pronunciation of 
its language all contribute to that rhythm.2 
 But before saying anything more about the features in a literary work that 
contribute to rhythm, something first must be said about what rhythm is simpliciter. 
Whatever constitutes rhythm in a work of literature, the rhythm itself is a singular feature 
to be experienced, and one in need of explanation and analysis. If literature has rhythm, 
literally so, then we should be able to get a fix on what that feature is by appealing to 
discussions of rhythm in the philosophy of music. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Though there is nothing in principle that would prevent a writer from including such directions. 
2 See Patel (2006) for a quick canvass of empirical studies that examine the similarities between 




 Minimally, rhythm is organized sound. A continuous, periodic, undifferentiated 
stream of sound does not have rhythm. For there to be rhythm, sound must be organized 
or differentiated in some fashion. Various features may do the work of this 
organization—stress, accent, pitch, or duration, for instance3—but it is the ordering itself 
that gives rise to rhythm. The simplest way to conceive of this organization is in terms of 
grouping. If we take a series of continuous, periodic, acoustically identical sounds and 
stress every fourth iteration, we will hear the sound as grouped—and thus organized—
into fours. Beyond this minimal account, there is not a great deal of agreement as to what 
rhythm is. But there are two main issues around which disagreements cluster. The first is 
the distinction between rhythm and meter. The second is whether movement is essential 
to rhythm. As already noted, it is not the business of this chapter to weigh in on what 
rhythm really is. But even a working account of rhythm requires more than the minimal 
notion of organized sound. So a quick canvass of these issues is in order. 
 The general consensus among musicians, musicologists, and philosophers of 
music is that rhythm is distinct from meter, and conceiving of rhythm as mere grouping 
does not recognize this distinction. Rhythmic organization appears to be much freer and 
less codified than periodic sound. The rhythm of a piece of music often plays with or 
against a periodic beat, a grouping of sound that serves as the backdrop for rhythm. A 
paradigmatic example of this phenomenon is Ravel’s Bolero (see Hamilton 2007, 136 
and Scruton 2007, 236). Conversely, rhythm might exist without a sense of regularity or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For a fairly exhaustive list of these features, see Scruton 1997, 24–31. 
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consistent periodic backdrop, as is the case in the “Sacrificial Dance” of Stravinsky’s Rite 
of Spring (see Scruton 1999, 23).  Thus is the traditional distinction between rhythm and 
meter justified. Meter (or beat) is periodic, organized sound. Rhythm is organized, non-
periodic sound; it is something less constrained, something more or other. As Roger 
Scruton puts it, “Meter is the frame; rhythm the life that grows on it” (2007, 136). There 
are some, however, who do not see a distinction in kind. Rather, it is a matter of degree; 
meter is a particular, even if rigid, expression of rhythm.4 And Andy Hamilton strikes a 
middle ground, arguing that though there is distinction in kind, rhythm cannot be 
understood independently of meter (2007, 141). Now, though the nature of this 
distinction is interesting and surely important, to fruitfully consider the appreciation of 
rhythm, we need not come down on the matter one way or the other. We need only 
recognize that rhythm does not reduce to meter; that much, at least, is clear. 
 Less agreed upon is the relationship between our experience of rhythm and 
rhythm itself. Our experience of rhythm seems to involve a sense of movement spatial in 
kind, a feeling often bound to actual or imagined bodily movement—foot-tapping or 
head-nodding, for instance. With our bodily movements it is as if we are tracking the 
movement of rhythm itself. This much seems uncontroversial. But what this 
characteristic experience of rhythm demonstrates about rhythm itself is up for debate. 
There are three possible positions. (1) Movement is an inessential, eliminable feature of 
experiencing rhythm (Budd 2008a, 167-168). While we may hear movement in rhythm, 
as if each note is brought about by the one before it, this is not an essential 
phenomenological component of rhythm. All hearing rhythm requires is noticing patterns 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For a sketch of these positions, see Hamilton 2007, 136. 
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of stress and accent and so forth and the groupings of sounds that form as a result. 
Rhythm does not move and we need not hear it as doing such. (2) Movement is an 
essential, but metaphorical, feature of experiencing rhythm. To hear rhythm is to hear 
movement, a “virtual causality” among sounds, each bringing the next into being 
(Scruton 1999, 35 and 2007, 229). It is not simply that we may hear movement rhythm, 
but we must; otherwise, we are not in fact experiencing rhythm. Though rhythm does not 
have the physical property of movement, it has the phenomenological property of 
movement. (3) Movement is an essential, non-metaphorical feature of rhythm (Hamilton 
2007, 144–45). To hear rhythm is to hear movement, but this movement is not a 
metaphorical projection. This does not mean that sounds literally bring each other into 
being or that sounds actually move through space. Such a position seems untenable. 
Nevertheless, the concept of rhythm cannot be pulled apart from movement. We do not 
take our concept of bodily movement as primary and then project it onto our description 
of rhythm; rather, the two are intertwined. And metaphor requires such projection. 
 The debate over movement in rhythm does ultimately have bearing on matters of 
appreciation. For Scruton and Hamilton, if one does not hear movement, one is not 
properly appreciating rhythm. But, as Scruton notes, this movement is a gestalt property 
(2007, 229). We can consider all the basic properties that give rise to rhythmic 
organization—and thus the properties one must be attentive to when experiencing 
rhythm—without worrying whether metaphorical or non-metaphorical movement 
supervenes on this rhythmic organization. At minimum, it is natural to hear movement in 
rhythm. And even if Budd is right that movement is an eliminable feature of experiencing 
rhythm, such eliminability does not mean such talk is not useful. 
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 So then, a working account of rhythm boils down to three conditions: (1) rhythm 
is organized sound, (2) rhythm does not reduce to meter, and (3) rhythm may be—and 
often is—experienced as a sense of movement. With this account, we can now proceed to 
consider rhythm in literature. 
 
Rhythmic Organization in Literature 
 It is clear that a literary work has properties of sound and that this sound is 
organized. This latter fact is largely in virtue of spoken language itself consisting of 
organized sound. Various features do the work of this organizing and it is worth 
enumerating some of them here, but I do not intend to provide a detailed analysis of any. 
Such analysis has been carried out in detail by both linguists and literary theorists. To get 
on with a general discussion of appreciating and evaluating rhythm in literature, it need 
only be clear that (a) literature has rhythm and (b) analyzable features give rise to this 
rhythm, even if not determinately so. The features that organize language rhythmically 
fall into three classes: features of pronunciation, features of intonation, and features of 
phrasing. I will address each briefly. 
 Correctly pronouncing a word requires enunciating the word’s syllables and 
stressing those syllables correctly. Both how many syllables a word contains and which 
syllables receive more emphasis determine the patterning of sound, more and less so with 
respect to the language at hand. Some languages (such as French) are said to be syllable-
timed, and others (such as English) stress-timed (see Wennerstrom 2001, 47). The 
distinction is intended to trace what feature of pronunciation—syllable number or 
stress—does the primary work in determining the time it takes to pronounce a word. 
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Now, this distinction is contested (see Patel and Daniele 2003, B36), but the important 
point is that both syllables and stress bear on the organization of sound in language. And 
with English, it is most salient with stress. For instance, a two-syllabled word with stress 
on the first syllable organizes sound much differently than a two-syllabled word with 
stress on the second syllable. Consider the words rocket and Rockette (Wennerstrom 
2001, 47) or content defined as substance or meaning and content defined as satisfied. 
These example illustrates not only how stress organizes sound, but also that stress is 
determined—at least usually5—by the correct pronunciation of the word. 
 We should, however, distinguish stress from accent, where the latter is determined 
not by pronunciation, but by contextual cues. Important words often call for accent, for 
an increase in the pitch of one’s voice (i.e. a change in intonation).6 And since such 
increase in pitch can affect the time it takes to pronounce a word, it can affect rhythmic 
organization. This affect on rhythm comes when an accented syllable is normally 
unstressed, thereby altering the organization of sound mere pronunciation dictates. But of 
course what counts as “important” within a lexical unit might be open to more than one 
interpretation. Therefore, unlike stress, accent is not determined by the language at hand. 
So talking about the rhythm of a sentence becomes trickier, about which more will be 
said below. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Context may sometimes alter stress. Compare “sixteen believers” and “sixteen anecdotes” 
(Attridge 1995, 30). In the first phrase, it is natural to stress the second syllable of “sixteen” more 
than the first. But in the second phrase, it is natural to stress the first syllable of “sixteen” more. 
Perhaps a more conspicuous example is the pronunciation of “unknown” in the phrases 
“unknown assailant” and “Tomb of the Unknown Soldier” (Kelly and Bock 1988, 389). While 
one might stress the second syllable in the first phrase, it would be odd to do so in the second. 
6 Wennerstrom calls this pitch accent (2001, 18). 
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 Phrasing—or the enunciation of phrases and clauses—raises similar issues. Yes, 
just as there are constraints on the proper pronunciation of words, there are also 
constraints on the proper enunciation of phrases. The most obvious constraint is syntax. 
Even if the primary function of punctuation is grammatical, translating that function into 
speech often requires enunciation of a particular kind. Commas call for pausing; and thus 
a list of items joined by conjunctions reads faster than a list individuated by commas. 
Periods sometimes call for a pause slightly longer in duration. Parentheses ask not only 
for a pause, but also a change in pitch, one that can affect the typical time it takes to 
pronounce a word. An introductory prepositional phrase demands a short pause, even if 
unpunctuated. But there are various degrees to which syntax can be properly enunciated, 
where these variances may affect the patterning of sound. Even less determinative of an 
individual phrasing is semantics. Just as perceived importance may influence intonation, 
so meaning may influence phrasing. As Scruton argues, “Speech is therefore a paradigm 
for us of a rhythmical organization generated not by measure and beat but by internal 
energy and the intrinsic meaningfulness of sound” (2007, 250). A phrase describing 
action or an agitated emotional state, for instance, may ask to be read swiftly, while a 
phrase with content more meditative in nature may encourage a slow, deliberate pace. 
What is expressed by a sentence gives it an “internal energy,” a sense of how it ought to 
be phrased.7 And we might turn to Derek Attridge for a means of parsing this internal 
energy more precisely. Attridge argues that most words are felt to have one of four basic 
types of movement, all of which influence the perceived grouping of words, and thus 
phrasing: “(1) they are part of a movement toward some point that lies ahead; (2) they are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 And of course the rhythms prescribed by syntax and pronunciation may work against the 
internal energy of a phrase, sometimes for deliberate effect. 
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part of a movement away from some point that has already passed; (3) they are part of a 
relatively static moment from which something might develop; (4) they are part of a 
moment of arrival toward which the previous words have been moving” (1995, 183). 
Now, one might take issue with Attridge’s analysis, with his four basic types, but it seems 
difficult to deny that sentences deserve analysis along these lines, that meaning 
influences phrasing and thus rhythm. 
 So since language contains features that organize sound non-periodically, it has 
rhythm. And since language is the medium of literature, insofar as an oral reading of a 
work is an instance of that work, works of literature have rhythm. But language’s features 
of rhythmic organization also underdetermine rhythm. Thus, if there is any sense in 
determining a literary work’s rhythm, interpretation must be part of the picture. However, 
before unpacking interpretation’s role in determining rhythm, a quick discussion of meter 
is in order. Many poems have this additional means of rhythmic organization, and two 
things should be noted. 
 First, that a poem has a particular meter—that it is, for instance, in iambic 
pentameter—is not often indicated explicitly. While line breaks may arguably serve as 
the analog to bar lines, the meter of a poem’s line is not noted anywhere in the poem’s 
text. So unless the form of the poem is named in the title (e.g. Shakespeare’s sonnets), 
one must scan a line to determine if it has meter and what that meter is, where scanning 
amounts to determining whether any linguistic features of rhythmic organization establish 
a periodic beat. If they do, the line has meter. But since linguistic features of rhythmic 
organization may underdetermine rhythm, they therefore also may underdetermine meter. 
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 Second, that meter is usually a feature of verse rather than prose does not mean 
that poetry is more rhythmic than prose. On the one hand, some prose may have meter. 
William Faulkner’s prose, for instance, is said to exhibit iambic pentameter (Pinsky 1998, 
67 and 73). On the other hand, as noted above, rhythm does not reduce to meter. In fact, 
in some cases meter may overwhelm rhythm, subsuming any non-periodicity to periodic 
beat. Some argue that this is a common occurrence in rap music (Scruton 2007, 250 and 
Hamilton 2007, 136). And with enough emphasis on the beat of a metric poem, a reading 
can begin to lose the poem’s rhythm. Some poems may even invite such readings, most 
likely to their detriment. In her guide to understanding and writing poetry, Mary Oliver 
warns against just this (1994, 43–44). So while poetry may, on the whole, be more 
metric, this only entails that its rhythms may tend to be more regular and thus more easily 
noticed, not that its rhythms are more rhythmic. Many prose writers clearly labor over 
their sentences’ rhythms despite these sentences being non-metric. And Virginia Woolf 
went as far as believing that rhythm was the primary business of all good writing (see 
Sutton 2010). 
 Lineation itself also does not give reason to think verse is more rhythmic than 
prose. Lineation’s influence on rhythm is less straightforward than it may seem. It might 
seem that line breaks constrain phrasing, calling, like commas and periods, for pause in 
enunciation. But it would be wrong to say they clearly function this way. Readers 
unfamiliar with the conventions of verse often treat them in this fashion, pausing longer 
than they would for a period. But many poets and scholars advise against this, urging that 
we read through line breaks, pausing only when the usual features of syntax demand we 
do (e.g. Pinsky 1998, 18). On this view, line breaks may only serve to amplify pause, and 
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even that function is questionable. Now, some do prescribe a brief pause at line breaks 
(e.g. Attridge 1995, 2); and this brief pause, of course, would result in rhythmic 
organization, but no more than syntax does in prose. Either way, there is no sense is 
saying, on the grounds of lineation, that verse is more rhythmic or has more ability to be 
rhythmic than prose. 
 
Rhythm & Interpretation 
 Since the features of rhythmic organization in literature do not determine 
rhythm—at least not in any obvious way—we are faced with questions of interpretation. 
Some of these questions can be addressed in the usual fashion. What words carry special 
significance or importance and thus deserve special emphasis or accent? What is the 
mood conveyed in a line or sentence? Does it call for moments of slow and heavy 
phrasing, syllables elongated and perhaps exaggerated in some places? Or does it demand 
something staccato in nature? What is the best analysis of a passage’s internal energy, as 
Scruton puts it and Attridge demonstrates? These questions all align with those addressed 
in literary critical practice, questions of theme, structure, semantic content, character, and 
so on. They fall within the purview of what Levinson calls critical interpretation. 
 Critical interpretation is a familiar feature in literary practice. A literary work’s 
imagery, narrative, plot, characters, structure, and semantic content all have to hang 
together in one way or another, to greater and lesser degrees. And that hanging together, 
that complete picture of the work, is often non-obvious, thus requiring an interpretive 
account of some kind. Critical interpretation is the business of offering such accounts. As 
Levinson puts it, critical interpretation consists in “formulating a view of what a work 
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means or expresses and how it hangs together at various levels” (1996c, 61). Literary 
critics offer critical interpretations in print, in both academic and popular venues; general 
readers form book clubs and engage in critical interpretation in a less formal setting; 
informally, in our everyday lives, we might trade critical interpretations over coffee; and 
in solitude, when reading alone, reflecting on how the various features of a work should 
be understood or explained is far from foreign. Indeed, it seems reasonable to think 
critical interpretation is required for the full appreciation of a literary work. But even if 
one does not go that far, it cannot be denied that critical interpretation is entrenched in 
our practice, accepted as a norm in the literary enterprise. 
 Yet some questions concerning the interpretation of a literary work’s features of 
rhythmic organization exceed the scope of critical interpretation; some are the business of 
what Levinson calls performative interpretation. With respect to music, performative 
interpretation “consists in deciding to play a score, taken as unequivocal or 
uncontroverted, in a particular way, in effect electing particular values of its defining, 
though never absolutely specific, parameters of tempo, rhythm, dynamics, accent, and 
phrasing” (Levinson 1996c, 61). In short, it is “a considered way of playing a piece of 
music” (Levinson 1996c, 63).8 Clearly, such decisions are a crucial feature of musical 
practice, acknowledged as such by both performers and listeners alike. And if we are 
attending to rhythm in literature, such decisions with respect to the vocalization of a text, 
such considered ways of reading literature aloud, appear equally crucial, even if they are 
not a usual part of literary practice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 I am simplifying things a bit. Levinson distinguishes between two modes of performative 
interpretation: realizational and reconstructive (1996c, 61–62). But rehearsing this distinction is 
not important to the concerns of this chapter. 
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 While critical interpretation certainly informs an understanding of rhythm and 
provides guidance in matters of accent and phrasing—and thus informs and guides 
performative interpretation—critical interpretation does not uniquely determine 
performative interpretation. As Levinson puts it, “there are inevitably aspects of a PI 
[performative interpretation] that are irreducibly performative—aspects whose content 
may be signaled, though not captured, by phrases such as ‘this is how it should go’—and 
which thus could not be part of a CI [critical interpretation], necessarily expressed as it is 
in articulate terms” (1996c, 66). A CI that demands, say, accent on a word may be 
realized by various PIs. After all, there are various degrees of accent, with shadings 
subtle enough such that no plausible critical interpretation could dictate a particular one. 
The specificity required of such a CI would at best be absurd and at worst collapse the 
distinction between critical and performative interpretation. The particular values that 
realize accent and phrasing are firmly within the realm of PI. 
 It is also important to note that the underdetermination goes both ways. A PI may 
seem to suggest a certain CI; but, as Levinson notes, it would be a mistake to believe we 
can infer any one critical interpretation from a PI (1996c, 77–86). To be sure, accent may 
indicate importance of some kind, but accent alone does not indicate what that kind is. 
And inferring much about a CI from a particular phrasing seems even worse off. Slow 
and heavy phrasing of a literary passage is compatible with CIs that consider the passage 
somber or lethargic or especially tense and fraught with narrative tension, among other 
moods. 
 Given this underdetermination in both directions, one might be inclined to think 
that there is no sense in talking about the rhythm of a literary work, for a literary work’s 
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rhythm is indeterminate. If CIs are the means through which PIs are justified, even if we 
agree that there is a single correct CI, there is still no principled way to settle on a PI. 
Among the set of PIs suggested by a CI, one might prefer one PI over another. But it is 
hard to see what reasons could be offered for that PI—and thus that realization of 
rhythm—being the correct or best one. Since we cannot infer any particular CI from a PI, 
it cannot be argued that one’s favored PI best reveals the correct CI. Nor is there much 
help in appealing to the author of the work having that PI. Just as Goldman notes that 
“composers who conduct are not always the best conductors or interpreters of their own 
works” (2013, 34), authors are not always the best oral readers of their own works. And 
some are aware of this. William Gaddis, for instance, abstained from giving readings of 
his novels, noting that “[y]ou have to be a sort of actor to get away with reading it aloud” 
(2002, 129). 
 The only option I see for settling on a single PI and thus the rhythm of a literary 
work is if one subscribes to an aesthetic maximization view of interpretation, at least in 
part. Clearly, if one believes the best interpretation in every instance is the interpretation 
that maximizes aesthetic value, then, in principle, determining the best PI is simple. 
Choose the PI—and thus rhythm—that yields the greatest aesthetic value.9 But 
interestingly, even if one does not take an aesthetic maximization view with respect to CI, 
one might take an aesthetic maximization view with respect to PI. While making a 
coherent argument for this hybrid view might prove difficult, settling the question of the 
best PI follows the same path as the full-blooded aesthetic maximization view. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Of course, in practice this determination is not so easy. 
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 Now, few may subscribe to views of this sort. But rejecting aesthetic 
maximization does not entail that we should toss PIs to the wind. The rhythm of a literary 
work may be indeterminate in that no one PI can capture it. But vocalization or 
subvocalization are the only means through which literature’s rhythm can be experienced. 
And (sub)vocalizations can only be experienced one at a time. So while the rhythm of a 
literary work may be indeterminate among a class of PIs, we only have experiential 
access to the work’s rhythm through those PIs, and they may only be experienced 
individually. Unlike with CI, there is no possibility of a comprehensive PI that 
encompasses the entire class. Single PIs are the means through which a literary work’s 
rhythm is experienced, be it indeterminate or not. But this should not be cause for 
concern. As Peter Lamarque notes, “Few would hold that for each play or musical work 
there must be a single right performance, even though performances are judged for their 
effectiveness and fidelity to the work” (2002, 302). There may be no comprehensive PI 
that allows us, in one go, to experience the rhythm of a literary work, but each PI that is a 
member of the appropriate class allows us to experience a different aspect of a work’s 
rhythm, uniquely illuminating through the particular values of accent and phrasing it 
elects, in the particular realization of rhythm it brings to the fore. 
 
II. APPRECIATING RHYTHM 
 With rhythm’s place in literature roughly sorted, we are now able to address the 
question of what it takes to appreciate that rhythm. While rhythm may be the feature 
literature shares in common with music, appreciating rhythm in literature is a bit more 
complicated. To be sure, if we are listening to an audio book, appreciating the work’s 
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rhythm may look a lot like the appreciation of rhythm in music. In both cases, attentive 
listening is in order. But much of our engagement with literature is done in solitude, 
written copy of the work in hand. And when reading literature alone, appreciating a 
work’s rhythm is not a matter of attentive listening. It is a more demanding affair. The 
goal of this section is to sort out just how demanding that affair is. 
 
Degrees of Appreciation 
 Since PIs are the means through which rhythm in literature is experienced, they 
are the means through which we may appreciate rhythm in literature, even if CIs may 
enhance or supplement that appreciation. So the degree to which we can appreciate a 
literary work’s rhythm depends on the quality or competence of the PI to which we are 
attending. Some rough distinctions will be useful. With respect to the rhythm of some 
work W, say that a best PI accurately represents all determinate features of rhythmic 
organization in W (e.g. word order and stress) and is compatible with the best CI of W. 
Say that a strong PI accurately represents all determinate features of rhythmic 
organization in W and is compatible with a plausible CI of W (i.e. a CI that is at least a 
live option for understanding W). Say that a weak PI accurately represents all determinate 
features of rhythmic organization in W but is not compatible with a plausible CI of W. 
And say that an inadequate PI does not accurately represent all determinate features of 
rhythmic organization in W and is not compatible with a plausible CI of W. Certainly a 
minimal condition for adequacy in any interpretation is getting all the determinate 
features of a work right, the features not open to interpretation. Any PI that, for instance, 
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involves pronouncing “rocket” as Rockette or not pausing whatsoever at a period is 
fundamentally deficient. 
 While hearing a work’s rhythm right consists in attending to a best PI, it is 
questionable whether we can, in practice, determine a class of best PIs. Typically, we will 
have to settle for a strong PI. And provided that there is not an agreed upon class of best 
PIs, strong PIs will be in contention for inclusion in that class. Thus strong PIs offer the 
fodder for intelligent debate over whether one is hearing a work’s rhythm right. So 
provided that there is not consensus on a class of best PIs, strong PIs offer the 
opportunity for adequate appreciation of a work’s rhythm. 
 
Hearing Rhythm 
 Yet simply listening to a strong PI does not result in adequate appreciation of a 
work’s rhythm. One must follow the rhythm presented in the PI, along with the effect that 
rhythm generates; one must recognize the patterns of sound10 and how those patterns 
influence or fit with the content of the work. So, for example, when listening to a strong 
PI of William Gaddis’s JR or Carpenter’s Gothic, if one is adequately appreciating their 
rhythm, one will recognize patterns of sound within sentences that, as Jonathan Raban 
plausibly claims, brilliantly capture the way we speak now, “with a wicked fidelity to its 
flimsy grammar, its elisions and hiatuses, its rush-and-stumble rhythms. When Gaddis’s 
characters open their mouths, they’re apt to give voice to sentences like car pileups in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 And depending on who you ask, one must also hear movement in a passage due to those 
patterns. Though whatever view one takes on movement and rhythm, it certainly is natural to talk 
about the way a sentence or line moves, whether that talk is eliminable or not. 
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fog, with each new thought smashing into the rear of the one ahead and colliding with the 
oncoming traffic of another speaker’s words” (2004, 164). 
 This does not, however, mean that one must be able to describe Gaddis’s prose in 
this fashion or, for that matter, in any fashion. As Levinson notes of someone who 
understands a piece of music, one “need only have an implicit grasp of these things—in 
his bones and ears, so to speak” (1996b, 36).11 Adequate appreciation of rhythm does not 
require an ability to describe or explain what one has heard. Rather, as Levinson argues 
of musical literacy, it is fundamentally a matter of “hearing it in an appropriate way, in 
virtue of the experiences one has had and the resulting reorganization of one’s mental 
space” (1996b, 36), something that “can be evidenced in having the right kinds of 
affective responses at the right points; by the character of one’s reactions to alterations, 
rearrangements, truncations of the [rhythmic] progression; in the way one [...] attempts to 
reproduce given passages; and in the answers to simple questions designed to probe 
whether the sort of aural experience constitutive of comprehending listening has occurred 
(e.g., ‘Do you hear X as more similar to Y or to Z?’ ‘Do you hear W as a continuation of 
V or not?’)” (1996b, 39–40). In this way, literacy with respect to literature goes beyond 
mere verbal literacy, beyond the mere grasp of an articulate meaning, and into a shared 
space with musical literacy. 
 But of course this does not give us a complete picture of adequately appreciating 
rhythm in literature. Listening to literature—via audiobooks or live readings—only 
accounts for a small portion of most people’s engagement with literature. Reading is the 
primary mode of literary consumption. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Malcolm Budd (2008b, 139–41) argues a similar line.  
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Reading & Rhythm 
 When reading, we do not have the luxury of merely listening to a PI; we must 
produce a PI ourselves in order to attend to rhythm. Thus, when reading, in order to 
adequately appreciate a literary work’s rhythm, we must produce a strong PI ourselves. 
And so, in reading, literature’s primary mode of consumption, attending to rhythm 
radically diverges from musical literacy, and is, in a sense, a more demanding affair. Yet 
there is a question of how intentional a reader’s production of a strong PI must be to 
enable adequate appreciation, and thus just how demanding the adequate appreciation of 
rhythm is when reading. If a reader must herself have a strong PI, the demands of 
appreciating rhythm appear, at first blush, incredibly high, perhaps prohibitively so.  
 Of a musical performance, Levinson distinguishes three degrees of intentionality, 
“three relations that may obtain between a performance of a work W and performative 
interpretations of W” (1996c, 75). A performance may correspond to a possible PI, 
embody an actual PI, or advance a PI. Every performance trivially corresponds to a 
possible PI, as every performance “always instantiates some way of playing or other” 
(1996c, 75). But merely corresponding to a possible PI does not mean that the 
performance actually contains a PI, that it embodies someone’s considered way of 
playing the piece, even if that someone is not the performer. But if a performance does 
embody a PI, and the performer either formed the PI herself or embraces the PI as her 
own, then the performance not only embodies a PI but also advances it. 
 Now, while some oral readings of literary works are certainly performances (e.g. 
audio book narrations and live readings), I think most of the reading we do, usually in 
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relative solitude, does not qualify as performance. So I will continue to speak simply of 
one’s reading of a literary work. Thus, how demanding adequate appreciation of a 
literary work W’s rhythm is when reading turns on the relationship that must obtain 
between one’s reading of W and performative interpretations of W. But nothing in my 
ensuing analysis depends on the view that solitary readings, be they vocal or subvocal, 
are typically not performances. My account functions just the same for those who believe 
solitary readings of literary works are performances.12 
 While every musical performance corresponds to a possible PI, only oral readings 
correspond to a possible PI, as rhythm is a product of organized sound. Thus, a minimal 
requirement for appreciating rhythm when reading is that the text of the work be 
vocalized or subvocalized.13 And of all possible PIs, it is only strong PIs that offer the 
opportunity for adequate appreciation. So the question is whether oral readings may 
merely correspond to a possible strong PI or must embody or advance a strong PI.  
 Since no more than one PI (be it possible or actual) can be represented in a 
reading, if one’s oral reading R merely corresponds to a possible strong PI of a literary 
work W, R does no more for the reader’s appreciation of W’s rhythm than an oral reading 
that corresponds to any possible PI. This is because little thought has been given to R, 
with accents unconsciously uttered and phrasings resulting out of necessity. After all, the 
text of W must be read some way or other. Thus there is no sense in saying that the reader 
follows the rhythm presented in R. If she did, then her accenting and phrasing in R would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Like, for instance, Peter Kivy (2010 and 2006). 
13 I am assuming that subvocalization sufficiently replicates the perceptual experience of hearing 
a vocalization, at least when it comes to rhythm. However, nothing of radical consequence turns 
on this assumption. If subvocalization is not in fact robust enough to replicate the perceptual 
experience of hearing a vocalization, then that simply means no less than vocalization is required. 
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necessarily be considered, as it would be a focus of her attention, and so R would at least 
embody a strong PI. Thus, R’s mere correspondence to a possible strong PI is clearly 
insufficient for adequate appreciation of W’s rhythm. 
To be sure, it seems unlikely that any unreflective oral reading would just happen 
to correspond to a possible strong PI. Perhaps the likelihood increases with one’s general 
aptitude in oral reading. It is at least conceivable that someone especially practiced in oral 
reading might stumble into producing an R that corresponds to a possible strong PI of W. 
And interestingly, R could in principle offer an attentive listener the opportunity for 
adequately appreciating W’s rhythm.14 But during her production of R, the reader is 
simply too inattentive to adequately appreciate W’s rhythm. 
 For similar reasons, an oral reading R that embodies a strong PI does not 
necessarily put the reader in a better position with respect to appreciating rhythm. Yes, 
for R to embody a strong PI of W, the reader must have at least decided to produce the PI 
in R. But this does not entail that the reader is reflective in the act of producing R. 
Consider someone who unreflectively mimics, in her oral reading R of W, another oral 
reading R* of W, and as a result faithfully reproduces the strong PI presented in R*.15 
Imagine her dream is to become an audio book narrator and she is practicing her craft by 
simply copying a master, with her concentration focused solely on strict reproduction. R 
certainly embodies a strong PI (namely, the one presented in R*). But in the production 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Imagine a talented audio book narrator who records an unreflective oral reading R that happens 
to correspond to a possible strong PI of W. If a listener follows the rhythm presented in R, then 
the listener has adequately appreciated W’s rhythm, even if the narrator has not. Of course the 
narrator could, upon listening to her own recording, do the same, and even then, at the point of 
listening, adopt the possible PI as her own actual PI of W. But during the act of producing R, the 
narrator does not adequately appreciate W’s rhythm. 
15 As Levinson considers of the musical case (1996c, 75). 
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of R, the reader no more follows the rhythm realized in R than does a computer 
programmed to reproduce R*.16 
 Of course, this does not mean that a reader cannot, in principle, follow the rhythm 
presented in her oral reading that embodies a strong PI of W. One may choose in her oral 
reading R to reproduce a strong PI of W, not embrace that PI as her own, and still closely 
attend to the PI as she executes it in R. Thus, one need not have a strong PI in order to 
adequately appreciate a literary work’s rhythm; one need only deliberately reproduce a 
strong PI and closely attend to the rhythm realized in her reproduction. But when it 
comes to the practice of solitary reading, this would be unusual. When reading, we 
typically come to a literary work fresh, never before having read or listened to another 
read it aloud. In this context, it would be by a stroke of wild chance that any oral reading 
would embody a strong PI. Thus, when reading a work alone for the first time, a reader 
must advance a strong PI in her oral reading in order to adequately appreciate a literary 
work’s rhythm. She must choose to phrase and place accents in a considered way, such 
that she believes her choices capture the way the work should be read aloud. In other 
words, she must have a strong PI of the work. 
 While it may seem, then, that the demands for adequately appreciating rhythm are 
incredibly high, it is important to keep a few things in mind. First, in virtue of advancing 
a PI, a reader follows the rhythm realized in that PI. Thus in virtue of advancing a strong 
PI, a reader adequately appreciates the rhythm of the work. Nothing additional is 
required. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 It is also worth noting that a reader could mimic herself, unreflectively reproducing a strong PI 
she formed at some previous time. At the time she formed the PI, the reader adequately 
appreciated rhythm; but at the time of self-mimicry, she does not. 
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 Second, the requirements for a strong PI itself are not incredibly high. The 
majority of literature’s features of rhythmic organization are features of language 
generally. So if a reader is fluent in the language in which a literary work is written, 
making considered choices about accent and phrasing will be far from foreign to her. In 
fact, such decisions will most likely come naturally. For such a reader, making linguistic 
judgments based on context and semantic importance is an everyday affair. In principle, 
for fluent readers, constructing a strong PI of a literary work largely amounts to 
marshaling and deploying everyday skills. By intending to be sensitive to a literary 
work’s rhythm, a fluent reader’s construction of a strong PI is not far off. To be sure, 
some literary works may have complex syntax, and thus rhythms that may be 
complicated to realize and follow in one’s first reading, fluent or not (e.g. the novels of 
William Gaddis).17 But this does not somehow raise the difficulty of constructing a strong 
PI in principle. Many literary works deemed “difficult” are so deemed in virtue of their 
complicated syntax (see, for example, Franzen 2003). And yes, even executing a strong 
PI of a work without complex rhythms may be difficult to do flawlessly. But a PI cannot 
be mechanically read off an oral reading. As Levinson notes, “Mistakes of execution [...] 
are not generally accounted part of the PI involved in a performance; we idealize 
somewhat, bracketing such unintended, unwanted features, so that it is only the 
performance with those practical blemishes removed that properly represents the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Interestingly, vocalizing rhythmically complicated works may be the best way for one to hone 
one’s ability to construct strong PIs. Benjamin and Schwanenflugel (2010) found that with 
children of diverse fluency levels, when instructed to read two texts aloud, each with different 
degrees of syntactic difficulty, “[c]hildren’s intonation contour was more adultlike with the more 
difficult text” (399). This suggests that more difficult texts encourage better reading prosody. 
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performer’s PI” (1996c, 64). Likewise, it is only the idealized oral reading that properly 
represents the readers PI. 
 Third, to have a strong PI, a reader need not be able to explain why her PI is 
strong. Though accents and phrasings must be chosen deliberately, the felt reasons for 
these choices may be intuitive and non-verbal, sentences, in a sense, seemingly just 
moving in particular ways. As Levinson notes, “a performer need not be able to articulate 
reasons why his way of playing is right or true to the work’s expressiveness or structure 
in order for us to say he possesses a PI, so long as he feels, upon consideration, that the 
work should be played in such and such a manner and is so able to play it. To insist on 
more is to narrow unjustifiably the gap between a PI and a CI” (Levinson 1996c, 75–76). 
And given that it is at least likely that there is no singular best PI, a reader need only feel, 
upon consideration, that her oral reading is one way the work should be read aloud. Most 
would agree that the rhythm of a literary work may be rightly realized in more than one 
way. 
 So for a fluent reader—and certainly one practiced in oral reading—adequately 
appreciating rhythm when reading alone is not, I think, so daunting after all. To be sure, it 
is not part of common reading practice. But an avid reader of literature should be able to 
build strong PIs into her repertoire without too much difficulty.  
 
III. RHYTHM & VALUE 
 Even if I am right about the demands of adequately appreciating rhythm in 
literature, one might question whether readers need to attend to a literary work’s rhythm 
all that often. It might seem that appreciating rhythm is rarely required to fully appreciate 
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a literary work. To be sure, there may be some works whose rhythm requires attending to, 
works where rhythm stands to the fore, works whose authors evidently care a great deal 
about rhythm and craft their sentences accordingly, authors like Virginia Woolf, William 
Gaddis, and James Joyce, along with many poets. But this obviously does not encompass 
most, let alone all, of literature. Especially rhythmic works are the exception. And it 
seems absurd that one should need to attend to rhythm in drugstore romance novels in 
order to fully appreciate them. It may be interesting to explore the demands of attending 
to rhythm in literature, one might think, but nothing discovered in that exploration bears 
on the reading of literature generally. 
 Offering a full argument to the contrary is beyond the scope of this chapter. At 
worst, I hope to have said something interesting about the works in which attending to 
rhythm is required or worthwhile, even if such cases are only a subset of literature. But I 
will give a few reasons why rhythm in literature is generally worth attending to. 
 First, considerations of rhythm are common in literary criticism.18 So if assessing 
the value of literary works is at least part of the primary business of literary criticism—as 
it intuitively seems and as Carroll (2009) argues19—then it would seem that rhythm is 
deserving of our attention when reading. And it is reasonable to think that criticism 
explicitly serves a social function, one that aids readers in appreciating the value of 
literary works. 
 Second, dialogue is a feature of much prose. Often, one of the goals when writing 
dialogue is that it be natural, that it feel real, that it capture the kinds of things real people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For a sampling of the evidence, browse past issues of the New York Times Book Review. At the 
time of this writing, a search for “rhythm and novel” returns over 700 results. 
19 See especially chapter one of Carroll (2009). 
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say and the way they say them. Successful realist dialogue captures the rhythms of real 
speech; and one trouble with much novice writing is its failure to do that, its tendency to 
contain stiff, stilted dialogue (see, for instance, Lamott 1994, 64–66 and Burroway 1992, 
135). So it seems that rhythm worth attending to does not just reside in the ornate, 
complicated, and prominent realms of literature. 
 Third, a common recommendation given to budding writers of literature is to read 
their work aloud so they may be more sensitive to its rhythms (e.g. Burroway 2011, 205; 
Gardner 1985, 153; Gotham Writers’ Workshop Faculty 2003, 115; LaPlante 2007, 554; 
Mills 2006, 35, 91; and Prose 2006, 56). Now, it may not be that everything budding 
writers are instructed to do or be sensitive to is something deserving of our attention 
when reading. For instance, another common recommendation is that budding writers 
should write daily, so as to tune their writing muscles; and a writer’s writing schedule is 
surely not relevant to our appreciation of her work. But we at least have good reason to 
attend to things writers are often instructed to attend to when those things bear directly on 
the writer’s work. 
 Finally, it is important to keep two senses of the term “appreciation” distinct: (1) 
to grasp the value of and (2) to value or regard positively in virtue of experiencing. And it 
seems wise to follow Levinson in distinguishing the first sense as evaluation per se 
(2009, 415). Given this distinction, I admit that we need not attend to rhythm to fully 
appreciate at least some literary works. But it does seem that we need to attend to rhythm 
to properly evaluate literary works. To fully grasp the value of a work, consideration of 
both good- and bad-making features is required. When evaluating a work, we do not 
simply sum the good-making features; rather, we weigh the good and bad and come to an 
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overall view of the work’s value. Thus, with respect to literary evaluation, it is odd to 
suggest that the only works whose rhythm requires attending to are those whose rhythmic 
fashioning is prominent and presumably counts as a good-making feature. If anything 
delimits the relevance of rhythm in evaluation, it certainly cannot be the particular value 
of a work’s rhythm. For instance, we might well consider the novels of Virginia Woolf 
and James Joyce as better than those of the drugstore romance variety because of the poor 
rhythm evidenced by the latter. Thus even if my exploration of the demands of 
adequately appreciating rhythm in literature is of no concern for the full appreciation of 





3. THE PUZZLE OF FACTUAL PRAISE 
 
On the one hand, literary fiction is just that: fiction. So it seems truth should have 
no bearing on its value as literature and, thus, our appreciation of it as such. And yet, on 
the other hand, it seems there are clear cases where a fictional work’s getting the facts 
right at least appears to matter to our evaluation of it as a work of literature. Historical 
facts are a prime example, so much so that Christopher Bartel (2012) argues for what he 
calls the puzzle of historical criticism. Despite obvious conflict, we are not willing to give 
up the intuitions that (a) fiction is free from the constraints of historical truth and (b) 
historical inaccuracies sometimes count against the artistic value of works of fiction. I 
argue that this puzzle extends beyond historical facts. While it is especially salient that 
historical accuracy at times appears to be relevant to evaluation of literary fiction, such 
relevance appears to be a feature of facts in general. Furthermore, I argue that this 
relevance is more than mere appearance. Resolving the conflict calls for a revision of the 
make-believe theory of fiction. 
 
I. THE PUZZLE OF HISTORICAL CRITICISM 
 It is hard to see how a work of fiction can assert anything about the real world, let 
alone assert something true of the real world. In part, what distinguishes fiction from 
nonfiction, what makes fiction fiction, is that it constructs worlds rather than describing 
the real world. Unlike nonfictional texts, fictional texts are not constrained by the facts; 
we do not subject them to the same truth evaluation as we do of, say, journalism or 
textbooks or philosophy. “And,” as John Gibson puts it, “this implies an independence of 
literary content from factual content; indeed, it suggests that the presence of the former 
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reveals a turning-away from the latter” (2007, 29). Fictional works do not ask us to 
believe; they ask us to make-believe (see Currie 1990 and Walton 1990). When we apply 
the sentences of fictional works to the real world, most of them turn out to be false. The 
make-believe theory of fiction makes sense of this. Even with cases of realist—or 
mimetic—fiction, mimesis is a relationship of resemblance, not reference. Realist fiction 
may resemble the real world, but it does obviously not refer to it. To quote Gibson again, 
“Literature is not brought before the basic semantic court of worldly truth and reference” 
(2007, 29). If this is right, then it is wholly unclear how fictional works could get any 
purchase on the real world. And pointing to cases where the line between fiction and 
nonfiction is blurred—the “new” journalistic works of Norman Mailer and Tom Wolfe, 
for instance—does little good, for what is at issue are unequivocally fictional works. 
 Yet, despite the nature of fiction, it seems historical inaccuracies sometimes count 
against the artistic value of unequivocally fictional works. As an example, Bartel (2012, 
213) appeals to the film U-571, which chronicles a pivotal event in World War II. In the 
film, a German-disguised US naval crew boards a German submarine and captures its 
Enigma cipher machine, which is needed to break the German Navy’s coded messages. 
In reality, an Enigma cipher machine is captured in the fashion portrayed in the film, and 
with the same important consequences for the war, but it is the British—not the US—
Navy that is responsible for the mission. The filmmakers made this change to appeal to 
an American audience. But while the film enjoyed general success in the US, it received 
serious criticism for its distortion of history. As Bartel notes, even Tony Blair publicly 
condemned the film (2012, 221). Since the film centers on the story of the capture of the 
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Enigma machine, there appears to be a demand for, or at least expectation of, being 
faithful to the key elements of that story. 
 Now, to be sure, Bartel is concerned primarily with film and I am concerned 
primarily with literature. But in the matter of whether truth matters to the artistic merit of 
a fictional work, I see nothing special with respect to film or literature. And criticism of 
historical inaccuracies also shows up in the domain of literature. One notable example is 
Philippa Gregory’s The Other Boleyn Girl. Though the novel enjoyed large commercial 
success, it also received a good deal of criticism on account of numerous historical 
inaccuracies.1 
 So, given that these cases are merely representative of many more like them, it 
looks as though the standard conception of the nature of fiction as make-believe is in 
conflict with a general expectation that some fiction owes a certain degree of fidelity to 
the historical facts. On the one hand, there is the intuition that fiction is free from the 
constraints of historical truth; on the other hand, there is the intuition that historical 
inaccuracy sometimes counts against the literary (or, more broadly, artistic) value of 
some works. And most of us are not willing to give up either intuition. So it seems that 
either the standard account of fiction as make-believe must be adjusted to accommodate 
the relevance of historical truth to artistic value, or else the intuition that historical truth is 
relevant to artistic value must be explained away. 
 One means of doing that explaining away amounts to pinning the intuition on 
genre conventions (see, for instance, Lamarque 2009). The thought goes as follows. In 
order to be a member of some genre, a work must abide by the conventions of that genre, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For the most comprehensive review of this criticism, see Bordo 2013. 
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and one convention of the genre of historical fiction is historical accuracy. So, in cases 
like U-571 and The Other Boleyn Girl, what has, strictly speaking, gone wrong is not that 
these works have played loose with historical facts per se, but rather that they have failed 
to meet the conventions of the genre of which they are members. They have broken genre 
conventions; and that is their flaw. Thus the apparent tension in our intuitions is just that: 
merely apparent. Fiction in general is free from the constraints of historical truth, but 
works of historical fiction must meet special conventional demands as members of that 
genre. The nice thing about this approach is that it does seem to explain why we only 
sometimes care about historical inaccuracies in works of fiction. As Bartel notes, 
“Comedies seem almost entirely immune to historical criticism: no one ever seriously 
complains that Mel Brooks’s History of the World, Part 1 (1981) is a bad film because it 
is historically inaccurate” (2012, 216)! And in virtue of belonging to the genre we might 
call “alternative history,” our expectations with respect to historical accuracy are a mixed 
bag. Such works must take liberties with the course of historical events and yet also be 
faithful to matters of, for instance, historical setting and dress. For instance, Quentin 
Tarantino’s Inglorious Bastards is an alternative account of World War II and thus free 
from constraints and expectations of historical accuracy concerning events. But, as Bartel 
notes, “the costumes, props, and setting still aim for some historical accuracy. If 
Tarantino’s actors had been communicating by the use of mobile phones, then such 
historical liberties would likely not be condoned” (2012, 216). 
 But it is not so clear that this appeal to genre conventions really explains our 
intuitions that historical accuracy sometimes matters in the evaluation of fictional works. 
Criticism of some fictional works on the grounds of historical accuracy really does seem 
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to be a matter of such works failing to be historically accurate, period, not a matter of 
such works failing meet the demands of their genre. So even if an appeal to genre 
conventions helps with the metaphysics of historical criticism, it does not seem adequate 
to the phenomenology. Then again, a proponent of this account may just say, “So much 
the worse for our intuitions.” Now, here it would be nice to have an argument as to why 
our intuitions are so far askew. But failing that, at least an argument is in order as to why 
we should think an appeal to genre does the metaphysical work desired, for it is 
questionable that it does. 
 First, as Bartel points out, it is not clear whether genre plays an evaluative or 
categorical role (2012, 217). In failing to meet certain demands on historical accuracy, 
this may mean works like U-571 and The Other Boleyn Girl simply do not qualify as 
historical fiction, even if that was the intention of the creators and the expectation of 
viewers and readers. Or maybe, as with science fiction and its distinctions between 
“hard” and “soft” works, there are gradations within historical fiction such that U-571 
and The Other Boleyn Girl fall short of being “hard.” Either way, if genre serves solely a 
categorial (rather than evaluative) function, then any criticism on the grounds of 
historical inaccuracy would amount to criticism of a creator for failing to satisfy her 
intentions, or else mere expression of disappointment that a work is not of some genre.2 
Second, if the demand for historical accuracy is a matter of genre convention, it seems 
that the problem of how a fictional work could be constrained by truth in the actual world 
becomes the problem of how a genre of fictional works could impose a constraint 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 One might take the position that the categorial role of genre has an evaluative mechanism built 
in, where some genres have more merit than others (for example, one might think hard science 
fiction has more merit than soft science fiction). But of course this position still comes with the 
burden of giving an argument for such evaluative mechanism. 
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governed by truth in the actual world. Maybe an available response here is that historical 
fiction is not strictly or purely a genre of fiction. But even if a satisfying account of how 
to approach the hybrid works of historical fiction can be given, a larger problem looms, 
namely that the puzzle of historical fiction extends beyond historical fiction. It is a puzzle 
that applies to fictional literary works in general.3 Despite obvious conflict, we have 
intuitions that (a) fiction is free from the constraints of truth and (b) accuracy is 
sometimes relevant to the literary value of works of fiction. This, at least, is what I argue 
in the following section. 
 
II. EXTENDING THE PUZZLE 
 There are two ways the puzzle of historical fiction might be generalized to all 
literary fiction: by appealing to thematic truth or factual truth. While the former may 
seem intuitively compelling, I argue it does not pave the path to the generalization of the 
puzzle. We do not evaluate the merit of a literary work by the truth of its thematic 
concerns—its implied general propositions about human life4—but rather by the 
plausibility of such concerns. What leads to the generalized puzzle is the expectation of 
fidelity to certain facts. Despite a work of fiction being just that—fiction—it is, in some 
of its fictional assertions, expected to get things about the real world right. 
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narrative fiction. But I will not explicitly argue for that in this chapter. 
4 More generally, following Lamarque, we might define a thematic concern as “a perspective or 
vision or general reflection that informs the subject matter and moves beyond the immediate 
events portrayed,” “a unifying thread that binds together incident and character in an illuminating 
way” (2009, 150). But certainly any general proposition about human life implied by the entirety 
of a literary work falls under this more general definition. And the perspectives, visions, or 
unifying threads that we tend to be interested in are those that deal in human life.  
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Thematic Truth 
 A seemingly obvious place where truth appears to be relevant to literary 
evaluation generally is in the truths found in literary works’ themes. For instance, M. W. 
Rowe asks us to imagine works whose themes show that “nudism makes you intelligent, 
or that cruelty to children makes them outgoing and well adjusted” (1997, 337). He then 
goes on to claim that not only would such idiotic ideas count against the literary value of 
the works that express them, they would debar the works from the category of literature. 
Even if we set the stronger claim aside, which I am more than skeptical of, Lamarque 
objects to the weaker one on the grounds that imagining some work that has a blatantly 
false theme distorts the enterprise of literary interpretation; we must begin with a specific, 
actual work, not an imagined general statement (2006, 138). When we do consider 
specific works, we see that it is common for them to develop conflicting themes, such 
that this conflict does not appear to affect our evaluation of the works’ value. A 
paradigmatic case of this is the question of whether we have free will. 
 Nevertheless, I think Rowe’s point has an intuitive pull we cannot ignore. If we 
look to terms found in standard criticism of literary works, we find “[w]ords like 
‘sentimental,’ ‘unrealistic,’ ‘improbably,’ ‘priggish,’ ‘immature,’ ‘adolescent,’ and so 
forth” (Rowe 1997, 338). So we owe some explanation that accounts for the use of such 
terms. Rowe thinks the explanation must lie with some notion of truth or adequacy to the 
facts.5 But I think there is a better explanation, one that accounts for the use of such terms 
and the intuition that a blatantly false theme counts against a work’s literary value as well 
as the fact that conflicting themes do not appear to affect our value judgments. What I 
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have in mind is Peter Kivy’s plausibility theory, which has it that “it is a good-making 
feature of a literary work that it expresses a live hypothesis as part of its purpose, a bad-
making feature if it expresses a dead one,” where a live hypothesis is, to the reader, at 
least a viable candidate for belief, even though she might not believe it (2006, 102). If we 
exchange “theme” for “purpose,” it seems Kivy’s theory can both do the explanatory 
work we want and save the phenomena Lamarque points out. It explains both why 
Rowe’s imagined theme would (most likely) count against the value of a work and yet 
why a theme concerning the question of free will would not, whatever the fact of the 
matter is. Something that appears to a reader as a viable candidate for belief need not 
have any relationship to truth or factual adequacy. So an appeal to thematic truth does not 
result in a more general version of Bartel’s puzzle.  
 
Factual Truth 
 However, there is another type of case Rowe evokes that Kivy’s plausibility 
theory cannot handle. These are cases of factual falsehoods within the text of a literary 
work. Rowe provides a handful of specific examples where works get the facts wrong 
and where it is hard to deny that the errors matter to the evaluation of the works (Rowe 
1997, 333–35).6 In the first edition of Middlemarch, Eliot describes a character’s pupils 
as dilated from the effects of opium, when opium in fact causes the pupils to contract. 
After this was pointed out to her, she made the correction in a later edition. An error more 
serious with respect to plot occurs in Golding’s Lord of the Flies. The glasses of a 
shortsighted character, Piggy, are stolen in order to light fires. Concave lenses, however, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The first two of these cases he takes from Ricks (1996). 
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diffuse rather than concentrate light, and so cannot be used to light fires. But Piggy could 
not simply be made long-sighted because his shortsightedness is crucial to an incident in 
the plot. And an error maybe even more serious concerns imagery in Larkin’s poem 
“Absences.” At the poem’s beginning, he describes waves offshore dropping like walls. 
But offshore, waves don’t drop like a wall; this only happens with waves rolling into 
shore. After this was pointed out to him, he added a note to the poem, admitting this error 
damaged the poem technically. 
 Early on, Lamarque responded to these cases in hand-waving fashion, claiming 
that most readers are able to brush the factual errors aside (2006, 138). But even if he is 
right about how most readers would react to discovering these falsehoods, more recently 
Lamarque recognizes that such a response will not do, acknowledging that “[f]actual 
mistakes of this kind, when brought to the surface, do have an adverse affect” (2009, 
230). But he goes on to argue that “such cases seem curiously peripheral to the formula 
of ‘instruct’ and ‘please’“ (2009, 230). To be sure, these works do not aim, even in part, 
to instruct readers as to the physical effects of ingesting opium and the fire-starting 
properties of lenses; these things “are part of the subject and imagery of the works but not 
part of any significant ‘truth’ the works impart” (Lamarque 2009, 230). And despite the 
falsehoods, the works still “give pleasure and retain their essential literary interest” 
(Lamarque 2009, 230). 
But the question on the table is whether truth is relevant to the evaluation of 
works of fiction as fiction, period. And yes, these works may not aim to instruct, but 
aiming to instruct has no bearing on whether a work can instruct, let alone whether truth 
matters. Lamarque is perhaps right that even if the works did get these facts right, they 
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would not be part of any significant truth in the works. Such facts are minor concerns in 
the grand literary scheme of things. But with Golding’s novel and Larkin’s poem, if not 
with Middlemarch, this seems questionable. I think Rowe is, in part, right that “we can 
never be quite comfortable with these works again because, while we read, we have to 
make a conscious effort to suppress the knowledge that what they describe is impossible” 
(1997, 335). I know that at least I would not be quite comfortable. But the claim is 
empirical. Maybe Lamarque is right that most readers would read on just fine. 
 What we need are stronger cases. And I think we can find them within a class of 
works deemed “encyclopedic.” Here there is a similarity to the historical fiction Bartel 
considers. 
 In 1976, Edward Mendelson introduced the term encyclopedic narrative to 
identify a literary genre that had not yet been fully recognized. He gives a series of fairly 
strict conditions for the genre, so much so that at the time of his writing, he could think of 
only seven works that qualified: Dante’s Commedia, Rabelais’ five books of Gargantua 
and Pantagruel, Cervantes’ Don Quixote, Goethe’s Faust, Melville’s Moby-Dick, Joyce’s 
Ulysses, and Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow (1976, 1267). But for the purposes of 
argument here, I am only interested in one of these conditions: “Encyclopedic narratives 
all attempt to render the full range of knowledge and beliefs of a national culture” 
(Mendelson 1976, 1269). Of course, Mendelson notes, these works cannot actually cover 
all of the culture’s knowledge, so one or two examples from a field of knowledge stand in 
for all. With respect to this condition, Gravity’s Rainbow is a paradigmatic case. It 
covers, fairly extensively and among other things, chemistry, ballistics, behaviorism, and 
some calculus, all with both allusion and factual statements. Richard Poirier claims, 
72 
“Really to read Pynchon properly you would have to be astonishingly learned not only 
about literature but about a vast number of other subjects belonging to the disciplines and 
to popular culture, learned to the point where learning is almost a sensuous pleasure, 
something to play around with, to feel totally relaxed about, so that you can take in stride 
every dizzying transition from one allusive mode to another” (2003, 47–8). And if you 
are not so learned, you might invest in Steven C. Weisenburger’s 400-page A Gravity’s 
Rainbow Companion (2006), now in its second edition. 
 So it seems that if we are properly appreciating Gravity’s Rainbow, were we to 
discover that any of its allusions to or statements of supposed fact are in error (which, to 
my knowledge, none are), this would be far from something we could just brush off.7 
From Mendelson to Poirier to numerous other literary critics—not to mention Pynchon’s 
large, cult-like readership—the encyclopedic quality of Gravity’s Rainbow is one of the 
reasons it is touted as an exemplary work of literary fiction. Yes, these facts serve as part 
of the work’s subject and imagery, but getting them right matters. Perhaps the work’s 
central aim is not actually to instruct the reader on matters of chemistry, ballistics, or 
calculus. But insofar as the praise given to Gravity’s Rainbow on account of its 
encyclopedic qualities is something we should take seriously, truth at least appears 
relevant to such evaluation, and significantly so. And this goes, it seems, for all 
encyclopedic narrative. What we have, then, is a situation similar to the puzzle of 
historical criticism. On the one hand, encyclopedic fiction is just that: fiction. Yet on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It is worth noting that in a fictional work, the accuracy of any appeal to real-world “facts” 
established by science will be measured against the scientific findings of the era in which the 
fictional work is set. As anyone versed in the debate between scientific realism and antirealism 
knows, what our best scientific theories say is the case is always, at best, approximately true. So 
even when fictional works appeal to current real-world science, truth is in relation to the 
propositions of the real-world science, not the real world itself. 
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other hand, much of the praise of an encyclopedic work rests on how well it weaves non-
trivial facts about the real world into its narrative. Were an encyclopedic work to get any 
of these non-trivial facts wrong, it would be subject to serious criticism, just as the 
historical works Bartel considers have been criticized for getting historical facts wrong. 
 But how does this show much more than the case of historical fiction? How does 
this extend, in any notable way, the puzzle of historical criticism? Encyclopedic works 
are, after all, only a small subset of literary fiction. The difference is that rendering the 
full range of a culture’s knowledge is only one feature of encyclopedic narrative as 
Mendelson defines it. Meeting it is not sufficient for a work to be included in the genre. 
Many works might be fittingly described as “encyclopedic” in one respect or another 
without, strictly speaking, qualifying as encyclopedic narrative. And most works that 
might not be fittingly described as “encyclopedic” still engage with non-trivial facts 
about the real world (Lord of the Flies, for example). Doing so is not an uncommon 
feature of literary fiction. To be sure, if an encyclopedic work—even one that does not 
meet all the criteria for Mendelson’s encyclopedic narrative—gets a non-trivial fact about 
the real world wrong, we may find it more troubling than Golding’s error in Lord of the 
Flies. But there is a good explanation for why this might be. Works fittingly called 
“encyclopedic” engage with non-trivial facts to a far greater degree than the typical novel 
or short story, so much so that we are inclined to call them encyclopedic. Their dealing in 
real-world facts is front and center, notable even to the casual reader.8 And because of 
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venues you will often find almost as much criticism of encyclopedic qualities as you will praise. 
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this, there is more at stake in the accuracy of those dealings. The more a work attempts to 
employ, reference, or allude to non-trivial real-world facts, the more that work sticks its 
neck out, so to speak. If it succeeds in this attempt—where a necessary condition of this 
success is, of course, getting the facts right—then it may well be deserving of praise.9 But 
if it fails by getting any facts wrong, the more notable this failure will be in virtue of the 
work drawing attention to its use of facts. With any work that we come to call 
“encyclopedic,” there is a strong expectation that such a work will do, in some sense, 
what we expect an actual encyclopedia to do: get the facts right. Of course, with a work 
that is not encyclopedic, the expectation to get the facts right will most likely be weaker. 
But this expectation seems to exist given any attempt to employ, reference, or allude to 
non-trivial real-world facts, be it within an encyclopedic work or otherwise. 
 
III. RESOLVING THE PUZZLE, IN PART 
 If my account of facts and fiction is right, then the puzzle Bartel outlines so nicely 
has much greater reach than matters of historical accuracy. The puzzle extends to factual 
accuracy of all kinds (or at least all kinds in which there is an agreed upon matter of fact). 
On the one hand, literary fiction is supposedly wholly within the realm of fiction; yet on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The appreciation of encyclopedic works tends to be a polarizing affair, where detractors argue 
that all of this dealing in real-world facts dampens a work’s emotional power, which, as far as 
they are concerned, is the primary goal of good literary fiction. But even if these naysayers are 
right, the puzzle still stands, for their criticism of encyclopedic qualities turns on recognizing 
them as just that: the rendering of extensive non-trivial facts about the real world. And if it turned 
out that an encyclopedic work was in error about any of these facts, it would be even worse off in 
detractors’ eyes, caught in something of an emperor-has-no-clothes scenario.  
9 Other conditions of this success may be complex, a matter of how well the facts are integrated 
into the overall narrative. It is, to be sure, not the case that a writer can simply drop facts into her 
work of fiction and expect to receive praise. For an example of someone who disagrees with 
Poirier on Gravity’s Rainbow’s successful use of facts, see Vidal 1976. 
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the other hand, some of its praise and criticism turns on its fidelity to real-world facts. 
But of course, that literary fiction is praised and criticized on such grounds does not entail 
that such evaluation is justified. The evidence certainly does stack up in favor of taking 
this praise and criticism seriously. And in typical cases where a work of some kind is 
considered good or bad largely in virtue of some feature F (as it arguably appears to be 
for Gravity’s Rainbow and possibly U-571 when it comes to truth), I think we can take 
that as sufficient evidence for F being relevant to the evaluation of works of that kind. 
But as the puzzle of historical criticism or, more broadly, what I will call the puzzle of 
factual accuracy shows, we are not dealing with a typical case. So it seems we should be 
willing to readily accept an alternative explanation for the apparent relevance of truth to 
the evaluation of fiction. But barring this alternative explanation, we should yield to the 
weight of the evidence and accept that real-world factual accuracy is relevant to the 
evaluation of at least some fictional works. That, however, is not the end of the story. 
Even if it is accepted that truth is relevant in the evaluation of fiction, we need to do two 
things: (1) reconcile our theory of fiction with the evaluative relevance of truth and (2) 
provide a theory of factual criticism and praise, one that delimits and unifies the 
evaluation of fictional works in virtue of their fidelity to real-world facts. While I have 
little to say about (1), I will suggest a strategy for (2). But before I proceed to that, I will 
first consider one seemingly promising alternative explanation, a means of dismissing 





Dissolving the Puzzle  
 Of the options Bartel considers for dissolving the puzzle of historical criticism—
for explaining away our intuitions and evidence that truth is relevant to our assessment of 
fictional works—an appeal to imaginative resistance seems to be the most promising. 
Bartel believes imaginative resistance theories can, broadly speaking, be divided into two 
camps: conceptual inconceivability and subjective inconsistency. And the latter is the real 
contender when it comes to the puzzle of historical criticism or, more broadly, the puzzle 
of factual accuracy. As a representative of the subjective inconsistency camp, Bartel 
examines Tamar Gendler’s account. Gendler has it that imaginative resistance arises 
when the reader is unwilling to believe something a fictional work invites the reader to 
take as true not just in the fictional world, but also in the real world. To put it in 
Gendler’s terms, imaginative resistance occurs when the reader is unwilling to export a 
proposition that the storyteller seemingly intends the reader to export. So, for instance, 
say some work invites the reader to export the proposition that infanticide is morally 
permissible. Certainly some readers would refuse to export this proposition. Thus: 
imaginative resistance. In being unwilling to believe that infanticide is morally 
permissible in the real world, readers also resist imagining it is true of the fictional world. 
The authorial invitation to export the unacceptable has, in a sense, spoiled the experience 
of the work itself. (Bartel 2012, 219) 
 One might argue, then, that what occurs where there is factual inaccuracy in 
fiction (either historical in nature or otherwise) is imaginative resistance. So, in U-571, 
because we are unwilling to export the notion that the US Navy was responsible for 
capturing the German Enigma cipher machine, we resist imagining that the US Navy is 
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responsible for this feat in the film. And in Lord of the Flies, because we are unwilling to 
export the proposition that concave lenses can light fires, we resist imagining that Piggy’s 
glasses can light fires in the book. Thus, any legitimate criticism of these works lies in the 
invitation to export, not in the facts of the matter themselves. Accordingly, our intuitions 
that factual accuracy is relevant to our evaluation of works of fiction as works of fiction 
are explained away. 
 But Bartel notes two troubles with this potential line of argument (2012, 220). 
First, some works criticized for their factual inaccuracy clearly do not invite the reader 
(or viewer) to export the propositions for which the work is criticized. Such is the case 
with U-571. The filmmakers obviously do not have the intention that anyone who 
watches the film leave believing it was the US and not the British Navy that, in real-
world actuality, captured the Enigma machine. The filmmakers were not out to revise 
history. In fact, the filmmakers explicitly state that the film is a “parallel history.” And 
the film itself ends with a dedication to the British naval officers who in actuality 
retrieved the Enigma machine. 
 Second, any appeal to imaginative resistance of this kind is descriptive, not 
normative. On a subjective inconsistency account, criticism of U-571, The Other Boleyn 
Girl, and any other work that gets the non-trivial real-world facts wrong boils down to 
what we cannot stomach imagining. It is a state of affairs contingent on an individual 
being constitutionally unable to export some proposition expressed in a work of fiction. 
But surely the criticism targeted at these works does not reduce to people merely 
expressing their own inability or reluctance to export propositions. It is criticism of the 
works themselves, such that any proper experience of the works ought to be attuned to 
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their factual inaccuracies. Or, at minimum, this criticism is intended to be normative, 
more than the mere expression of one’s own imaginative resistance. So any appeal to 
imaginative resistance as a means of resolving the puzzle of factual accuracy requires an 
error theory of sorts. Such an account must explain why the general belief that factual 
criticism is of a work itself and of normative significance is mistaken. 
 Furthermore, an imaginative resistance account has little to say of factual praise. 
It is hard to see how the praise of Gravity’s Rainbow on account of its extensive use of 
non-trivial real-world facts could reduce to mere success in imagining. Presumably, there 
is something notably praiseworthy about encyclopedic qualities, where, as discussed 
above, a necessary condition of such qualities is factual accuracy. So even if there is a 
version of imaginative resistance that can somehow deal with Bartel’s objections, at 
minimum, it cannot be the whole story. 
 
Requirements for a Theory of Factual Criticism and Praise 
 When it comes to any good theory of historical criticism, Bartel points out two 
desiderata (2012, 214–15). First, it should satisfactorily deal with what Bartel calls the 
problem of scope. It should be able to distinguish between cases where historical 
accuracy does and does not matter. For instance, in the film A Knight’s Tale, a musical 
comedy, characters sing and dance to twentieth-century pop songs, despite the film being 
set in the fourteenth century. But unlike the cases discussed above, this is an instance in 
which historical accuracy is clearly not at issue. And, as Bartel notes, “someone who 
objected that A Knight’s Tale was not a good film because it was historically inaccurate 
would likely be dismissed as simply ‘not getting it’“ (2012, 214). 
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 Second, a good theory should provide a unified account of historical criticism. It 
should provide a common feature that underlies all historical criticism and explains why 
historical inaccuracy, in such cases, counts against the artistic value of the work. Bartel is 
not, in principle, opposed to a piecemeal account, one that includes no common feature of 
historical criticism. But without a unified account, Bartel believes “we would be forced to 
abandon the intuition that history deserves justice,” an intuition that  seems to motivate 
historical criticism in the first place (2012, 215). 
 Both desiderata extend nicely to the larger issue of factual accuracy. Unlike 
Gravity’s Rainbow and Lord of the Flies, there are clear cases where factual accuracy is 
not at issue. For instance, plenty of science fiction falls into this domain. And of course, 
within the very works where factual accuracy does appear to matter, more often it does 
not. Gravity’s Rainbow is not subject to criticism for introducing a US soldier whose 
sexual encounters predict the fall of German V2 rockets on the grounds that this soldier 
never existed in reality or in myth. But if, in Gravity’s Rainbow, the chemical 
composition of benzene were described as “three carbon atoms arranged in a triangle” 
instead of “six carbon atoms [...] curled around into a closed ring” (1995, 413), it seems it 
would be subject to criticism. So when it comes to the evaluative relevance of factual 
accuracy in general, we have the problem of scope. 
 As for the matter of a unified account, history deserving justice is just a species of 
the facts deserving justice. Just as we speak of doing justice to history, we speak of doing 
justice to facts of all kinds, from a scientific theory to the way a natural landscape looks. 
Of course, when the reputation of actual persons is at stake, the business of doing justice 
may take on moral and even legal overtones. And historical fiction may deal in the 
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reputation of actual persons more often than other kinds of fiction. But it has no special 
purchase on this domain and, more importantly, as Bartel himself notes, “insofar as these 
films [or novels] are criticized for their inaccuracies that are not morally offensive, and 
these inaccuracies are also thought to diminish the value of the work as fiction, then the 
moral argument cannot give us a unified account” (2012, 215). So there should be no 
worry about the moral flavor of some historical criticism ruling out the potential for a 
theory that gives a unified account of all factual criticism and praise. On, then, to a theory 
that attempts to do just this. 
 
A Theory of Factual Criticism and Praise 
 It is not uncommon to consider what a work of fiction is attempting to do, what its 
aims are. We might say, for instance, that a work aims to move readers emotionally or 
parody a particular style, and then assess whether it succeeds in doing so. I think a theory 
of factual criticism and praise turns on considerations of this kind. And if a work’s aims 
are relevant to its evaluation and factual accuracy is an aim of some works of fiction, then 
factual accuracy is relevant to evaluation. But while it seems perfectly intelligible in 
casual conversation to talk about works of fiction in this way, strictly speaking, a work 
itself cannot attempt or aim at anything. An act of this kind requires an agent. Thus we 
should take talk of a work’s aims as shorthand for authorial intentions, however thick or 
thin. I find authorial intentions of the hypothetical sort to be a natural rendering.10 When 
we say that a work W aims at x, we mean that, considering W in its context of origin, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Here I have in mind Jerrold Levinson’s version of hypothetical intentionalism (see his 1996a 
paper). 
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intended readers have good reason to believe that in writing W, the author was aiming at 
x. 
 But authorial intentions might be described more thinly, without reference to 
contextual considerations and intended readers. When we say that a work W aims at x, we 
mean that, considering all constituent parts of W (and only those constituent parts), 
readers are justified in positing that the author was aiming at x. Thus talk of a work’s 
aims may be friendly to those with formalist leanings. After all, as Henry Staten notes, 
“Wimsatt and Beardsley’s argument in ‘The Intentional Fallacy’ has been widely 
misunderstood to exclude intentionality as such, in any sense of the term,” when “the 
only kind of intention Wimsatt and Beardsley ruled out of bounds to the critic is the 
author’s private intention” (2010, 420–21). In fact, Staten argues that “both the Russian 
and American [formalist] groups clearly believed that one kind of context, at least, is 
indispensable for construing the structural intentionality of literary texts,” namely a 
context of other literary works (2010, 421). So an even looser formulation than the one 
given above may accommodate formalists. 
 In this chapter, it is not my business to determine which analysis of a work aiming 
at x is correct or to spell out either analysis given above in detail. Rather, my goal is 
merely to render the notion of a work aiming at something intelligible. If I have 
succeeded in doing this, then the notion can be used to construct a theory of factual 
criticism and praise, and the theory I propose goes roughly as follows: when the aims of a 
fictional work include employing, referencing, or alluding to non-trivial real-world facts, 
we are justified in evaluating the work according to those aims. More specifically, given 
any constituent part P of a fictional work W, where W either aims at real-world factual 
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accuracy in P or has a greater aim of real-world factual accuracy against which P appears 
incongruous (in virtue of other constituent parts in which W aims at real-world factual 
accuracy), we are justified in evaluating P (and thus W) on grounds of real-world factual 
accuracy. Examples are in order. 
 The clearest cases are those where, in a constituent part, a work aims at fidelity to 
real-world facts. Consider, again, Golding’s Lord of the Flies. It seems that in the case of 
Piggy’s glasses being used to light a fire, the work was aiming at real-world factual 
accuracy. Everywhere else the behavior of the physical world in the novel aligns with the 
behavior of the physical world in the real world. So barring any special indication 
otherwise, the aim of Lord of the Flies is that its physical world be true to the real 
physical world, including the light-diffusing properties of concave glass. Thus, we 
criticize Golding’s mistake accordingly. A similar story can be told for Eliot’s 
Middlemarch and Larkin’s “Absences” with respect to the effects of opium on humans 
and the behavior of offshore waves. The aim in the constituent parts criticized for factual 
inaccuracy is factual accuracy. And the same goes for Gravity’s Rainbow, just in the 
other direction. Gravity’s Rainbow receives praise partly because of its success in aiming 
at real-world factual accuracy. To be sure, much of the praise given to Gravity’s Rainbow 
concerns the way real-world non-trivial facts are used, the way they are woven into the 
work. But this praise presupposes Gravity’s Rainbow getting the facts right. 
 But what about cases like U-571 and Gregory’s The Other Boleyn Girl, cases 
where in some constituent part, it is clear that the work is not aiming at real-world 
accuracy, and yet it is equally clear that criticism on such grounds seems appropriate? 
Here the situation is much trickier, but if we turn to the work’s greater aims, I believe we 
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can sort things out. Yes, U-571 is not, in depicting the US Navy as being responsible for 
recovering the German Enigma machine, aiming at real-world accuracy. But in other 
major respects, U-571’s depiction of the mission to recover the German Enigma machine 
is aiming at real-world accuracy, from the fact that the German Enigma machine is what 
was crucially recovered, to the time and location of the battle. Thus there is a strong 
sense, given the aims of the work, that depicting the US Navy rather than the British 
Navy as the heroes of the Enigma story is incongruous. To be sure, as Bartel notes (2012, 
213), the filmmakers had a reason for substituting the US for the British (namely, to 
appeal to an American audience). It would be odd if they did not. But this reason seems 
external to the aims of the work; and even if it does figure in some way into the work’s 
aims, it still seems that the aim at real-world accuracy is overriding. And there is also no 
indication that U-571 has competing aims of presenting an alternative history in the way 
Quentin Tarantino’s film Inglorious Bastards or Philip Roth’s novel The Plot Against 
America do. If U-571 did have such aims, it would no longer be appropriate to critique it 
on the grounds of inaccuracy, for no longer would we have good reason to consider the 
switch of the US for the British ad hoc or the aim at historical accuracy as overriding 
with respect to events. Of course, it is difficult to say just what features U-571 would 
need to exhibit in order to demonstrate the aim of presenting an alternative history. But 
certainly it would require more than simply switching the identity of those responsible for 
executing a military mission that actually occurred in the real world while holding all 
other features of that mission fixed. 
 Bartel himself hints at a strategy along the lines of the one I propose, claiming 
that “the filmmakers’ deliberate choice of the Enigma machine as the object that 
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motivates their story’s drama suggests that they at least partly wanted to tell the story of 
the Enigma machine, and it appears to be this that raises the expectation and the demand 
for historical accuracy” (2012, 213). But I suspect that some (and maybe even Bartel) 
might accuse my account of being unable, with difficult cases like U-571, to offer a 
unified theory of factual criticism and praise. After all, determining the greater aims of a 
work and how a constituent part of the work fits within those aims is a piecemeal affair, 
dependent on various fine-grained considerations of the work at hand. But if fictional 
works do in fact have determinable aims against which their parts can be assessed and 
this assessment serves as the foundation for all factual criticism and praise, then however 
piecemeal that process may be, a work’s aims are at the heart of all factual criticism and 
praise. The assessment of aims, as complicated as that may be, explains and unifies the 
evaluation of fictional works according to real-world factual accuracy. To be sure, it 
would be nice to have a theory of factual criticism and praise that offered a simpler 
procedure for evaluation, one that could easily be spelled out in detail. But since literary 
and film criticism is an intricate business, an enterprise that lives in the particularities of 
works, I do not think we should expect one. 
 
Reconciling a Theory of Fiction with Truth 
 Yet even if I am right about aims and factual criticism, there remains the problem 
of reference. On the one hand, I am not convinced it is as much of a problem as 
Lamarque and Gibson think it is. After all, as Gaut points out, with works of satire, 
audiences must recognize the reference to actual persons (2005, 447). So it seems there is 
at least some amount of reference to the real world in satirical works of fiction. But even 
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if Lamarque and Gibson are right that reference is impossible in clear-cut literary fiction, 
I do not think the relevance of truth is. The make-believed worlds constructed by works 
of literary fiction typically overlap to some degree with the real world, and where a work 
has the aim that its world overlaps with the actual world, we may evaluate the work with 
respect to this aim. Now, Gibson does admit this much, acknowledging that “[t]he real 
world and its history often provide settings for the literary; they provide a backdrop for 
the action (praxis) of the narrative line. But,” he goes on to argue, “literary texts do not 
refer to or make truth claims about this backdrop of reality; they use it” (2007, 31). So 
Gibson thinks our evaluation of this overlap amounts to how well or badly the work uses 
features of the real world as its backdrop, just as we might evaluate the accuracy, not 
truth, of theatrical sets. To claim that a theatrical set functions to make truth claims about 
a region of physical space in the real world is nonsense. So too with works of fiction, 
according to Gibson. 
 But accuracy, in such cases, is a notion closely related to truth. A theatrical set or 
literary backdrop is accurate only insofar as it overlaps with the real world in the right 
way, only if it gets the facts right. And while the accuracy of a literary backdrop may be 
trivial when it comes to our evaluation of a work as a work of literary fiction, the 
accuracy of a work’s rendering of history or a culture’s knowledge is not, as it is not 
always simply the backdrop on which the narrative takes place. Rather, it may, like 
Gravity’s Rainbow, be a major aim of the narrative. 
 So when it comes to reconciling our theory of fiction with factual criticism and 
praise, we might not have to give up a make-believe account. Works of fiction may ask 
us only to make-believe. But the proper evaluation of some fictional works calls for 
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considering their make-believe worlds’ conformity with the real world. Of course, this 
route may raise metaphysical worries, for now we have a proliferation of entities: those 
of the real world and those of make-believe worlds that accurately resemble entities of 
the real world and are assessed according to that accuracy. Any metaphysicians who 
prefer desert landscapes will not be happy with this situation. But that is territory I will 





4. FICTION AND MORAL INTUITION 
 
 When it comes to making a moral judgment of a particular case, intuition more 
often than not takes the lead. A seemingly effortless and unconscious process quickly 
assesses the situation and then spits its output into consciousness as something that just 
feels right. But empirical research has shown that these moral intuitions are subject to 
framing and order effects (see Weigmann 2012). With a change in the order of cases, so 
comes a change in moral judgment. But you might argue, in the spirit of Williamson 
(2011), that these results do not demonstrate the unreliability or instability of moral 
intuitions per se. Rather, the results can be accounted for by the kind of subjects used in 
such studies, namely the folk, and more specifically, often undergraduate students. Were 
these studies to take moral experts as their subjects, the results would come out 
differently, or so it is argued. 
To be sure, this line of argument is reasonable. Experts in other areas do much 
better than novices in making quick assessment of particular cases; so it is natural to 
assume the same would apply to the moral sphere. But recent empirical evidence suggests 
otherwise. Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012) have shown professional philosophers’ 
moral intuitions are just as subject to order effects as the folk’s. 
 The trouble then, as I see it, is understanding what moral expertise amounts to, as 
the traditional account of expertise does not apply. Such is the problem this chapter takes 
up. I argue that though training in moral philosophy may not entail having moral 
intuitions any more reliable than the folk, it does entail being more sensitive to evidence 
and thus belief revision, and it is here, in this sensitivity and willingness to revise, in a 
resistance to becoming what Haidt (2001) calls “morally dumbfounded,” that moral 
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expertise lies. Furthermore, I argue that developing moral expertise in this sense does not 
require training in moral philosophy. Rather, something like Haidt’s social intuitionist 
model might do the trick. But this model need not be restricted to standard social 
interaction. My hunch is that private engagement with narrative art might suffice to 
cultivate moral expertise. 
 
I. MORAL INTUITION & ORDER EFFECTS 
 Consider your favorite version of the trolley thought experiments first introduced 
by Foot (1967) and Thomson (1976). On whatever version one chooses, there are two 
standard scenarios up for consideration. On the one hand, a runaway trolley destined for 
five people on the tracks can be diverted to another set of tracks where one person lies if 
you pull a lever. On the other hand, a runaway trolley destined for five people on the 
tracks can be stopped if you push a sufficiently large person off a bridge above and into 
the trolley’s path. It is well known and well established that people tend to judge the first 
action as morally permissible and the second action as morally impermissible (see Hauser 
2006). This is the case even though both actions yield the same net result: one person is 
killed to save the five. 
 Now, what this difference in moral judgment demonstrates about the moral facts, 
if anything at all, is not an issue that will be considered in this chapter. What is, however, 
of primary consideration is how these judgments can be influenced simply by the order in 
which the scenarios are presented. When the second scenario (push) is presented first, 
judgment of the moral permissibility of the action in the first scenario (pull) decreases 
(for a review of this research, see Weigmann et al. 2012). In fact, in a study conducted by 
89 
Weigmann et al. (2012), participants’ approval of the action in the first scenario 
decreases by more than 50% when presented with the second scenario (followed by three 
related intermediary scenarios) first. Such so-called “order effects” are troubling. If 
anything ought to be irrelevant to moral judgment, the order in which scenarios to be 
judged are presented surely should. Something has gone badly awry if, say, a request for 
physician-assisted suicide is not granted solely because a bioethics board just minutes 
before reviewed a request for euthanasia. 
 Thus, the phenomenon of order effects shows that the kind of moral judgment 
made in these studies is unreliable, where we may call this kind moral intuition, as the 
judgments are pre-theoretical and made quickly, without time for reflection.1 In fact, 
these latter aspects are built into the procedure of the studies themselves. Participants are 
neither given much time to deliberate, nor are they allowed to change their answers after 
the fact. However, that moral intuitions fall prey to order effects does not entail that we 
need to throw moral intuitions out entirely. It might be noted, for instance, that our 
perceptions fall prey to numerous means of distortion (for example, that a stick partially 
submerged in water appears bent, or, more akin to the moral cases under consideration, 
that judgment of a color in the middle of a spectrum may change depending on which end 
of the spectrum one begins). But despite our faculties of perception being not wholly 
reliable, we do not jettison them entirely as a source of evidence. Nevertheless, that the 
mere ordering of cases influences moral intuitions is troubling, even if such intuitions are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 To be sure, there are other accounts of just what moral intuition amounts to, of what moral 
intuition in fact is (Rawlsian accounts, for instance). But it is not the business of this chapter to 
adjudicate accounts of moral intuition or make any substantive claims about what moral intuition 
in fact is. In this chapter, I am strictly concerned with the type of moral judgments subject to 
order effects. It seems perfectly fitting to deem such judgments intuitions, but nothing argued in 
this chapter turns on calling or considering them as such. 
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epistemically analogous to sense perception. Moral thought experiments are often 
constructed as a means of argument, as in, for example, Thomson’s famous violinist 
scenario. At minimum, the phenomenon of order effects gives us cause to be wary of the 
intuitions these thought experiments pump, especially when dealing with tricky cases. 
 There is, however, another move open to the defender of moral intuitions, namely 
what has been called the expertise defense. Both the studies reviewed by Weigmann et al. 
(2012) and the study they conducted themselves take the folk as their subjects, and 
oftentimes folk from undergraduate student populations. In light of this, you might argue 
that the right moral intuitions, those of moral experts, have yet to be tested. Just as the 
intuitions of experts in mathematics and chess are to be trusted more than the folk’s 
intuitions about how to construct a mathematical proof or choose a chess opening, the 
intuitions of moral experts are to be trusted more than the folk’s when it comes to judging 
moral cases. Moral experts would not be so susceptible to ordering effects. And if anyone 
should count as a moral expert, it seems it is a moral philosopher. 
 This is just the line Williamson (2011) takes. To be sure, Williamson is concerned 
with Gettier cases and other epistemic thought experiments. But the spirit of his argument 
can easily be extended to the moral realm. And it is important to note, as Williamson 
does, that the expertise defense does not amount to claiming that “philosophical 
education ‘immunizes’ one against the influence of whatever psychological factors distort 
the judgments of untrained subjects” (2011, 219). Rather, the defense amounts to 
claiming that “philosophical training substantially reduces the influence of the distorting 
factors, even short of total eradication” (Williamson 2011, 219). 
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II. MORAL EXPERTISE & ORDER EFFECTS 
 Unfortunately, the expertise defense has recently been empirically undercut. 
Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012) tested whether ordering effects hold for philosophers, 
and it turns out they do, and nearly to the same degree as for the folk. Philosophers and 
ethics PhDs were only marginally more resistant to the influence of order effects, far 
from the substantial reduction in influence the expertise defense calls for. And given the 
shaky ground on which the expertise defense stands, this is not surprising. 
 Weinberg et al. (2010) submit that the reason the expertise defense has garnered 
support and, on the face of things, appears convincing rests on a mistaken folk theory of 
expertise. This folk theory is composed of two general notions: “(i) sufficient 
background, training, or experience is by and large all it takes to get better at any given 
activity; and (ii) expertise at one aspect of an activity is closely correlated with expertise 
in other aspects of that activity” (Weinberg et al. 2010, 333). But the reality of 
developing expertise and its application in practice is not so simple. 
 First off, expertise develops very narrowly and task-specifically, with little 
transfer among domains, even when the domains seem similar. Having expertise in some 
board game does not mean you will have expertise in another, similar game. And the 
same goes for surgical expertise and particular surgical tasks; having expertise in one is 
not necessarily transferable to a similar other. “So,” as Weinberg et al. (2010) put it, 
“philosophers’ possession of such demonstrable skills as, say, the close analysis of texts, 
or the critical assessment of arguments, or the deployment of the tools of formal logic, 
does little to nothing to raise the probability that they possess any correspondingly 
improved level of performance at conducting thought experiments” (335). But there are 
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three ways you might argue philosophical expertise could extend to evaluating thought 
experiments: the possession of superior conceptual schemata, the deployment of more 
sophisticated theories, and the possession of more finely-tuned cognitive skills. Weinberg 
et al. (2010) consider these possible avenues of the expertise defense in turn, and I will 
sketch their critiques of them. 
 The main thrust of the superior conceptual schemata line lies in claiming that due 
to possessing these superior schemata, in judging thought experiments, philosophers will 
not be distracted by philosophically-irrelevant features (e.g. the order in which the cases 
are presented). Unlike the folk, philosophers have the conceptual schemata required to 
track the philosophical truth. The main trouble is that philosophical training does not 
involve substantial feedback on the truth of judgments of thought experiments, and such 
substantial, reliable feedback is what is required to finely tune conceptual schemata. In 
fields where experts on particular cases routinely develop (e.g. meteorology, livestock 
judging, and chess), “experts are confronted with a truly vast array of cases, with clear 
verdicts swiftly realized across a wide range of degrees of complexity or difficulty. 
Philosophy rarely if ever (outside its formal subareas) provides the same ample degree of 
well-established cases to provide the requisite training regimen” (Weinberg et al. 2010, 
341). Feedback on errors in judgments of thought experiments often comes only when 
judgments and arguments are made public, and even then, the feedback received is often 
ambiguous. Negative feedback is easily construed as simply in error; and positive 
feedback may be due to a tendency to surround ourselves with like-minded intuiters. In 
addition, the size of the set of cases on which conceptual schemata could be tuned is 
much smaller than in fields with recognized experts. Though seemingly large, the number 
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of trolley cases or fake barn cases or teletransporter cases (and so on) pales in comparison 
to, say, the number of times a chess master in the making will practice an opening. 
 The main thrust of the “more sophisticated theories” line is that philosophers have 
mastered philosophy’s well-established theories or principles and call on this mastery 
when evaluating thought experiments. The main trouble is that (i) the discipline of 
philosophy does not contain a sufficient set of well-established theories on which such 
theoretical expertise can be built, and (ii) even if philosophy did have such a sufficient 
set, mastery of it would not entail that philosophers’ intuitions would be shielded from 
order effects and other irrelevant factors. As Weinberg et al. (2010) note, “in the areas of 
philosophy in which appeals to intuition about cases are still central, such as 
epistemology and action theory [and ethics], there is just nothing out there that can serve 
for ‘solving a philosophy problem’ anything like the role that is played by the contents of 
a good physics textbook for solving a physics problem” (345). And even if it were 
convincingly argued that there is something in philosophy that can serve such a role, only 
if these best philosophical theories rested on the backs of intuitions shielded from 
irrelevant factors could we trust that evaluation of thought experiments too is so shielded. 
 The main thrust of the “more finely-tuned cognitive skills” line has it that like 
other experts, philosophers, when considering thought experiments, “have an expanded 
ability to extract quickly and to store temporarily lots of domain-related information” 
(Weinberg et al. 2010, 347). This is the only underpinning of the expertise defense that 
Weinberg et al. find potentially promising. Yet they also note that it is not entirely clear 
how the details of this defense should be fleshed out and how these finely-tuned cognitive 
skills would make philosophers’ moral intuitions more resistant to order effects. 
94 
Ultimately, the answer to the latter question is an empirical matter, and so far, in light of 
Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012), the empirical evidence weighs in favor of a negative 
response. 
 And it is this empirical evidence that also weighs against Williamson’s (2011) 
response to Weinberg et al. (2010). One of Williamson’s major criticisms of Weinberg et 
al.’s arguments is their comparison class. Weinberg et al. take chess, mathematics, and 
physics as exemplars of domains in which expertise develops and measure the prospect 
of philosophical expertise in thought experimenting against these domains. “But,” as 
Williamson (2011) argues, “who ever claimed that the difference in skill at thought 
experimentation between a professional philosopher and an undergraduate is as dramatic 
as the difference in skill at chess between a grandmaster and a beginner” (224)? A more 
apt comparison, Williamson goes on to claim, “is between feedback in legal and 
philosophical training with respect to hypothetical cases” (224). These are reasonable 
points. But as noted, given the recent empirical evidence, the dialectical ball is in 
Williamson’s court, particularly with respect to the former, main claim. As for the legal 
comparison, this may still have something going for it, but not, I think, with respect to the 
expertise defense in thought experimenting. And I will have more to say about this 
below, in section three. But before moving on, I will sketch a few more reasons why we 
should expect further empirical evidence to support Schwitzgebel and Cushman’s results 
(because besides Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012), only one other study has tested 
philosophers’ judgments of thought experiments (Tobia et al. 2013), and its results are 
both not focused on order effects and less clear overall).2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 And though I do not have time to consider it here, for an argument against the analogy between 
intuition and sense perception doing the expertise defense any good, see Mizrahi (2015). 
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 Ryberg (2013) gives two more reasons to doubt the expertise defense: (i) with 
respect to moral philosophers, evidence is not in favor of a causal link between prior 
experience and present moral intuitions; and (ii) judgments of particular moral cases are 
not assessable on some sort of quality parameter. One reason we regard the intuitions of 
the mathematician or grandmaster as more reliable than those of the novice or amateur is 
that the formers’ intuitions are the result of vast prior experiences in chess and math; their 
expertise is the causal result of prior experiences. But the situation does not look the same 
when it comes to philosophers and moral intuitions. Ryberg (2013) points out that while 
the novice at math or the amateur at chess have only very weak intuitions compared to 
the grandmaster or mathematician, when it comes to moral cases, “[w]hat moral 
psychological studies have revealed clearly is that lay people have just as many and 
equally strong intuitions as trained philosophers” (6). Even if this does not establish that 
there is no causal link between moral philosophers’ prior experiences in doing moral 
philosophy and their moral intuitions, it does give us reason to be wary of there being 
such a causal link. 
 But suppose there is such a causal link for moral philosophers; there is still an 
important disanalogy between moral philosophers’ prior experiences doing moral 
philosophy and mathematicians’ or grandmasters’ prior experiences doing math or 
playing chess. As Ryberg (2013) puts it, “What the mathematician has prior experience 
of is not merely numerous mathematical problems but of having been engaged in correct 
mathematical proofs or other sorts of correct mathematical problem-solving. Likewise, 
the grandmaster of chess has not only been engaged in numerous plays but possesses a 
comprehensive experience of making moves in won plays” (8). For the moral 
96 
philosopher, the story is not the same, for “while the philosopher may have engaged in 
many cases of intuition-based reasoning, it seems much less plausible to hold that she has 
prior experiences of having made intuitive judgments which led to correct moral 
answers” (Ryberg 2013, 8). 
 But then again, maybe Ryberg’s arguments turn on a bad analogy. That moral 
expertise in the judgment of particular cases is not analogous to expertise in mathematics 
or chess does not entail that the notion of moral expertise is entirely vacuous. Rather, 
moral expertise might just need to be recast in a different light. This recasting is the 
business of my next section. 
 
III. WHAT MORAL EXPERTISE AMOUNTS TO 
 The challenge in the wake of Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012) (bolstered by 
Weinberg et al. 2010 and Ryberg 2013), as I see it, is understanding what moral expertise 
in the intuitive judgment of particular cases amounts to.3 I think the answer lies in 
noticing something about Williamson’s analogy of philosophical expertise to legal 
expertise, namely how both professions proceed in practice. Legal experts may have 
intuitions that come to bear on a case, but their expertise manifests in the form of 
methodical research and careful analysis, the sorting out of how current law and the 
character of previous cases apply to the case at hand, not in any pre-theoretical judgments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It is worth noting that this thought is compatible with a critique De Cruz (2014) directs at 
Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012). Since “[e]xpert skills are typically context-sensitive,” she 
finds it puzzling “that philosophical expertise should be measured by how context-insensitive 
philosophical intuitions are” (De Cruz 2014, 13). We should, she argues, expect philosophers to 
be especially sensitive to contextual features, such as the order in which moral cases are 
presented. While I am not so sure about this, De Cruz is right to think that experimental results 
like those of Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012) do not take some notion of expertise off the 
table, and one that philosophers might well exhibit. 
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that come before this work. There is little involved in the application of a lawyer’s 
expertise that resembles the intuitive judgment of particular moral cases rendered in 
thought experimenting. 
 Given the results and arguments outlined above, I think something similar must 
be said of moral expertise. It cannot be said to be had in the actual intuitive judgments of 
particular cases, for the judgments of even those we can rightly call moral experts fall 
prey to the influence of morally irrelevant factors. In other words, moral experts appear to 
do no better than the folk when it comes to making intuitive judgments of particular 
cases, at least in any in measurable sense of the notion. So then, like legal expertise, I 
claim that moral expertise comes in the aftermath of initial intuitive judgments. In the 
domain of thought experimenting and intuitive judgment, what differentiates a moral 
expert from a moral novice is the attitude taken after making judgment and the cognitive 
skills required to shape and have this attitude. More specifically, I claim that moral 
expertise in thought experimenting amounts, in the aftermath of an intuitive judgment, to 
sensitivity to evidence, sensitivity to belief revision, an ongoing search for justification, 
and, as a result, a resistance to being what Haidt (2001) calls “morally dumbfounded.” In 
order to have such an attitude (or cluster of attitudes), one must have the ability to 
suppress or overcome the strong pull of intuition, and such cognitive aptitude must be 
cultivated. This is what makes having such an attitude a matter of expertise rather than 
simply a matter of disposition or character. 
 So, in one sense, Williamson is right. Holding the notion of moral expertise up to 
the light of expertise in mathematics or chess is a poor analogy. But in another sense, 
Williamson is wrong. A more appropriate analogy, such as to legal expertise, is of no 
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help to the expertise defense as outlined above. In the act of making an intuitive 
judgment of some particular moral case, moral expertise appears to play little role. It is, 
rather, in the attitude one has toward one’s intuitive judgment that moral expertise 
manifests itself. The task, then, for the rest of this section, is spelling out this notion of 
moral expertise. 
 For the folk, the emotional pull of intuition appears to supersede rational 
reflection on a moral judgment via intuition. After making a fast, pre-theoretical 
judgment of a moral case, Haidt and Hersh have found people often to be “morally 
dumbfounded,” “that is, they would stutter, laugh, and express surprise at their inability 
to find supporting reasons, yet they would not change their initial judgments of 
condemnation” (Haidt 2001, 817). One such case is of incest. Consider the following 
story. 
Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in France on 
summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near 
the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making 
love. At the very least it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was 
already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. 
They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. They keep that 
night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other. What 
do you think about that? Was it OK for them to make love? (Haidt 2001, 814) 
After hearing this story, most people immediately say it was wrong for Julie and Mark to 
make love. But they have trouble giving reasons for this judgment. As Haidt (2001) 
describes it, “They point out the dangers of inbreeding, only to remember that Julie and 
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Mark used two forms of birth control. They argue that Julie and Mark will be hurt, 
perhaps emotionally, even though the story makes it clear that no harm befell them. 
Eventually, many people say something like, ‘I don’t know, I can’t explain it, I just know 
it’s wrong’” (814). 
 It is here, in this final move that the folk make, this condition of being morally 
dumbfounded, where I argue moral experts differentiate themselves.4 While moral 
expertise does not make one more resistant to ordering effects, we should expect it to 
make one more resistant to moral dumbfounding, to claiming that “I just know it’s 
wrong,” especially in face of a lack of reasons for saying so. In fact, if one is susceptible 
to moral dumbfounding, it seems strange to consider such person a moral expert. To be 
sure, it is possible someone susceptible to moral dumbfounding still may have a stock of 
moral theory at her cognitive fingertips, and so may be justifiably considered a moral 
expert in this sense. But the sort of moral expertise that we are concerned with—that the 
so-called expertise defense is concerned with—is moral expertise as it pertains to the 
intuitive judgment of particular moral cases. 
 There is, however, a worry one might have about this conception of moral 
expertise. Given the tendency for people to quickly judge moral cases and become 
morally dumbfounded, Haidt argues that moral reasoning rarely plays a causal role in 
most people’s moral judgments. Rather, it seems most people only reason about moral 
cases in a post hoc fashion, first making an intuitive judgment, and only then, after the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 One might be quick to point out that this is a case of social taboo; so people who have grown up 
in the appropriate environments are especially disposed to respond in the fashion described 
above. But Haidt also asked participants to consider cases of homosexuality and found similar 
results. And, furthermore, the crucial consideration for this chapter’s purposes is that, taboo or 
not, the case described is a moral matter (in that there are serious debates over the morality of 
sexuality). 
100 
fact, engaging in reasoning in order to justify the judgment they have already intuitively 
made. In short, though people are capable of reasoning their way to a moral judgment, 
they just do not do so very often. Haidt does note that philosophers are “one of the few 
groups that has been found to reason well” (2001, 819) and that “solitary moral reasoning 
may be common among philosophers” (820). But if it is granted that this ability and 
tendency distinct from the folk does not bear on the act of making intuitive judgments of 
moral scenarios, one could argue that philosophers’ superior reasoning abilities might just 
make them very good at post-hoc reasoning. And so philosophers might be resistant to 
moral dumbfounding simply because they are very good at post-hoc reasoning. They 
never are faced with the dilemma of giving up their intuitive judgments or else saying, “I 
can’t explain it, I just know it’s wrong.” If this is moral expertise, it is not moral expertise 
as it pertains to the intuitive judgment of particular moral cases. 
 But this worry forgets that I claim resistance to moral dumbfounding is the result 
of an attitude. To be sure, this attitude in part comprises an ongoing search for 
justification, but it also comprises sensitivity to evidence and belief revision. And we 
have good reason to believe that philosophers’ attitudes toward their intuitive moral 
judgments embody these latter features. One testament of this comes from Jan 
Crosthwaite. Of her view that “the use of fetal tissue for research and therapy is morally 
permissible,” she says, “My current judgment is not fixed; it could be altered by 
information which affects my assessment of the likely harms and benefits of using fetal 
tissue—including harms to women (through potential exploitation) and harms to the 
community through permitting actions which lead to some change in important values. It 
could change were I to be given reason to revise a particular judgment” (1995, 367). And 
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I would be very surprised if anyone doing philosophy would not testify to something 
similar. Having such an attitude seems to be part of the ethos of philosophy; one will not 
get far in the field without it.5 
 So it might be said that within professional philosophy there is an institutional 
filter for just the sort of attitude moral expertise in thought experimenting requires. But 
while the discipline of philosophy may filter, it also trains. One need not come to 
philosophy already having the attitude in question; one may acquire it along the way as a 
product of learning to suppress or overcome the strong pull of intuition, not due to 
explicit instruction, but rather due to the way in which philosophy is taught and done in 
the professional sphere. Positions are posited, challenged, and defended, arguments are 
amended and augmented, conclusions are rehearsed and rescinded, be it in the classroom 
or at a conference. As Haidt notes, “[S]ince Plato wrote his Dialogues, philosophers have 
recognized that moral reasoning naturally occurs in a social setting, between people who 
can challenge each other’s arguments and trigger new intuitions” (2001, 820). Haidt 
argues that this social exchange and triggering of new intuitions does occur among the 
folk, but it is a rare rather than common occurrence, and typically only occurs when the 
challenge to one’s arguments or views comes from a member of one’s ingroup, from 
one’s friends, allies, and acquaintances (2001, 819). The discipline of philosophy simply 
institutionalizes this exchange. Challenging each other’s arguments and taking those 
challenges seriously is just part of the business of philosophy practiced. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In fact, with difficult moral cases (such as the trolley thought experiments), many philosophers 
might be wary of even making definitive judgment. Given the results of the Phil Papers internet 
survey of professional philosophers, Rini (2015) agues that “[i]n general, it seems, philosophers’ 
actual moral judgments do not correspond well to forced choice binary answers” (445). 
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 But aside from belonging to a group where the practice of challenging arguments 
and intuitions is commonplace, I think there is, for the folk, another road open to 
cultivating moral expertise in the intuitive judgment of particular cases, namely narrative 
art. Or so I will argue. And though I will focus my attention on literary fiction, I see no 
reason why the argument would not extend to all narrative art. 
 
IV. FICTION & MORAL EXPERTISE 
 If reading literary fiction can, as I claim, cultivate moral expertise with respect to 
the intuitive judgments of particular cases, then it seems something must appropriately 
distinguish it from thought experiments. For if thought experiments are, in all relevant 
respects, equivalent to the narratives in literary fiction, then with respect to the folk we 
should expect nothing but the same psychological results produced by moral thought 
experimenting in itself, namely moral dumbfounding. There are only two ways the 
narrative of literary fiction could differ from thought experiments: in kind or degree. I 
have dim hopes for the latter, but despite some troubles with the former, I believe there a 
case can be made. I argue that, unlike thought experiments, the narratives of fiction do 
not demand definitive moral judgment and, because of this, are capable, in themselves, of 
cultivating the attitude required for moral expertise. But before making this argument, I 
will say a bit about why thought experiments and the narratives of fiction do not seem to 
differ in any notable sense. 
 First off, it is clear that thought experiments are narratives. They tell a story of 
some kind. To be sure, the narratives of literary fiction are usually more detailed; but this 
is only a matter of degree. After all, even a novel with the most robust narrative is, just 
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like a thought experiment, metaphysically incomplete. For both thought experiments and 
narratives of literary fiction, there are always questions with no right answer. For 
instance, “How many hairs were there on Leopold Bloom’s head when he met Stephen?” 
or “How many hairs are there on the head of the person steering the runaway trolley?” 
 So, if there is to be a difference in kind, it is to be found in the kind of narrative, 
where the only potentially relevant kind distinction here seems to be fictionality. 
Questions of why a narrative being fictional would matter to the cultivation of moral 
expertise aside, it seems clear that this distinction cannot be made. Davies (2007) offers 
two conditions on the fictionality of a narrative: (i) “fictional narratives must be products 
of acts of ‘fiction-making,’ where the maker’s intention is that we make-believe, rather 
than believe, the content of the story narrated;” (ii) “the construction of a fictional 
narrative must not be primarily governed by what we may term the ‘fidelity constraint’—
’include only events you believe to have occurred, narrated as occurring in the order in 
which you believe then to have occurred’—but, rather, by some more general purpose in 
story-telling” (31). It appears thought experiments meet both of these conditions. As for 
the first condition, the narratives of thought experiments present a hypothetical situation, 
one which it clearly seems we are meant to imagine, not believe. As for the second, the 
author of a thought experiment does not believe the narrative being presented actually 
occurred, and thus the narrative’s construction is not governed by the fidelity constraint. 
It appears, then, that the narratives of both literary fiction and thought experiments are of 
the same kind. 
 Maybe, however, a case could be made for greater narrative detail playing some 
role in differentiating narratives that cultivate moral expertise from those that do not. 
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Details can, after all, give pause in making moral judgments. The more sensitive we 
become to the complexity of a moral situation, the more reluctant we may be to make 
definitive moral judgments, and thus the more open we may be to new evidence and 
belief revision, thereby becoming resistant to moral dumbfounding. But there are some 
works of literary fiction whose narratives are extremely short, shorter than those of some 
thought experiments. Consider flash fiction, which is 1,000 words or fewer, and often 
under 500. Or, for a more extreme example, consider the six-word stories popularized by 
the Hemingway legend.6 And, on the other hand, some thought experiments are fairly 
detailed. Camp (2009) argues that while thought experiments often “are only 
schematically described, since their main point lies in the situation’s structure,” some 
“can also operate in at least one of the ways literary fictions do: By describing 
counterfactual situations in concrete detail, they can trigger a kind of experiential 
acquaintance that an abstract description misses” (124). Consider, for instance, Williams’ 
(1973, 98–99) case of Jim and the Indians.7 Of this thought experiment, Camp claims that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Run a simple internet search on “six-word stories” to see just how popular these six-word tales 
have become. The story said to have been written by Hemingway (though most likely was not) 
goes as follows: “For sale: baby shoes, never worn.” See Haglund (2013). 
7 Jim finds himself in the central square of a small South American town. Tied up against the wall 
are a row of twenty Indians, most terrified, a few defiant, in front of them several armed men in 
uniform. A heavy man in a sweatstained khaki shirt turns out to be the Captain in charge and, 
after a good deal of questioning of Jim which establishes that he got there by accident while on a 
botanical expedition, explains that the Indians are a random group of the inhabitants who, after 
recent acts of protest against the government, are just about to be killed to remind other possible 
protestors of the advantages of not protesting. However, since Jim is an honored visitor from 
another land, the Captain is happy to offer him a guest’s privilege of killing one of the Indians 
himself. If Jim accepts, then as a mark of the special occasion, the other Indians will be let off. Of 
course, if Jim refuses, then there is no special occasion, and Pedro here will do what he was about 
to do when Jim arrived, and kill them all. Jim, with some desperate recollection of schoolboy 
fiction, wonders whether if he got hold of a gun, he could hold the Captain, Pedro and the rest of 
the soldiers to threat, but it is quite clear from the set-up that nothing of the kind is going to work: 
any attempt at that sort of thing will mean that all the Indians will be killed, and himself. The men 
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“the rich imagery (e.g., ‘a heavy man in a sweat-stained khaki shirt’) helps us to project 
ourselves imaginatively into the situation, in a way that precludes the pat application of 
general moral principles (in particular, utilitarian principles) that might be tempting given 
a more abstract, schematic description” (2009, 125). So if I am right that there is 
something special about literary fiction that allows its narratives to cultivate moral 
expertise, then whatever role narrative detail plays in that cultivation, it is not enough to 
do the job. On with the argument for the antecedent. 
 To begin, I take a cue from Nersessian (1993), who argues that “unlike the 
fictional narrative, […] the context of the scientific thought experiment makes the 
intention clear to the reader that the situation is one that is to represent a potential real-
world situation” (297). More precisely, I take a cue from Davies’ (2007) refining of 
Nersessian’s claim, for if we take her claim on face value, as it stands, it is false, as many 
fictional narratives intend for the reader to take the situations to represent potential real-
world situations. As Davies puts it, “People in fictions are assumed to be biological and 
behavioral analogues of people in real life, and fictional toasters burn the fictional bread 
put into them if fictionally ignored” (2007, 32). So we ought to construe Nersessian’s 
claim not as suggesting that the narratives of thought experiments fail to meet the 
requirements for fictionality, but rather that the narratives of thought experiments are 
presented with a motivation different from that of the narratives of literary fiction. With 
the narrative of a work of literary fiction, given some circumstances C, the belief that 
some sequence of events S would occur is instrumental to the goal of the narrative: 
making believe that C obtains and S occurs. However, with the narrative of a thought 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
against the wall, and the other villagers, understand the situation, and are obviously begging him 
to accept. What should he do? 
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experiment, the situation is reversed; making believe is instrumental to coming to the 
belief that given C, S would occur (Davies 2007, 33). In short, while belief is the 
motivation for presenting the narratives of thought experiments, making believe is the 
motivation for presenting the narratives of literary fiction. 
 Now, I am not so sure about the claim that the motivation behind the narratives of 
literary fiction is making believe. Writers of fiction often talk about wanting to 
emotionally move their readers; and so while belief may be instrumental to making 
believe, making believe may be instrumental to emotional resonance or something along 
these lines. But what does seem right about Davies’ sharpening of Nersessian is that, 
unlike with the narratives of literary fiction, the motivation behind the narratives of 
thought experiments is belief. The whole business of making believe that there is a 
runaway trolley headed for five people lying on the tracks is so that we come to a moral 
judgment, to a belief that pulling the trolley’s lever or pushing a person off a bridge is 
either morally right or morally wrong. This, then, appears to be enough to distinguish the 
narratives of literary fiction from the narratives of thought experiments. Fictionality is not 
the only relevant measure by which we can distinguish kinds of narratives. 
Davies, however, points out that some fiction appears to be motivated in a way 
similar to thought experiments. “[W]riters of utopias or dystopias such as 1984 and Brave 
New World,” he notes, “plausibly intend that, as a result of the receiver’s making-believe 
the content of the narrative, she will come to believe that this is how certain societies 
would turn out, and will therefore amend her views about the merits of alternative 
political or socio-economic systems” (2007, 33). Accordingly, by the lights of the 
distinction above, it seems some works of literary fiction are in fact merely elaborate 
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thought experiments. And this looks like a bad result. Something seems wrong about 
calling 1984, Brave New World, and the like thought experiments. 
But we need not give up Nersessian’s insight entirely. Even if Davies is right—
and it seems he is8—there is at least a large subset of fiction whose writers do not intend 
make-believe to be an instrument for belief. So while the narratives of literary fiction may 
be motivated by belief, unlike thought experiments, they need not be so motivated. And it 
is the narratives of literary fiction that are in fact not so motivated that I am interested in, 
for within this subset of fiction lie the works capable of cultivating moral expertise. 
 My second cue comes from John (2010), who argues that “morality demands an 
evaluative ‘double take,’” and that literature is an apt vehicle through which this demand 
might be met (287). According to John, “literary works [are able to] set up moral 
judgment as a form of complex judgment, one that asks for more than one perspective to 
be taken on situations or persons” (2010, 287). For instance, given some segment of a 
work of fiction’s narrative, readers might be led to judge a character or her actions as 
morally wrong. But the experience of the reader is many times not simply left there. 
Works often also provide resources to see a character’s failings “as understandable, 
perhaps as reflecting a social and psychological context in which some human tendencies 
are encouraged and some discouraged, or in which human nature is put under severe 
pressures” (John 2010, 288). Or, even if the work does not provide such resources, the 
failings “may appear to call for acknowledgment as human and to deserve some form of 
compassion” (John 2010, 288). While these moments of “double take” do not remove the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A potentially even clearer case is one Davies notes elsewhere (2010, 62). Noël Carroll (2002, 9–
10) argues that Graham Greene’s The Third Man should be understood as a counterexample to a 
universal claim E. M. Forster made about loyalty to one’s friends, which is a function that 
thought experiments often have.  
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grounds for the initial judgment, they do introduce non-judgmental response and thereby 
put pressure on the reader not simply to condemn, but rather to see another’s moral 
failings “as possibly shared by me, or as influenced by a social world that I help to 
sustain, or as making manifest the possibilities of my human kind” (John 2010, 288). 
 This all looks right. It seems fiction does have the power to produce moral double 
takes, and to do so in the way John describes. But it is a stretch to think such experiences 
in themselves could cultivate moral expertise with respect to the intuitive judgment of 
particular cases, because these double takes amount to a matter of understanding, not 
revision or reconsideration. We may understand, sympathize, or empathize with a 
character’s moral failing, but this does not, as John acknowledges, remove the grounds 
for our initial judgment. What is at issue with moral expertise as I have characterized it is 
a willingness to revise one’s judgment, not simply sympathize with those you have 
judged. But I think John’s view can be pushed further, where these double takes extend to 
the judgment of the acts in question. To be sure, in morally clear cases this will not be so. 
However much readers may empathize with, say, aspects of Humbert Humbert of Lolita, 
their initial judgment of the wrongness of seduction of the underage will stand firm. But 
there are plenty of cases nowhere near as clear, and the narratives of much literary fiction 
lie in this middle ground. As Putnam has argued, “What especially the novel does is aid 
us in the imaginative re-creation of moral perplexities, in the widest sense” (1978, 87).9 It 
is in these cases of moral perplexity, this moral middle ground, that our judgments of acts 
themselves will be subject to double takes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Putnam’s line of argument suggests a view about the role literary fiction may play in our moral 
lives akin to the one I am arguing for in this chapter. 
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 Consider, for instance, a scene from Edith Wharton’s The House of Mirth, which 
John takes as a paradigmatic case of the double-take phenomenon. As John sets the 
scene, “The protagonist, society belle Lily Bart, is leaving a young man’s apartment, 
where she has done nothing but have tea and conversation, and yet from which she would 
rather not be seen leaving” (2010, 288). 
There was no one in sight, however, but a charwoman who was scrubbing the 
stairs. Her own stout person and its surrounding implements took up so much 
room that Lily, to pass her, had to gather up her skirts and brush against the wall. 
As she did so, the woman paused in her work and looked up curiously, resting her 
clenched red fists on the wet cloth she had just drawn from her pail. She had a 
broad sallow face, slightly pitted with small-pox, and thin straw-coloured hair 
through which her scalp shone unpleasantly. “I beg your pardon,” said Lily, 
intending by her politeness to convey a criticism of the other’s manner. (Wharton 
1969/1905, 13) 
John has it that here, in the face of Lily’s superiority, her failure to be sincere, exhibit a 
respect that transcends class lines, appreciate the charwoman’s vulnerability, “we might 
have a slight bristle of distaste” and make moral judgment accordingly (2010, 289). But 
we are also subject to a double take in, John argues, at least three ways. First, we may 
experience Lily’s desire not to be humanly accessible to a person like the charwoman, 
finding ourselves caught in a morally vulnerable position as a result, one that does not 
allow for moral superiority, and we may be thus led to sympathize with Lily. Second, we 
may imagine Lily’s anxiety at being seen leaving from a man’s apartment and thus 
empathize with her. Third, we may register how restrictive and unforgiving the social 
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world in which Lily lives is, how it would be a surprisingly impressive feat for Lily to 
transcend this and exhibit kindness or openness with the charwoman, and we may thus be 
led to understand Lily’s action. 
 Again, this all seems right. But it also seems we can go further, that the scene 
serves the material for a double take on the judgment of Lily’s action itself or even a 
reluctance to make any particular judgment at all. Yes, we may see that Lily has been 
short of sincere, kind, and open. But we might also see the charwoman pausing to look up 
curiously as also short of sensitive, even if not at all deliberately so. And yes, all things 
considered, at the moment of interaction, we may see the charwoman as in a more 
vulnerable position, and so we may more easily empathize with her and understand her 
stopping to give a curious look (and we may even question whether this look was in fact 
curious, or only seen as such from Lily’s perspective). But this only means we may be 
quicker to experience a double take of the kind John describes—a double take of 
understanding—with respect to the charwoman. But our questioning of the charwoman’s 
action would still stand, as double takes of understanding do not remove the grounds for 
judgments of acts, thus giving rise to a tension in the judgment of either character’s 
action. Accordingly, we may experience a double take with our initial judgment of Lily’s 
action—a double take of judgment—or we might be hesitant to make any definitive 
judgment at all, even for a moment. And given my analysis of the scene, fully 
appreciating The House of Mirth requires such double take or hesitancy of judgment. To 
do otherwise would be either to overlook the moral complexity the work has offered or 
mistake moral judgment as the motivation of the narrative. 
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 If I am right about this, then literary fiction is fit to cultivate moral expertise in the 
intuitive judgment of particular cases, as it can make readers wary of their initial intuitive 
judgments, more open to belief revision, more sensitive to evidence and the demands of 
justification, and thus, in the end, more resistant to moral dumbfounding. To become 
moral experts, or at least less susceptible to moral dumbfounding, people need not do 
philosophy or, as Haidt suggests, surround themselves with friends and acquaintances 
who challenge their intuitions; people may fill their lives with literary fiction. 
Now, there are various accounts that pin the moral value of literary fiction on its 
ability to bolster our moral knowledge. For instance, Noël Carroll (2001, 2002) argues 
that the moral value of fiction lies in its ability to clarify our conception of particular 
moral principles by instantiating these principles, by giving them life. The narrative 
functions to “deepen our moral understanding by, among other things, encouraging us to 
apply our moral knowledge and emotions to specific cases. For in being prompted to 
apply and engage our antecedent moral powers, we may come to augment them” (Carroll 
2001, 83). This may be true, in part. Sure, we may, in some portions of a work’s 
narrative, find ourselves making moral judgments, and doing so without hesitation 
because these judgments seem clear, part of our moral stock, and clearly presented as 
such. And of course, when a work couples a clear case with the expectation of 
judgment,10 then the narrative may very well function in the way Carroll describes. 
But an account of this sort does not capture all the morally foggy moments in 
fiction, where it is unclear just what moral principles are being instantiated, yet clear that 
something moral is at hand, the moments where our moral judgment comes down to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 As Carroll (2002, 10) argues of Graham Greene’s The Third Man. 
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matter of intuition, not application. It is here, in these moments, that the narrative 
encourages us to experience a double take of judgment or maybe even rest in the space of 
no judgment at all, withholding definitive judgment of any sort. This is crucially distinct 
from the narratives of thought experiments, where the expectation of judgment is clear, 
however foggy the moral territory. Judgment is the currency in which thought 
experiments traffic. The enterprise of fiction often proceeds far from such traffic, and 
when it does, its moral value is not so much found in an ability to deepen our moral 
understanding or improve our making of moral judgments, but rather in an ability to 
modify our attitude or stance toward the judgments we intuitively make. 
There still, however, remains the issue of such moral value’s relationship to 
literary value. After all, there are some positive effects reading a work of literature may 
induce that clearly do not figure into that work’s value as literature (a character 
reminding a reader of a loved one, for instance). But here I think it is equally clear that 
this kind of moral value is relevant to literary value. This is due to double takes being 
predicated on proper engagement with a literary work. When fully attending to a literary 
work, the experience of a double take of judgment (or reluctance in making any definitive 
judgment) results from appreciating that the work presents a morally complex situation 
and does not ask the reader to make any definitive intuitive judgment regarding that 
situation. To make definitive intuitive judgment in the face of such features is to miss or 
ignore what the work itself has offered. So if experiencing a double take is morally 
valuable, as I have argued, a work’s ability to afford double takes contributes to its 
literary value, as this ability is in virtue of its proper appreciation. 
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Even if it turns out that a reader’s experiencing double takes does not, in fact, 
result in the development of moral expertise in the intuitive judgment of real-world 
cases—if, in other words, the literary experiences do not translate to a real-world attitude 
or disposition—it still seems that the experience of double takes has moral value, albeit 
of a much more limited sort. At minimum, the literary double take of judgment places a 
reader in the cognitive position of the moral expert, even if momentarily. It offers a 
reader a glimpse into a world whose moral complexity embodies that of our own.11 
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for moral value emerge from messy conditions, has literary potential” (2010, 295). 
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5. READING TO FEEL LESS ALONE: EMOTIONAL INTIMACY IN LITERATURE 
 
 When reading literature, a very common emotional experience is one had with a 
work’s characters. Their actions evoke emotional response, however irrational this may 
seem. But when reading literature, we might also experience an emotional connection 
with the author, or at least what appears to be such. We might feel as though there is 
someone else out there who not just holds the same views as us or likes the same things 
we like, but who sees the world in the way we do, experiences it similarly, characterizes 
it in a way that resonates deeply with our worldly perspectives, where this someone is, of 
course, the author. But it is unclear how such an experience could be had when engaging 
with a work of literature strictly as a work of literature, at least when it comes to fictional 
literature. In other words, it is unclear how a work of fictional literature could supply the 
resources for such an experience. It is, after all, a work of fiction, not a report of the 
author’s experience, as with memoir or autobiography. The task of this chapter is 
twofold: first, to explain the nature and value of this emotional experience; second, to 
argue that a fictional literary work can supply the resources for such an experience—or at 
least something close to it—and its ability to do so counts toward its value as literature.  
 
I. AUTHORIAL CONNECTEDNESS 
 Much has been written on the value of emotional response to fictional characters, 
especially when what is evoked is empathy for them.1 But little has been written about 
the emotional connection it at least appears a reader might have with an author. When 
reading a literary work we might feel a sense of intimacy, as though we are getting to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, for instance, Robinson 2005 and 2010. 
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know the author on a deep personal level. And in this intimacy, we might even feel a 
sense of identification, a robust resonance with the way the author describes and sees the 
world, and thereby feel less alone, because we feel there is someone else out there who 
gets it, gets us, understands things the way we do and can put those things better than we 
ever could ourselves. As David Foster Wallace expresses in an interview, 
There’s another level [on which] a piece of fiction is a conversation. There’s a 
relationship set up between the reader and the writer that’s very strange and very 
complicated and hard to talk about. [...] There’s a kind of Ah-ha! Somebody at 
least for a moment feels about something or sees something the way that I do. It 
doesn’t happen all the time. It’s these brief flashes and flames, but I get that 
sometimes. I feel unalone—intellectually, emotionally, spiritually. I feel human 
and unalone and that I’m in a deep, significant conversation with another 
consciousness in fiction and poetry in a way that I don’t with other art. (Miller 
2012, 62) 
And notably, Wallace’s fiction often seems to evoke something like this in his readers. In 
her reflection on the cult community that surrounds Wallace’s work, Kathleen Fitzpatrick 
argues that “many of his readers experience a sense of intimate connection with his 
writing, a connection that can very easily bleed over into a relationship, however 
imagined, with the man himself” (2012, 184–85). 
 Call experiences of this kind authorial connectedness. But we now need a sharper 
picture of what authorial connectedness consists in, for it is not entirely clear how reading 
literature could lead to an experience of this kind. That is the task of the next section. But 
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before getting on with that project, something needs to be said about what authorial 
connectedness is not. 
 It might be tempting to class authorial connectedness as a kind of friendship. It 
certainly does not seem foreign to conceive of a favorite author as a kind of friend. As 
Rick Gekoski puts it, “for so many people—not just authors and serious readers—an 
admired writer is a peculiar but superior form of ‘friend.’ There are a number of senses of 
the term in which this seems true: someone you can turn to; someone who has wisdom to 
transmit; who has been a constant and trusted presence; who can share similar 
experiences with us; who can give without asking anything in return” (2012). And in his 
book The Company We Keep (1988), Wayne Booth uses the metaphor of friendship to 
construct an account of the ethical criticism of literature.2 
But it is for this reason that I want to resist the notion of friendship in 
understanding the emotional relationship readers perceive having with authors: it is a 
metaphor. What I am interested in understanding is the actual emotional connection a 
reader might perceive having with an author. Additionally, the metaphor of friendship is 
applied both to the relationship readers perceive having with authors and the relationship 
readers perceive having with books,3 at times without care for how distinct these 
relationships are.4 And though the application of the metaphor is more common in regard 
to books, I suspect that many times it is a relationship with the author that one intends to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For an excellent overview of Booth’s account, see Nussbaum (1990). 
3 For a treatment of the latter that does not lean on the metaphor, see Levinson (2016). 
4 See Gekoski (2012), for instance. 
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be express. But simply put, and suspicions aside, the metaphor of friendship is not likely 
to be helpful. 
 It might also be tempting to see authorial connectedness as akin to something 
Jerrold Levinson notes as a potential reward of listening to music, something he calls 
Emotional Communion. This reward amounts to the listener adopting the assumption that 
the emotion expressed in a work was felt by the composer and thus, when the listener is 
moved to that emotion because of the work, she feels she is having a shared experience 
with the composer. As such, Emotional Communion offers a feeling of intimacy with the 
composer. In Levinson’s words: “The emotional separateness and alienation which occur 
frequently in daily living are here miraculously swept aside in imaginative identification 
with the composer whose feelings are, on the Expressionist assumption, plainly revealed 
for any listener to hear and to mirror” (2011, 329). So too it might go for literature, as of 
course Tolstoy believed, since for him transmitting emotion was the essential business of 
art.5 In assuming that the author felt the emotions expressed in her work, when moved to 
these emotions, the reader may experience a feeling of emotional intimacy with the 
author.6 But while Emotional Communion and authorial connectedness both result in a 
sense of intimacy with the author, it is intimacy of a different sort. The intimacy had from 
Emotional Communion is due solely to a feeling evoked in the reader by the work. The 
intimacy had from authorial connectedness is due, in part, to the reader recognizing 
something of herself in the work, something she believed or thought or felt before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Tolstoy (1995), particularly page 511. 
6 Of course, Emotional Communion had with a composer and Emotional Communion had with a 
literary author is not exactly alike. While the latter involves articulate thoughts, it is not obvious 
that the former does. 
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reading the work, for authorial connectedness turns on the reader feeling as though she 
has found, in some sense, a fellow soul. 
 
II. AUTHORIAL CONNECTEDNESS EXPLAINED 
 Even if readers do in fact experience authorial connectedness, it could very well 
be an emotional response that has little to do with the act of reading. It could be the case 
that readers import wild beliefs about literature and authorship that prime them to 
experience perceived intimacy with authors. Maybe some feel authorial connectedness 
because certain works or authors have sentimental value wholly independent from the 
works or authors themselves. (A work was a deceased friend’s favorite, say.) Or maybe 
intimacy felt with a loved one is somehow projected onto the author of a work one is 
reading. To be sure, in such cases authorial connectedness might be felt, but due to 
reasons lying beyond the reading experience itself. In other words, a satisfying 
explanation of authorial connectedness must locate the cause of a perceived sense of 
intimacy with the author within the act of reading. A satisfying explanation is moreover 
one that renders authorial connectedness reasonable, without the requirement of any 
special beliefs or life circumstances, even if the experience may not be sustainable when 
fictional literature is read and appreciated strictly as fictional literature. I argue that there 
are four features of the reading experience that, taken together, offer such an explanation. 
The first concerns the psychological context in which readers read. The other three 




The Psychological Context of Reading 
 In his critical discussion of John Ruskin’s use of the friendship metaphor, Proust 
identifies an important feature of the act of reading: “When we read, we receive another’s 
thought, and yet we are alone, we are in fully thinking work [sic], in full aspiration, in 
full personal activity: we receive the ideas of another person in spirit, that is to say, in 
truth, we can therefore unite with them, we are that other person and yet all the time we 
are developing our own I with more variety than if we thought alone, we are driven by 
another on our own ways” (1987, 147). Now, we might not be able to pin down exactly 
what receiving another person’s ideas in spirit or truth amounts to. Though if we do 
consider another’s ideas openly, with full concentration, and beyond all the distractions 
that can infringe upon social interaction, it does seem that we can engage with that 
person’s ideas “in truth” if that simply means to give these ideas full consideration. But, 
at bottom, what Proust puts his finger on is that we are, strictly speaking, alone when we 
read. And it is this being alone that allows one to engage with the product of another 
person’s thought in a richer way than one typically does (or can) in conversation. There is 
the possibility for a strong sense of intimacy, for “uniting,” as Proust puts it, with 
another’s thought. 
 There is an apparently obvious irony here: being (strictly speaking) alone allows 
the reader to develop a strong sense of intimacy with another’s thoughts. But then equally 
obvious is that there is no real irony, for we are engaging with another’s thoughts, not 
another individual. The same situation would obtain if we were reading a letter from an 
actual friend. One condition for best engaging with the content of a letter is being strictly 
speaking alone, or at least having the perception of being strictly speaking alone (i.e. 
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feeling as though you are not in the presence of those meaning or attempting to engage 
with you in some capacity or another). Even being in the presence of the author of a letter 
written to you, however quiet and unobtrusive that person is, can sometimes disrupt an 
intimate engagement with the letter itself. But while being alone allows for the possibility 
of experiencing intimacy with the written thoughts of another, it of course does not 
constitute or compel this experience. Being alone and able to concentrate fully, without 
distraction, on the dictionary, say, will most likely not result in any sense of intimacy 
with what is on the page. Whatever gives rise to experiencing a sense of intimacy with an 
author’s thought must in some way be grounded in the act of reading the author’s 
thoughts, in having a response to the text itself. So while the solitariness of reading may 
bolster authorial connectedness, it is some perceived feature (or features) of the text that 
elicits authorial connectedness in the first place. 
 
Shared Beliefs & Attitudes 
 An obvious starting point is the observations, insights, attitudes, and ideas 
expressed in a work. Part of what makes us feel emotionally connected to others is 
commonality. If we share no points of intersection with what another person thinks, it is 
incredibly difficult to feel emotionally connected to that person in any way. There is 
simply little upon which an emotional connection can be built, let alone an intimate one. 
And it certainly would not be possible, within reason, to feel as though that person sees or 
understands the world the way you do. But a reader’s sharing or agreeing with the 
observations, insights, attitudes, and ideas expressed in a work of literature does not seem 
to be enough to elicit a perceived emotional connection with the author, at least not of the 
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intimate kind. Experiencing emotional intimacy with someone seems to require more 
than simply sharing beliefs and attitudes. There are plenty of people with whom I share 
beliefs and attitudes about various things, but feel little, if any, emotional connection to. 
And I imagine I am not unusual in this respect. In fact, I suspect that it is not uncommon 
for one to share beliefs and attitudes with another and yet still dislike that person. To be 
sure, if one shares enough beliefs and attitudes with another, an emotional connection 
might be felt. But to experience a rich sense of intimacy, something more is required. 
There are two features that could do such work: style and expression. 
 
Style & Personality 
 Standardly, style in literature is thought to be a set of formal features—rhythm, 
rhyme, repetition, sentence length and syntactic structure, and so on. But on the one hand, 
this standard account does not seem to capture all of the features that constitute an 
author’s style. Subject matter and thematic concerns appear to be such features at least 
some of the time.7 That, for instance, novelist Thomas Bernhard almost always deals in 
misanthropic characters cannot be divorced from Bernhard’s style. On the other hand, the 
standard account seems to allow too much. Sometimes repetition and rhyme are 
incidental, and as such, do not appear to be part of what constitutes an author’s style. So 
the standard account requires retooling. A simple divide between form and content will 
not do the trick. 
 As an alternative to the standard account, Robinson offers the following view: 
“literary style is rather a way of doing certain things, such as describing characters, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For an argument to this effect, see Goodman (1975). 
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commenting on the action and manipulating the plot” (1985, 227). Now, this view does 
make room for subject matter and ruling out incidental formal features. But of course, as 
stated so far, it is troublingly vague. However intuitive it may be to speak of style as 
being a certain way of doing things, we need some guidance on how to pick out what 
features of a work are part of this “certain way.” Following Richard Wollheim (1979), 
Robinson takes style to be of two distinct kinds: general style and individual style. 
General style is defined by literary historians or critics. An individual within this literary 
community “picks what seem (to that person) to be the interesting or significant 
categories and [...] identifies the features characteristic of each category” (Robinson 
1984, 148). And thus a general style—e.g. minimalism, maximalism, modernism, 
pastoral poetry, and so on—is constructed. 
Individual style, on the other hand, is solely a function of the author. As Robinson 
puts it, “Something is an element of individual style only if it is consistently used by a 
writer in a work in such a way as to express personality or character traits, interests, 
attitudes, qualities of mind, etc., unique to the (implied) author of that work” (1984, 148). 
If she is right that individual style expresses the (implied) author’s personality, then an 
explanation of authorial connectedness can get off the ground. 
 Robinson’s argument goes roughly as follows. Grant that style is a way of doing 
things. Surely, a way of doing things might emanate from an individual’s personality. 
Someone who has a crass sensibility may have a crass way of dressing. Someone who has 
an uncompromising character may have an uncompromising way of making decisions. 
Someone who has a witty mind may speak in a witty way. In fact, this often seems to be 
the case. It is the mode or manner in which individuals dress and speak and generally 
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conduct themselves that give others a window into their personalities. Such things, as 
Robinson puts it, are “typically an expression of (some features of) [an individual’s] 
personality, character, mind or sensibility” (1985, 229). And these ways of doing things 
constitute one’s individual style. In sum, Robinson’s account boils down to two related 
claims: (1) features of one’s individual style are an expression of one’s personality and 
(2) one’s personality is causally related to the features of one’s individual style. “In 
expression,” Robinson argues, “an ‘inner’ state is expressed or forced out into ‘outer’ 
behavior. An ‘inner’ quality of mind, character or personality causes the ‘outer’ behavior 
to be the way it is, and also leaves its ‘trace’ upon that behavior. A timid or 
compassionate character leaves a ‘trace’ of timidity or compassion upon the actions 
which express it” (1985, 229).8 
 So too goes the story for individual style in literature. It is a way of doing certain 
things—constructing phrases, punctuating sentences, delineating lines, presenting a 
theme, describing a setting or the psychological workings of a character, and so on—and 
that way is an expression of the author’s personality (because the author’s personality is 
causally related to the features of her individual style). Thus the obsessive tone of 
Thomas Bernhard’s novels expresses Bernhard’s obsessive temperament. David Foster 
Wallace’s way of constructing introspective narrators expresses his own tendency toward 
introspection. Or, to use Robinson’s examples, “[Henry] James’ humorous yet 
compassionate way of describing Strether’s bewilderment expresses the writer’s own 
humorous yet compassionate attitude. Jane Austen’s ironic way of describing social 
pretension expresses her ironic attitude to social pretension” (1985, 230). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Tillyard also suggests this line of thought, though much less explicitly (1939, 35). 
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 But of course, style does not amount to a way of doing just anything. For instance, 
something done once in a particular way does not constitute a style of doing that thing. 
Something must be done in a particular way consistently. It is that Bernhard is 
consistently obsessive in tone or that Wallace’s narrators are consistently introspective 
that makes these ways of doing things stylistic and thus expressive of the authors’ 
personalities. Also, of course, an individual may have a consistent way of doing various 
things. And we do not always consider these various things in isolation, speaking only of 
one’s style of doing this and style of doing that. So we may say that it is the collection of 
these various things that constitutes an individual’s style simpliciter. It is someone’s 
consistent way of speaking and dressing and making decisions, among other things, that 
constitutes her (individual) style. They collectively express her personality. Thus, in the 
domain of literature, “[i]f a writer has an individual style, then the way she writes has a 
certain consistency: the same traits of mind, character and personality are expressed 
throughout her work” (Robinson 1985, 232). It is, for instance, Bernhard’s consistent way 
of presenting obsessive prose and misanthropic themes and text without paragraph 
breaks, among other things, that constitutes his (individual) literary style. 
 There is, however, one large qualification in order. Strictly speaking, the style of a 
literary work expresses the personality of “what, following Wayne Booth, we might call 
the ‘implied author,’ that is, the author as she seems to be from the evidence of the work” 
(Robinson 1985, 234). Though we are justified in inferring that someone’s way of 
speaking or acting expresses features of her (actual) personality, the situation is trickier 
for works of literature. Authors commonly employ or adopt personas when narrating their 
125 
works.9 As Robinson notes, “however querulous and intolerant the actual Tolstoy may 
have been in real life, the implied author of Anna Karenina is full of compassionate 
understanding” (1985, 234). And however consistently obsessive and misanthropic 
Thomas Bernhard’s narrators are throughout his novels, there is some sense that the 
degree misanthropy is a bit of a show. Even with a work of nonfiction, it seems we are 
not justified in attributing the personality expressed through the work’s style to the actual 
author. As David Foster Wallace says in an interview, “In those essays that you like in 
Harper’s, there’s a certain persona created, that’s a little stupider and schmuckier than I 
am” (Lipsky 2010, 41). Of course in some cases, it may be that a work’s implied author 
overlaps entirely with the actual author. But from the work alone, we cannot determine to 
what degree the implied and actual authors overlap, if at all.10 
 Now, this matter of the implied author may seem to spell trouble for fictional 
literature as fictional literature supplying the resources for authorial connectedness. After 
all, any emotional intimacy felt on account of the personality expressed through a work’s 
style will seemingly be, strictly speaking, emotional intimacy had with the implied 
author, not the author herself. And I will take up this trouble later. But this matter of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This may seem especially salient in fictional works narrated from the first person. Nabokov has 
his Humbert Humbert; Salinger has his Holden Caulfield; Melville has his Ishmael. But the 
implied author is distinct from first-person narrators. First-person narrators are characters in the 
work; the implied author is not. 
10 It should also be noted that there is some dispute over the notion of the implied author. Some 
simply find it to be an unintelligible notion. But at minimum, the implied author is intelligible as 
a pragmatic device. Rabinowitz (2011) gives an argument to this effect. And the editor of a 
special issue of Style on the implied author has the following to say: “The conclusion of this 
inventory of the practice of authors over several centuries in both high and ‘low’ forms is that the 
construction of the persona projected by the author is important to literary analysis and that the 
term ‘implied author’ is a most useful one to identify the congruence or divergence of different 
historical authors and inferred authorial voices in a work or body of work” (Richardson 2011, 6). 
For the purposes of this chapter, a pragmatic understanding of the implied author is all that is 
required. 
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implied author does not pose trouble for a satisfying explanation of authorial 
connectedness, of the fact that readers may feel a sense of intimacy with the author. Even 
if, strictly speaking, the personality expressed through a work’s style is that of the 
implied author’s, it nonetheless gives the sense of a singular consciousness as the cause 
of the text, the sense of a unified person, one with a personality to which the reader may 
be drawn, and one which the reader may reasonably take as the actual author’s. Even 
savvy readers, those well aware of the distinction between the implied and actual author, 
may reasonably take the implied author’s personality as overlapping with the actual 
author’s and thereby project the connection they feel with the personality expressed in the 
work onto the actual author. To be sure, there may be narrators whose personalities few 
readers would take as the actual author’s; but such cases certainly do not constitute the 
rule, even for first-person works. 
 There are, however, reasons to find Robinson’s account worrisome. As Stephanie 
Ross notes, it seems somewhat stipulative, for Robinson “declares style features to be 
those that express personality. It follows that, say, formal features of a certain work that 
aid us in identifying its creator but that aren’t expressive of character or personality fail to 
be stylistic traits of the work in question” (2003, 240). Euphonious sounds, for example, 
might be such features. They may be neither expressive of personality nor indicative of a 
school or period and thus features of neither individual nor general style. However, 
Robinson is aware of this worry and has something to say about it.11 And Ross does not 
spend a great deal of time addressing Robinson’s response. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Robinson 1985, 237–38. 
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But the dialectic between Robinson and Ross is not of primary importance here; 
the larger issue is that Robinson’s account is not uncontroversial. As such, it may appear 
that for personality to be of any use in explaining authorial connectedness, a defense of 
Robinson’s account is wanting. I do not, however, believe this is so. For the purposes of 
explaining authorial connectedness, there is no need to adopt Robinson’s entire account. 
The fact that some features of style express the implied author’s personality—namely, 
those things that are done in a uniquely particular way consistently—is all that is 
required. And Robinson’s argument seems to establish this much, that some stylistic 
features are expressive of the implied author’s personality. So, we can acknowledge the 
force of Ross’s worry without wholly giving up Robinson’s insight. 
 Still, being drawn to someone’s personality is not typically enough to establish 
emotional intimacy. We may “click,” so to speak, with another’s personality, like that 
person as a result, and thus have the foundation to develop emotional intimacy. But if that 
relationship begins and ends with merely getting along well, the chance of emotional 
intimacy seems dim. I may be drawn to someone’s personality and yet find that our 
interests, perspectives, and beliefs are wildly divergent, and thus that we have little to talk 
about, or at least little of substance, and thus little over which to experience emotional 
intimacy. So there must be more to a satisfying explanation of authorial connectedness, 
something more closely tied to the content of the work. It may be that being drawn to or 
identifying with the implied author’s personality in addition to sharing the beliefs and 
attitudes expressed in the work does give us a satisfying explanation of authorial 
connectedness, generally speaking. Anyone who has a personality you find mesmerizing 
and with whom you share beliefs and attitudes is certainly someone with whom you may 
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experience intimacy. But to experience the especially rich sort of connection Wallace 
describes, one where you “feel unalone—intellectually, emotionally, spiritually” (Miller 
2012, 62), one potentially unique to the act of reading literature, it seems something more 
must be at work. And I think Levinson’s analysis of emotional response to music can 
shed some light on this. 
 
Expressive Potency 
 When listening to music, Levinson argues that we may experience what he calls 
the reward of Expressive Potency (2011, 329). On the nature of this experience, it is 
worth quoting Levinson at length. 
If one begins to regard music as the expression of one’s own current emotional 
state, it will begin to seem as if it issues from oneself, as if it pours forth from 
one’s innermost being. It is then very natural for one to receive an impression of 
expressive power—of freedom and ease in externalizing and embodying what one 
feels. The sense one has of the richness and spontaneity with which one’s inner 
life is unfolding itself, even where the feelings involved are of the negative kind, is 
a source of undeniable joy. (2011, 328) 
If we relax the bit about “one’s own current emotional state” to include the whole of 
one’s current cognitive state or cognitive dispositions, then Levinson’s reward of 
Expressive Potency applies nicely to the literary case. To be sure, a reader’s connection 
with an author is an emotional response, a felt sense of intimacy and identification. But in 
virtue of its medium, literature has a much wider expressive scope than pure music. In 
addition to its expression of emotion, a work of literature might be perceived as 
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expressively potent or powerful in its portrayal of events, mode of description, and 
manner in which observations, insights, attitudes, and ideas are expressed. Thus the 
reader of a literary work may feel a connection of the sort Levinson describes with 
respect to any of these features. The reader may feel as though she would portray some 
event, describe some object, or present some observation in the way the author does, 
maybe even so much so that it begins to feel to the reader that were she to write a book, it 
would be just like the one she is reading. 
Of course the reader most likely does not have the expressive power to write or 
have written such a book. And I imagine most readers would be well aware of this, even 
when in the throes of such a rich emotional experience. But, as Levinson notes of the 
musical case, “The composer’s musical genius makes possible the imaginative 
experience described above, and we can remain aware of that throughout. But this does 
not take away the resulting satisfaction. The coat may be borrowed, but it is just as 
warm” (2011, 328–29). In fact, with the literary case, being aware that the coat is 
borrowed is an important component of the emotional experience. Were the reader not 
aware that it is another’s coat, another’s thoughts and mode of expression, she would not 
then be able to believe that there is another person in the world whose thoughts mirror her 
own, another person who sees things as she does or, more accurately, as she would if she 
had the expressive power of the author. It is, to return the metaphor, a matter of the coat 
fitting perfectly—better, even, than anything one owns—and yet still recognizing it as 
borrowed.  
 Put concisely, then, Expressive Potency in literature amounts to the following: 
when reading a passage within a work of literature that expresses x, the reader values the 
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expression of x and believes that were she to have the expressive powers of the author, 
she would have expressed x in the way the author has. Expressive Potency in literature of 
course comes in varying degrees. In its most robust form, the reader highly values the 
author’s expression of x and believes she would have expressed x in exactly the way the 
author has. But, in principle, if the reader values the author’s expression of x and believes 
she would have expressed x in the way the author has to some degree, a corresponding 
amount of Expressive Potency will be felt. 
 To be sure, there is a threshold below which the weakness of the experience 
renders it unnoteworthy, something that would not play much of a role in explaining 
authorial connectedness. But when notable, Expressive Potency—taken together with 
sharing beliefs and attitudes expressed in the work, being drawn to the manifest 
personality of the implied author, and the psychological context of reading—tips the 
scales in this explanation. It is also, I think, largely what makes authorial connectedness a 
uniquely rich form of felt emotional intimacy. Certainly speaking one-on-one with 
someone who shares your beliefs and attitudes, has a personality you find mesmerizing, 
and expresses things you value in a way that you believe you would if you could, if you 
only had such expressive power, has the makings for feeling a rich sense of emotional 
intimacy with this person. But the trick is that most people do not have the expressive 
power to evoke Expressive Potency, at least not nearly to the degree that literature does. 
Literature, especially that of the so-called “literary” sort, is often prized for its expressive 
power. Thus, when compared to our daily interpersonal engagements, reading literature 
occupies a special place in its ability to evoke Expressive Potency and the felt emotional 
intimacy that comes with it. Even authors of expressively powerful works are, I suspect, 
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rarely so expressively powerful in their daily interpersonal engagements. Writing is often 
considered to be a craft, and works of literature things that have been crafted, written and 
revised and rewritten. The author of an expressively powerful work most likely did not 
create it in one go or at the speed at which typical conversations progress. Rather, it most 
likely took various stages of fine-tuning so as to render the expression just so. As Anne 
Lamott says in her well-known book on writing, “Almost all good writing begins with 
terrible first efforts” (1994, 25).12 In our everyday interpersonal lives, our expression 
does not typically undergo any matter of revision or refining; we are left only with our 
first efforts. 
 
A Satisfying Explanation 
 In its most emotionally intimate moments, reading a work of fiction can feel as 
though you are engaging with the thoughts of a person whose beliefs and attitudes 
intersect with yours, whose personality you find mesmerizing, and who expresses things 
in a way that you believe you would if you could, if you had such expressive power. And 
all of this is intensified by a context ripe for emotional intimacy, one in which it feels as 
though it is only you and another’s thoughts. It is no surprise, then, that readers 
sometimes experience authorial connectedness. 
 But even if I have offered a satisfying explanation for authorial connectedness, it 
is still unclear how a work of fictional literature as such can supply the resources for 
authorial connectedness. A fictional work’s mode of expression and expressed beliefs, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In fact, the chapter from which this quote is taken, entitled “Shitty First Drafts,” routinely 
makes an appearance in the syllabi of creative writing courses. And many other books on the craft 
of writing give budding writers similar advice. 
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attitudes, and personality are, strictly speaking, that of the implied author. They may 
happen to be, in part or in full, the actual author’s, but they need not be. Any such overlap 
between the actual and implied authors is beyond the bounds of the work as a work of 
fiction. In other words, there seems to be no way to justify a suspicion that the actual and 
implied authors overlap solely from consideration of the work as a work of fiction. How, 
then, does the notion of authorial connectedness get any purchase? How could it feature 
in any proper appreciation of fictional literature? There is, in itself, little solace in finding 
a fictional character who sees the world the way you do. Likewise, it would seem there is 
little solace in finding an implied author who sees the world the way you do. That is, in 
experiencing merely implied authorial connectedness. 
 
III. AUTHORIAL CONNECTEDNESS JUSTIFIED 
 The first thing we might turn to in an effort to justify authorial connectedness, in 
understanding this experience as an appropriate part of the appreciation of fictional 
literature as fictional literature, is oeuvre and biography. Considerations of an author’s 
oeuvre or biography might yield evidence of overlap between the author’s genuine mode 
of expression and expressed beliefs, attitudes, and personality and the mode of expression 
and expressed beliefs, attitudes, and personality of one or more of her fictional work’s 
implied authors. And considerations of oeuvre and biography are often features of literary 
criticism, in both matters of understanding and appreciation.13 But on the one hand, I am 
skeptical of consideration of oeuvre proving all that useful; and on the other hand, 
consideration of biography in matters of literary appreciation is contested. Thus, it would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Olsen (2010) and Lamarque (2009), ch. 3. 
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be desirable to justify authorial connectedness on more neutral ground. I will attempt to 
do just that with the help of Eileen John’s thoughts on an artist’s sensibility. 
 
Oeuvre 
 Of course, considerations of an author’s oeuvre, when that oeuvre includes only 
fictional works, seems to provide little if any more evidence of overlap between actual 
and implied author than considerations of a single fictional work. To be sure, if mode of 
expression and expressed beliefs, attitudes, and personality are consistent across the 
oeuvre, it is much more tempting to think that these qualities are qualities of the actual 
author, especially when the body of work is large. This does, after all, seem to be the 
most compelling explanation for the consistency across all works. But considerations of 
an oeuvre of fictional works cannot determine this explanation. Even if less likely, the 
author could have constructed a persona she employs when writing her fictional works, a 
persona whose beliefs, attitudes, personality, and mode of expression is little or nothing 
like her own. That established authors routinely write works under pseudonyms—
sometimes unbeknown to anyone and sometimes, as Joyce Carol Oates said, because “I 
wanted to escape my own identity” (McDowell 1987)—lends to the plausibility of this. 
And as briefly noted above, obsessive and misanthropic beliefs, attitudes, personality, 
and modes of expression consistently run through Thomas Bernhard’s oeuvre, but there is 
some sense that—given the mannered and dramatic mode of expression and overall 
bravado—it is a bit of a performance, a persona adopted by Bernhard. While it may not 
be the case that this persona is so far from Bernhard himself (if it indeed is a persona), it 
is fairly plausible to imagine it is. 
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 Yet even if an author’s oeuvre includes nonfictional works, it is not clear that the 
situation is, in principle, much better. Recall the “stupider and schmuckier” persona 
behind at least some of David Foster Wallace’s essays (Lipsky 2010, 41). It would not be 
surprising if other writers of nonfiction would admit to such divergence between their 
genuine selves and the persona at least some of their works project.14 For budding 
writers, there is even a book designed to help them craft their nonfiction persona, “which 
is a version of your self made of words, a carefully crafted version that you can vary as 
you see fit. Confident or fretful, solemn or sassy, tough or tender, casual or formal—these 
are just a few of the many stances you can assume” (Klaus 2013, xi–xii). And James 
Phelan (2011) argues, intuitive so, that the actual author and implied author of a 
nonfictional work can diverge unintentionally. In fact, it seems easy to imagine an 
unskilled writer’s words expressing a personality radically divergent from her own.15 To 
be sure, there is a fidelity constraint on nonfiction, such that we are, all things considered, 
warranted in taking at least the beliefs and insights expressed in the work as the actual 
author’s. But the mode of expression—and even the attitudes expressed16—may be the 
result of a crafted persona and thus may be distinct from the actual author’s. And as noted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Interestingly, when asked “to what extent the persona in your nonfiction represents you,” Geoff 
Dyer attests that though his “tone is pretty similar, in real life and in the books,” “[i]t’s not the 
same persona in every book. The Lawrence book [Out of Sheer Rage] contains a particularly 
irritable one. That’s partly a phase I was in at that point in my life. But more importantly because, 
stylistically, I was under the spell of Thomas Bernhard” (Ratliff 2011). 
15 I especially have stiff and stilted prose in mind, the kind that can make it seem that someone is 
uptight and rigid, when they are in fact not. Though it should be noted that this is not Phelan’s 
focus. 
16 Certainly our personalities influence the attitudes we have. Thus if the authorial persona of a 
nonfiction work is distinct from the actual author’s personality, the attitudes expressed in the 
work may too be distinct from the actual author’s attitudes. So, for instance, the attitudes 
expressed in Dyer’s Out of Sheer Rage may have been at least partly determined by the stylistic 
influence of Bernhard (see note 14 above). 
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in the section above, shared beliefs and attitudes is not enough for authorial 
connectedness. So it seems considerations of an author’s oeuvre, even if it includes 
nonfictional works, will not justify authorial connectedness. 
 But maybe this conclusion is too fast. Colin Lyas argues that, in matters of 
personality and thus the construction of a persona, there are limits to pretense, both in 
matters of “what it is possible for a pretender to pretend and what it makes sense for an 
audience to assume is being pretended” (1983, 22). When the implied author “is 
perceptive, sensitive, emotionally mature and the like, there seems to be little sense in the 
supposition that the artist has, by an act of pretence, embodied these characteristics in a 
work although he himself was not possessed of them. The judgment that the work is these 
things is the judgment that the author there exhibited those qualities (though he might not 
otherwise exhibit them in the responses of his or her non-literary life)” (Lyas 1983, 22). 
Now there does appear to be something to this. But some sorting is in order. 
 First, what “makes sense for an audience to assume is being pretended” only has 
bearing on explaining, not justifying, authorial connectedness, as it only establishes the 
reasonableness of experiencing authorial connectedness, not (actual) authorial 
connectedness itself. When it comes to justifying authorial connectedness, the limits of 
pretense on the pretender are all that is of concern. Second, whether there are such limits 
of pretense on the pretender is ultimately an empirical question, and one that is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. However, it is difficult to imagine someone who is not, say, 
sensitive being able merely to pretend being sensitive.17 At least in that moment when 
sensitivity is expressed, it seems the person was in fact sensitive. So for the sake of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 But perhaps not impossible: it is at least imaginable that an especially cunning sociopath could 
pull off something like this. 
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argument, let us grant that Lyas is right about these limits. Thus when style expresses or 
mode of expression demonstrates sensitivity, the actual author, at least in those moments, 
was sensitive. 
 While this does not get us to the justification of authorial connectedness full stop, 
it may justify connectedness with the author as she was in the act of writing. Call this 
literary authorial connectedness. To be sure, literary authorial connectedness does not 
afford the same degree of emotional intimacy as authorial connectedness. But here 
considerations of oeuvre might be of some help. If a reader experiences literary authorial 
connectedness when reading work W by author A because of the set of features F, and A’s 
oeuvre consistently exhibits F, then the reader’s connection with the author does seem 
more robust. Even if the author does not exhibit F in her non-literary life, that she does 
consistently exhibit F when engaged in the act of writing seems to say something about 
her character. But of course the same limits on pretense clearly do not apply to beliefs. In 
fictional works, the beliefs of the implied author and actual author may be distinct; and as 
argued above, some shared beliefs are required for authorial connectedness. So literary 
authorial connectedness is justified only if the beliefs in F are those of the actual author. 
Here considerations of oeuvre will again be of help. Given the fidelity constraint on 
nonfiction—such that we are, all things considered, warranted in taking at least the 
beliefs expressed in the work as the actual author’s—if A’s oeuvre includes nonfictional 
works and those nonfictional works express the beliefs in F, then we are warranted in 
taking those beliefs as the actual author’s, and literary authorial connectedness is thereby 
justified.18 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In fact, if Levinson is right that an artist’s oeuvre “can, at least in many cases, be seen as, or as 
the upshot of, a single artistic act,” and thus that “it is possible to understand the items in an 
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 Nevertheless, this justification is a tall order. It turns on (1) Lyas being right about 
the limits of pretense, (2) the author’s oeuvre containing nonfictional works, and (3) the 
author’s nonfictional works expressing at least some of the same beliefs in the author’s 
fictional works. I am skeptical of (1); and many authors of fiction do not write nonfiction. 
Though if we widen the scope of nonfictional work to include prefaces, open letters, 
blogs, lecture transcripts, interviews, and so on—or, in other words, if we relax the 
traditional conception of oeuvre—we certainly will get more mileage out of consideration 
of an author’s oeuvre. Many authors have at least one of these nonfictional items in their 
historical record. But even if a convincing argument can be given for such widening (or 
relaxing), any of the nonfictional items that one might plausibly argue warrant authorial 
connectedness itself are biographical in nature (e.g. interviews). Thus if we are going to 
move beyond a particular fictional work in an effort to justify authorial connectedness 
(rather than just literary authorial connectedness), considerations of biography are a 
much more direct route. 
 
Biography 
 As both Lamarque (2009, 91–95) and Olsen (2010, 436) note, considerations of 
biography in the appreciation of fictional literature are commonplace. And Olsen argues 
that “biographical information that provides a background for appreciation poses no real 
challenge to the integrity of the literary work” (2010, 446). If biographical information 
can bear on our appreciation of fictional literature as fictional literature, then justifying 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
oeuvre, or some significant portion of it, to be the utterance of a single individual or mind, and 
the carrier of a unified enterprise of meaning” (1996e, 245–46), such holistic assessment might be 
required. 
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authorial connectedness is straightforward. If an author’s biographical information 
indicates that, for the relevant fictional work, the mode of expression and expressed 
beliefs, attitudes, and personality of the implied author and actual author sufficiently 
overlap, then authorial connectedness had when reading that work is justified. 
 But whether biographical information can in fact play a role in the appreciation of 
literature as literature is a contested issue. The New Critics notably held the position that, 
as Lamarque notes, “the work must ‘speak for itself’ as far as possible so that 
responses—particularly affective responses—that depend exclusively on external 
information about the circumstances of the author should not be deemed appropriate as 
distinctly ‘literary’ responses” (2009, 95). In light of this dispute, Lamarque suggests a 
pragmatic approach, one that evaluates the relevance of biographical information on a 
case-by-case basis. While this seems reasonable, it is not my business in this chapter to 
adjudicate the debate over the relevance of biographical information to literary 
appreciation. Furthermore, it would be nice for the justification of authorial 
connectedness not to be hostage to a particular stance on a contested issue. So, in an 
effort to provide a more neutral justification of authorial connectedness, we can turn to 
something Eileen John points out about the actual artist’s relationship to her work. It 
might not get us as far as the full sense of authorial connectedness outlined above; but it 
will get us something nearby, something that does look like emotional intimacy had with 






 John argues that “[t]he practice of art, as an intensely focused and reflective 
making, gives a default warrant for the rest of us to take nearly every mark, every feature 
that we think could be controlled by the artist, as evidence of something the artist found 
to be worth experiencing” (2012, 200). This seems fairly uncontroversial, especially 
when it comes to literature. It would be incredibly odd for someone to write a work of 
literature that included elements she believed, at least at the time of writing, were not 
worth experiencing. Sure, there may be cases in which a writer wrote without focus and 
reflection, simply letting her subconscious lead her pen wherever, willy-nilly. And in the 
case of conceptual poetry, it seems that for some works, the poet may not find all the 
elements of her poem worth experiencing. For instance, Kenneth Goldsmith’s Day is, as 
he says, “an entire edition of a day’s copy of The New York Times. Everywhere there is a 
letter or numeral, it is transcribed onto the page” (2013, 933). While Goldsmith clearly 
believes that contemplating the act of him transcribing The Times is worth experiencing, 
and may certainly find some content within that day’s paper worth experiencing, it is 
easy to imagine that he finds more than a few marks not worth experiencing.19 But such 
cases are not the norm. The default premise of the practice is intense focus and reflection 
at nearly every turn. And even in the case of conceptual poetry, if we are a bit more 
careful about considering what is within the writer’s control, John’s claim might still 
apply. Goldsmith teaches a class at the University of Pennsylvania called “Uncreative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Evidence of this can be found in Goldsmith’s view that “conceptual writing is more interested 
in a thinkership than a readership” (2013, 935) and his admission that “[m]y books are impossible 
to read straight through. In fact, every time I have to proofread them before sending them off to 
the publisher, I fall asleep repeatedly. You really don’t need to read my books to get the idea of 
what they’re like; you just need to know the general concept” (2013, 940–41). 
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Writing,” in which students are instructed to retype five pages of their choice, and about 
which he says the following: 
The trick in uncreative writing is airtight accountability. If you can defend your 
choices from every angle, then the writing is a success. […] We proceed through a 
rigorous examination of the circumstances that are normally considered outside of 
the scope of writing but, in fact, have everything to do with writing. Questions 
arise, among them: What kind of paper did you use? […] Do you reproduce 
exactly the original text’s layout page by page or do you simply flow the words 
from one page to another, the way your word processing program does? (2013, 
937, my emphasis) 
Thus, of the features within the writer’s control, there is intense focus and reflection. 
Conceptual poetry, then, may fit within John’s account after all. It simply requires 
understanding that the writer is not in control of all of the features a writer is usually in 
control of, that what the writer of a conceptual poem is in control of is somewhat 
inversely related to the norm. Typically, when a work of literature is published, the writer 
has little say about the paper stock, font, or typesetting. 
 So when it comes to literature, it seems John is right. Though the actual author 
may not overlap with the implied author, we are justified in believing that the actual 
author in some way values the implied author’s mode of expression and expressed 
beliefs, attitudes, and personality. We are justified in seeing these features as expressive 
of the actual author’s sensibility, her sense of what is worth experiencing, considering, or 
understanding, of what is generally worth being sensitive to.20 Thus even if we do not, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 It might also be argued that one’s sensibility is an aspect of one’s personality, especially if that 
sensibility is consistently expressed. Thus if a particular sensibility is consistently expressed 
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reading fictional literature (strictly as fictional literature), have the chance of finding a 
fellow human being whose actual view of the world resonates deeply with ours, we do 
have the chance of finding a fellow human being who understands a view of the world 
that resonates deeply with ours, does so with an expressive power beyond our own, and 
finds that view worth experiencing. This, it seems, is grounds for emotionally intimate 
human connection. 
 To be sure, this emotional intimacy is not of the extremely rich kind described by 
Wallace. It lacks the key feature of shared beliefs and attitudes. But this does not mean 
there are no points of intersection, no commonality had between reader and author. The 
author’s understanding and, in some sense, appreciating the reader’s way of seeing and 
experiencing the world is an intersection in itself, and, I think, a strong one. Engaging 
with someone who understands our perspective on things and finds that perspective worth 
experiencing is a vibrant and validating piece of social life, one that surely can make us 
feel less alone intellectually and emotionally, even, it seems, if we only engage with this 
someone through her written words. Let us say, then, that there two kinds of authorial 
connectedness: a strong and a weak kind. While experiencing strong authorial 
connectedness is certainly a reasonable response to reading fictional literature and may, 
depending on where you stand with respect to biographical information’s bearing on 
appreciation, be justified, fictional literature as fictional literature can certainly supply the 
resources for weak authorial connectedness. And this, I think, is no small feat. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
across an author’s oeuvre, it might be argued that we are justified in taking that sensibility as an 
aspect of the actual author’s personality. But I will not pursue that line here. Even if correct, 
personality is only one piece of authorial connectedness. 
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IV. THE VALUE OF AUTHORIAL CONNECTEDNESS 
 Ultimately, I aim to argue that a work of fictional literature’s ability to afford 
(weak) authorial connectedness is a merit in our evaluation of fictional literature as 
fictional literature. The argument calls for three things: (1) fictional literature (as fictional 
literature) must be able to afford authorial connectedness, (2) authorial connectedness 
must be a valuable experience, and (3) ability to afford authorial connectedness must be 
an intelligible notion. I have argued for (1) in the section above. Here I will argue for (2) 
and (3). 
 That authorial connectedness is a valuable experience seems fairly obvious. But 
this seeming is worth shoring up. First, many psychologists hold that emotional intimacy 
(also sometimes called psychological intimacy) is critical for personal wellbeing and 
human development, and much social psychological research on the essential features of 
adult relationships is driven by this notion (Gaia 2002). So since authorial connectedness 
provides a sense of intimacy, it is no surprise that we would value authorial 
connectedness. Second, since reading is done when we are alone (strictly speaking), 
authorial connectedness offers intimacy that is, in some sense, psychologically richer 
than intimacy experienced in typical interpersonal relationships. The solitariness of 
reading allows us to consider and engage with the thoughts of another person in an 
especially focused and reflective way; it allows us to “unite,” as Proust puts it, with 
another’s thoughts. Third, literature has the potential to be expressively potent. Much 
literature is prized for its mode of expression, for the powerful ways in which it puts 
things. And it is unlikely that any of the people in one’s life have the same expressive 
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power of a work through which one experiences authorial connectedness. As such, the 
kind of intimacy had from authorial connectedness may not be able to be found elsewhere 
in our lives. 
 The trouble with figuring authorial connectedness into an account of literary value 
is that given some fictional work W that triggers justified authorial connectedness in 
some reader (or readers), W will most certainly not trigger authorial connectedness in 
every competent reader. In fact, it would be extraordinary if it did, maybe impossible, as 
it would amount to the work expressing beliefs, attitudes, and personality that richly 
“clicked” with all. And the evaluation of any literary work should be held hostage neither 
to those who simply have the right cognitive dispositions to experience authorial 
connectedness in a particular case nor to any such individual’s testimony of experiencing 
authorial connectedness. Thus, if we want authorial connectedness to figure into the 
evaluation of literature as literature, we need an intelligible account of a work’s ability to 
afford authorial connectedness. 
Now while it certainly does not seem that there is any principled way of assessing 
whether a work has the ability to afford authorial connectedness, it seems equally certain 
that assessment of such an ability itself is not off the table. Even if one does not 
experience authorial connectedness when reading a work of fiction, it is possible to 
consider whether one could. We routinely engage in acts of imagining what it is like to be 
someone else, to feel and think as they do. In short, we routinely engage in acts of 
empathy. And such activity is central to the practice of reading, understanding, and 
appreciating literature.21 Assessing a work’s ability to afford authorial connectedness, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See, again, Robinson 2005 and 2010. 
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then, is a matter of extending that activity to other, imagined readers. If we can imagine 
that others could share the beliefs and attitudes expressed in the work, could find 
resonance with the personality expressed through the work’s style, could experience 
Expressive Potency as a result of the work’s expressive power, then we have good reason 
to believe that the work has the ability to afford authorial connectedness. And if this is 
right, then the business of determining whether a work has this ability can proceed in the 
usual fashion of literary criticism, on a case-by-case basis, one competent reader’s 







 In the preceding pages, I have explored five features that bear upon literary value 
and what is involved in appreciating those features. In chapter one, I argued that the sonic 
qualities of a work of fictional literature are always relevant to the literary value of the 
work, for better or worse. Sonicity may serve as a merit, demerit, or neutral feature in our 
overall evaluation of a literary work, but whatever evaluative role sonic qualities play for 
a particular work, they are always evaluatively relevant, always something that must 
figure into our evaluation of a work’s literary value. In chapter two, I developed a 
working account of rhythm in literature and argued that sufficiently appreciating rhythm 
when reading a work of literature requires having a strong performative interpretation of 
the work. Readers must advance a considered oral reading, one whose enunciation, 
intonation, and phrasing conforms to a plausible critical interpretation of the work. 
 In chapter three, I argued that truth is sometimes relevant to the literary value of 
fiction. If a work aims to employ, reference, or allude to non-trivial real-world facts, we 
are justified in evaluating the work on the grounds of real-world factual accuracy. In 
chapter four, I argued that literature has the capacity to encourage readers to reconsider 
their initial moral judgments of particular cases and thus the capacity to cultivate moral 
expertise in the intuitive judgment of particular moral cases, for it is in a sensitivity to 
evidence and belief revision that such moral expertise consists. Furthermore, since such 
moral value results from the proper appreciation of a literary work, it figures into a 
work’s literary value. Finally, in chapter five, I argued that fictional literature as fictional 
literature can provide a reader with the resources for an intimate emotional connection 
with the actual author and that a work’s ability to afford such an experience is a literary 
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merit. We are justified in taking the beliefs, attitudes, and personality expressed in a work 
and the work’s mode of expression as things the author genuinely values and thus as 
providing the grounds for genuine emotional engagement. 
 If I have been successful in these arguments, then any satisfactory theory of 
literary value must account for sonicity, real-world factual accuracy, the capacity to 
cultivate moral expertise in particular cases, and the ability to afford emotional intimacy 
with the author. However, I believe there is much more at stake than the reflective 
equilibrium between particular literary values and a theory of literary value. As I said in 
the introduction, it is clear that we, as a society, value literature. Working to understand 
why something we value is in fact valuable is, I believe, an important and worthwhile 
endeavor. Such efforts, at their best, can codify everyday discourse, correct 
misperceptions, justify intuitions, and, most importantly, enrich our appreciative practice. 
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